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Abstract
Nuclear power may be our best chance at a permanent solution to the world's energy
challenges, owing to its sustainability and environmental friendliness. However, it also
poses a great risk to life, property, and the economy, given the possibility of severe
accidents during its generation. These accidents are a result of the susceptibility of the
generating plants to component failure, human error, extreme environmental events,
targeted attacks, and natural disasters. Given the complexity and high interconnectivity
of the systems in question, a small glitch, otherwise known as an initiating event, could
cascade to catastrophic consequences. It is, therefore, vital that the vulnerability of a
plant to these glitches and their ensuing consequences be ascertained, to ensure that
the appropriate mitigating actions are taken.
The reliability of a system is the likelihood that it survives a deﬁned period and its
availability is the likelihood of it being capable of performing its required functions on
demand. These quantities are important to a nuclear power plant's safety because, a
nuclear power plant by default is equipped with safety systems to inhibit the propaga-
tion of an initiating event. An accident ensues if the safety systems required to mitigate
some initiating event are unavailable or incapacitated by the initiating event. It is,
therefore, easy to see that the reliability, as well as the availability of these systems,
shape the safety of the plant. These crucial quantities, currently, are estimated using
legacy techniques like static fault and event tree analyses or their derivatives. Despite
their popularity and widely acclaimed success, these legacy techniques lack the ﬂexi-
bility to implement fully the operational dynamics of the majority of systems. Most
importantly, their ease of application deteriorates with increasing system size and com-
plexity, such that the analyst is often forced to make unrealistic assumptions. These
unrealistic assumptions sometimes compromise the accuracy of the results obtained and
subsequently, the quality of the risk management decisions reached. Their inadequacy is
often ampliﬁed if the system is composed of multi-state components or characterised by
epistemic uncertainties, induced by vague or imprecise data. The ideal approach, there-
fore, should be suﬃciently robust to not necessitate unrealistic assumptions but ﬂexible
enough to accommodate realistic system attributes, while guaranteeing accuracy.
This dissertation provides a detailed account of a series of computationally eﬃcient
system reliability analysis techniques proposed to address the limitations of the existing
v
probabilistic risk assessment approaches. The proposed techniques are based mainly,
on an advanced hybrid event-driven Monte Carlo simulation technique that invokes
load-ﬂow principles to resolve, intuitively, the diﬃculties associated with the topological
complexity of systems and the multi-state attributes of their components. In addition to
their intuitiveness and relative completeness, a key advantage of the proposed techniques
is their general applicability. They have been applied, for instance, to a variety of
problems, ranging from the production availability of an oﬀshore oil installation and the
maintenance strategy optimization of the IEEE-24 bus test system to the probabilistic
risk assessment of station blackout accidents at the Maanshan nuclear power plant
in Taiwan. The proposed techniques, therefore, should inﬂuence robust decisions in
the risk management of not only nuclear power plants but other critical systems as
well. They have been incorporated into the open-source uncertainty quantiﬁcation tool,
OpenCossan, to render them readily available to industry and other researchers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
A system is a collection of entities and/or processes working in unison to achieve a
common goal. The likelihood of this goal being attained, given a certain operating
condition, deﬁnes the reliability of that system. One can deduce from this deﬁnition
that system reliability is relative rather than absolute. It depends on the operating
condition of the system, the criteria against which mission success is determined, and
the mission duration. For example, a car with a maximum achievable speed of 100km/h
would be deemed perfectly reliable for a mission requiring 1000km be covered in 12
hours, barring component failures. The same car, however, under the same conditions,
would be absolutely unreliable if the mission were to be completed under 10 hours.
Again, if the operating condition were modiﬁed to regard component failures, it would
be impossible to be certain about mission success, without a detailed and representative
reliability analysis of the car. This example highlights the relativity of system reliability.
Strictly, a system, as deﬁned earlier, may refer to a biological, ﬁnancial, or an engineering
system. For the purpose of this thesis, however, it refers to the last of these, and is a
collection of mechanical and electronic components. Structural systems like bridges and
buildings, which may also be regarded as engineering systems, are outside the scope of
this thesis.
An engineering system can be classiﬁed along several parameters. For instance, on
the basis of its operational period, a system is either continuous or mission-oriented. A
mission-oriented system, like a rocket taking essential supplies to the international space
station, performs a mission of ﬁxed duration [145]. Continuous systems, on the other
hand, have an inﬁnite mission duration, and their continuity is limited only by their
lifespan. Prominent examples include power plants, transportation networks, water
distribution systems, and power grids. These systems can also be repairable or non-
repairable. Unlike repairable systems, non-repairable systems are built of components
that cannot be repaired within the mission. Repairable components are mostly found in
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continuous systems and, in fact, are the very reason the systems sustain their continuity.
There are many more classiﬁcations of systems, but these are extensively dealt with in
Chapter 2 and the subsequent sections of this chapter.
1.2 Complex System Reliability
A system can be classed as complex from two fronts: complexity in terms of the
functional relationships between its components, and complexity due to its struc-
ture/topology. A system is deemed structurally complex if it is a non-series, non-
parallel, or non-series-parallel interconnection of components. The components, which
are the system's smallest building block, determine its output levels, states, and be-
haviour. In realistic systems, these components may exist in one of several possible
states/output levels [155], dictated by their failure characteristics, operating conditions,
age, or some stochastic event outside the system boundary. The result is a system char-
acterised by multiple states, with the number of states determined by the diversity in
the states of the components, as well as the structure of the system [38,75].
Unlike binary-state systems which can only be perfectly working or completely failed,
multi-state systems can exist in intermediate states, as well. The number of interme-
diate states may or may not be ﬁnite, depending on the performance measure under
consideration and the type of system [75]. For instance, the power generated by a
hydroelectric power plant may take any value between zero and its maximum achiev-
able value, depending on the height of water in the dam, the performance levels of its
components, and the demand on the grid. Other examples of multi-state systems are
communication systems; where data processing speed [78, 87] may be the performance
measure, cooling systems; where coolant ﬂow rate or cooling capacity [51] may be the
performance measure, and production systems; where production rate is the perfor-
mance measure. These systems may be standalone or form an indispensable part of
some critical system like safety-critical and industrial control systems. It is, therefore,
important to be able to assess their susceptibility to failures, quantify, and predict the
ensuing consequences, for eﬀective planning of preventive and corrective measures.
Reliability prediction transcends just deﬁning a set of standards for predicting the
failure rate of components to system-level and the safety of complex systems [123]. It has
phased through tremendous developments, moving from traditional methods treating
the failure of a system as a consequence of the failure of its components only, to methods
that approach its failure from a wider perspective, including external factors [34].
1.3 Motivation
Failure is an inherent phenomenon in mechanical and electronic components and sys-
tems. It is a consequence of their material properties, operating condition, and age.
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This highlights the impossibility to inﬁnitely operate a system, without scheduled and
unscheduled outages. Scheduled outages are due mainly to preventive maintenance and
inspections but should be planned in a way that inﬂicts minimal disruptions to the
operation of the system. Even though the system operator has no control over when
unscheduled outages occur, they can still institute measures to reduce their frequency,
mitigate their eﬀects, and ensure the timely recovery of the system when they occur.
An engineering system may be as simple as the smallest circuit in a transistor radio
or as critical and complex as an entire nation's transportation, power, communication,
and water network. One thing is certain, however, regardless of the size and criticality
of a system, its failure is often accompanied by consequences. These consequences range
from a mere discomfort (like the one one feels when one's air conditioner is broken) to
the more severe phenomena of economic loss and the loss of human lives. In May 2017,
for instance, a power failure crippled British Airway's (BA) IT system at the London
Heathrow and Gatwick airports in the United Kingdom [21]. The outage, which lasted
only a few days, caused hundreds of ﬂight cancellations, leaving about 75,000 passengers
stranded, and costing the airline ¿58m [22]. Similarly, in April 2010, the explosion of the
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig leased to British Petroleum (BP) in the Gulf of Mexico
killed 11 workers, triggering an oil spill believed to be the worst in US history [17]. The
disaster did not only bring ﬁnancial losses to the company, it created a big dent on its
reputation too. In fact, BP were forced to put aside $41bn (more than twice their proﬁt
in 2009) to cover clean up costs and legal fees [18]. The reliability analysis, therefore,
of engineering systems, is very important, since it is the only way their susceptibility to
failures and the ensuing consequences can be quantiﬁed.
There are a couple of other reasons why one would want to compute the reliability
of a system. At the design stage, for instance, the design engineer would want to ensure
a design meets the desired performance and safety requirements or to select the best
of multiple designs. After commissioning, a detailed reliability analysis of a system can
conﬁrm whether or not it performs as expected and can reveal any vulnerabilities, which
information is useful for more robust future designs. There is also maintenance strategy
optimization, where a complete reliability analysis of a system is required to compute
the beneﬁts of possible strategies, and hence, deduce the best maintenance strategy.
1.3.1 The Role of System Reliability Analysis in Nuclear Safety
Nuclear power plants are a typical example of a system that demands the highest
reliability of even its smallest component. Some failure events do not only result in their
loss of output but sometimes set oﬀ a sequence of events with far-reaching consequences
as well. The science of examining what can go wrong in a plant and its ensuing risks
is known as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). It entails the identiﬁcation of the
events (known as initiating events) that could trigger unwanted consequences and the
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subsequent computation of their frequencies and extent [137]. For nuclear power plants,
the primary unwanted consequences are core damage, reactor containment breach, and
the release of radioactive materials into the environment. Though these events are
extremely unlikely, there have been several nuclear accidents in history, some of which
dates to the 1950s [19]. Of these accidents, only the three infamous ones (the Three
Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi disasters), however, are explored in this
thesis, with focus on their causes, consequences, and similarities.
1.3.1.1 The Three Mile Island Accident
Three Mile Island was a 2-unit pressurised water reactor nuclear power plant in Dauphin
county, Pennsylvania. On the 28th day of March 1979, a failure of one of its cooling sys-
tems initiated a sequence of events that would later be regarded the most serious nuclear
incident in commercial nuclear power generation history in the United States [136]. De-
spite its relatively minor health and environmental consequences, however, its aftermath
sparked a revolution in the operation, regulation, and emergency response protocols of
nuclear power plants in the United States. The accident, rated 5 on the 7-point inter-
national nuclear events scale, was initiated by the failure of the main feedwater pumps
in the second reactor, which was later traced to imperfect maintenance [62]. Feedwa-
ter pumps supply cooling water to the steam generator and maintain circulation in the
secondary cooling loop of a nuclear reactor. When these pumps failed, the unit's turbine-
driven generator and reactor automatically shut down, and the core starved of cooling,
began to record a rapid temperature rise. This, in turn, resulted in pressure building
up in the reactor, which further actuated the pressure relief valve. However, the valve,
which was to reset itself when the pressure fell to an acceptable level, remained stuck
open, leading to a loss of coolant accident. Even when the reactor incident alarms went
oﬀ, the operators did not know a loss of coolant accident was already in progress. In con-
sequence, they reduced coolant circulation in the primary cooling loop, which fueled the
subsequent partial meltdown of the reactor, due to excessive temperatures [136]. The
reactor containment, however, remained intact, and there were no substantial releases
of radioactive materials into the surrounding, save for a small amount of radioactive
gases in the vicinity of the plant a few days later. These small releases were due to the
loss, through the stuck-open valve, of coolant contaminated with radionuclides.
It is clear the accident was initiated by component failure (the failure of the feedwater
pumps and the stuck-open valve) but its progression was exacerbated by design deﬁcien-
cies, human error, and organisational & quality problems [62, 136]. For instance, even
when the valve was stuck open, the control instrumentation indicated a closed valve.
The operators, prior to the incident, were aware that the valve leaked but postponed
its maintenance. Both the valve failure and false indication, therefore, would have been
prevented by eﬀective design and maintenance policy reconsiderations.
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1.3.1.2 The Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant was a 4-unit graphite-moderated light water reactor,
in the Ukrainian city of Chernobyl. Occurring on the 26th of April 1986, the accident,
which is arguably the world's worst nuclear disaster, resulted from an experiment-gone-
wrong culminating into the explosion of the fourth reactor. The disaster is believed
to have released about 2 orders of magnitude more radiation than the atomic bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. More than 350,000 people were resettled and
traces of radioactive materials from the accident were found almost everywhere in the
northern hemisphere [16]. Two deaths were recorded on the plant premisses, as a direct
consequence of the blasts and a further 28 deaths, from exposure to radiation [102].
The accident is attributable to human errors during an experiment to investigate
the ability of the fourth reactor to drive its cooling pumps at low power. Executing
their plans, the engineers had inserted the control rods into the reactor core, with the
view to reducing its power only to about 20% of its nominal value. Too many control
rods, however, were introduced, such that the reactor was almost shut down by Xenon
poising [129]. In response, the engineers withdrew some rods from the reactor, and in
two hours, managed to stabilize the reactor power at about 12% and commenced the
test. However, too many rods were withdrawn, and less than 1 minute into the test,
the reactor power shot up to about 100 times its nominal value [16]. The reactor's
automatic shut-down system which had been disabled to allow the low power operation
of the reactor, was reactivated. Its reactivation led to the insertion of more control rods
into the core, displacing the mixture of steam and hot coolant that had built up. The
result was two catastrophic explosions, blowing away the roof of the reactor building.
Unlike the Three Mile Island accident, component failure had no part in the Cher-
nobyl disaster. They, however, share human error and design deﬁciencies, as root causes.
In fact, the experiment was scheduled to have been performed by the day shift, who
had been trained for the exercise. The night shift, who had very little time to prepare,
had to take over after the initial schedule was disrupted by some eventuality. Secondly,
the young engineer who was assigned to the control rods had been working indepen-
dently for only three months, and may have initiated the accident when he erroneously
inserted the control rods too deep. Finally, the consequences of the accident may have
been minimized if the reactor were housed in a concrete containment, as present-day
reactors are. This was a design inadequacy of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
1.3.1.3 The Fukushima Daiichi Disaster
Unlike the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl disasters, the Fukushima accident was
triggered by a natural disaster. The accident ensued from a magnitude 9.0 earthquake-
triggered 40.5m high Tsunami in east Japan, on the 11th of March 2011 [129]. The
tsunami reached about 14m at the 6-unit plant, whose units 4-6 were not in operation
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at the time. As a result of the earthquake, the operational reactors automatically
shut-down, at which time the backup generators were to take over the powering of
the safety systems. These generators, however, were housed in the basement of the
turbine building, which was only protected against a 10m ﬂood height. Consequently,
the generator room was ﬂooded, initiating a station blackout sequence, culminating into
a series of hydrogen explosions that damaged reactors 1-4 [129]. Since the reactors were
housed in a concrete containment, the explosions only aﬀected the reactor buildings.
The unusual levels of radioactivity recorded in the vicinity of the plant were due to the
venting operation employed to relieve the pressure in the respective reactor vessels.
No deaths were linked to the direct exposure to the radioactive nuclides released,
but the accident eventually cost the plant operator billions of dollars in compensa-
tion claims. Though triggered by natural events, the progression of the accident was
largely down to organisational and regulatory deﬁciencies. In fact, the chairman of a
Japanese parliamentary panel set up to investigate the accident, Kiyoshi Kurokawa,
called it a manmade disaster [20]. The operator had ignored earlier safety concerns
about the layout of the emergency cooling system and the vulnerability of the plant
to tsunamis. There was no robust probabilistic risk assessment of the plant and the
operator's emergency response plan was lacking, the panel found. It is even alleged that
relevant sections of the severe accident instruction manual were missing [20].
1.3.1.4 Concluding Remarks
From the preceding reviews, one could argue that nuclear accidents result from at least
one of three causes: component failure, natural disasters, and human factors. The
human factors may include, but are not limited to, human errors, targeted attacks,
negligence, and procedural breaches. Given the unpredictability of these root causes
and the potential severity of an accident, probabilistic risk assessment is key to the safe
operation of nuclear power plants.
Probabilistic risk assessment in nuclear power plants is decomposed into three levels
[137]. Level 1 PRA identiﬁes all those events with the potential to inﬂict core damage
and estimates the total core damage frequency of the plant. It models the response of the
plant's safety systems to accidents and involves, mostly, the reliability analysis of these
systems. Level 2 PRA, on the other hand, assumes core damage and investigates the
quantity of radioactive materials released and how soon, after core damage, this begins.
The reliability analysis of the concrete containment of the reactor forms the basis of
the analysis here. Level 3 PRA estimates the consequences of the release on life, the
environment, and the economy, constitutes level 3 PRA. System reliability analysis,
therefore, as could be deduced from the preceding, is the backbone of probabilistic risk
assessment in nuclear power plants.
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1.4 Aims and Objectives
Computing the reliability of a realistic system is not always simple. Even with the
existence of a number of computational techniques, there still is a signiﬁcant room for
improvement. The aim, therefore, of this thesis is to develop an approach or a series of
approaches to simplify, as well as enhance the reliability analysis of realistic engineering
systems, without the need for unrealistic assumptions. The thesis, speciﬁcally, will seek:
1. to develop an intuitive means of resolving diﬃculties arising from the topological
complexity of systems during their reliability analysis;
2. to develop component and process modelling techniques capable of replicating
reality as close as possible, with the view to obtaining credible reliability estimates;
3. to intuitively model all forms of inter-component dependencies in systems;
4. to improve maintenance modelling and optimization in practical systems;
5. to apply the computational tools and methodologies developed in 1-4, to the
probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear power plants.
1.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis comprises eight (8) chapters, organised in two (2) groups, as shown in
Figure 1.1. The ﬁrst group, composed of Chapters 1, 2, and 8, provides the necessary
theoretical framework for an understanding of the thesis and the research questions
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it seeks to answer. Chapter 2, for instance, reviews the existing system reliability
modelling techniques and their applicability to complex system reliability evaluation,
maintenance modelling & optimization, and the probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear
power plants. The extent to which the thesis answers the research questions asked in
Section 1.4 and addresses the inadequacies of existing techniques identiﬁed in Chapter
2, is discussed in Chapter 8, which also oﬀers recommendations for future research.
Each of the remaining chapters builds on the inadequacies identiﬁed in Chapter 2
to develop a computational approach and showcase its applicability via a case study. In
this light, Chapter 3 proposes an intuitive load-ﬂow Monte Carlo simulation technique
to resolve the diﬃculties emanating from the topological complexity, as well as the
multi-state behaviour of systems. This approach is extended to interdependent systems
in Chapter 4, and used to assess the production availability of an oﬀshore oil installa-
tion characterised by limited maintenance teams. Chapter 5 generalises the cascading
failure model proposed in Chapter 4 and in conjunction with the load-ﬂow simulation
proposed in Chapter 3, proposes an approach to simulate station blackout accidents
in nuclear power plants. The chapter concludes with the probabilistic assessment of
station blackout risks at the Maanshan nuclear power plant in Taiwan.
The case study presented in Chapter 4 highlights the need for a general procedure for
the maintenance modelling of multi-state systems in the presence of maintenance delays
and operational uncertainties. Consequently, such a maintenance modelling approach is
proposed in Chapter 6, complemented by an eﬃcient algorithm, proposed to identify the
best maintenance strategy. Being mindful of the demanding computational intensity of
simulation-based techniques, Chapter 7 extends the eﬃcient survival signature approach
to systems susceptible to cascading and common-cause failures, comparing the resulting
framework with the load-ﬂow simulation approach proposed in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2
The State of the art in System
Reliability & Risk Modelling
2.1 Existing Reliability Modelling Techniques
In system reliability and performance evaluation, the analyst has numerous techniques
at their disposal. Sometimes, one technique cannot quite yield the required outcome,
and a collection of techniques is required, instead. The technique employed is deter-
mined by the system being analysed, the reliability indices of interest, the available
computing resources, and the degree of precision demanded. These techniques, accord-
ing to [1,128] (cited in [38]), can be classed as heuristic, analytical, or simulation-based.
They can also be classiﬁed on the basis of applicability, in which case they can be static
or dynamic [38]. Unlike static techniques, dynamic techniques do not only model the
system based on the functional and structural relationships between its components,
but also support dynamic relationships like inter-component dependencies.
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBD) [11,144] and Fault Trees (FT) [11,141] have been
used extensively, in the reliability evaluation of binary-state systems. RBD are a graph-
ical expression of the functional relationships between system components in terms of
the combination of functioning components required for system success. FT, on the
other hand, express this functional relationship via boolean logic gates and depict the
combination of component failures that culminate in system failure. Both techniques
have proven particularly useful for moderately sized systems with series-parallel con-
ﬁgurations. However, they become diﬃcult to apply with large or complex systems
and often require additional techniques [4] to decompose the system. Overcoming this
diﬃculty necessitated the development of Reliability Graphs (RG) [113, 147]. RG rep-
resent the system as a network of nodes connected by edges and failure is deﬁned as
the non-existence of path between the source and sink nodes [38]. They are very much
eﬃcient in modelling structural complexities.
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RBD, FT, and RG assume components to be statistically independent, rendering
them inadequate for systems susceptible to restrictive maintenance policies and compo-
nent interdependencies. However, techniques including but not limited to Dynamic Reli-
ability Block Diagrams (DRBD) [38], Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) [24], Condition-based
Fault Trees (CFT) [126], Dynamic Flow Graphs (DFG) [3], Petri Nets (PN) [95], and
other combinatorial techniques [138] have been developed to model these dynamic rela-
tionships. They have found application in a wide range of reliability engineering prob-
lems, including repairable systems with restrictive maintenance policies [5, 6, 95,138].
Though the earliest forms of these techniques were applicable only to binary-state
systems, numerous instances of their recent extension to multi-state systems exist. Lis-
nianski [88], for instance, employed an extended block diagram method to apply classical
block diagram principles to a repairable multi-state system. Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDD) [146,156], whose underlying principles are built upon Boolean algebra, have also
been applied, with success, to multi-state system reliability evaluation. They proceed
via a state enumeration procedure in which each system state is represented by a multi-
state fault tree. Unfortunately, state enumeration is only feasible for moderately sized
simple systems. For large/complex systems, it is expensive and error-prone when done
manually, which limits the applicability of BDD to moderately sized simple systems.
In recent years, RG have also attracted signiﬁcant attention, which interest has given
birth to algorithms optimized for multi-state system reliability evaluation. Despite Yeh's
successful attempts, on two separate occasions ( [148] and [150]), of developing algo-
rithms that do not require prior knowledge of all minimal paths or cuts of the system,
most graph-based algorithms [83, 84, 151, 162] do. Therefore, exploiting them requires
ﬁrst deriving the desired path or cut sets, using other well-known algorithms, which is
an NP-hard problem [148,150]. Compounding the challenges of these graph-base algo-
rithms, including Yeh's algorithms in [148] and [150], is the fact that they are based on
the assumption that the capacities of system components are integer-valued. However,
in many systems, components and system capacities are not necessarily integer-valued.
In addition to their individual shortfalls, the extended block diagram technique,
BDD, and graph-based algorithms share two common limitations. First, they deﬁne
reliability with respect to the maximum ﬂow through the system. Therefore, they are
limited to systems with single output nodes or systems (like signal transmission networks
[73]) with multiple output nodes in which only the presence of ﬂow at these nodes is
desired but the relative magnitude is irrelevant. They stop short at solving multi-
output systems with competing demand at the output nodes. The second limitation
arises from the assumption that there are no ﬂow losses in the system, making them
inapplicable to certain practical engineering systems in which ﬂow under some condition
(e.g. component failure) escapes across the component/system boundary.
Various researchers [51, 78, 79, 87, 153, 155] have made invaluable contributions to
multi-state system reliability analysis, developing techniques applicable to a wide range
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of systems. These techniques have mainly been based on either the structure function
approach, stochastic process, simulation, or the Universal Generating Function (UGF)
approach [75,77,89]. The most popular stochastic process employed in reliability anal-
ysis is the Markov Chain (MC), which involves enumerating all the possible states of
the system and evaluating the associated state probabilities [89, 143]. This technique
is only easily applicable to exponential transitions or distributions with simple cumula-
tive distribution functions, requires complicated mathematics, and becomes complex for
large systems. The number of states in the model ranges from M   1, for binary-state
series systems, to 2M , for binary-state parallel systems, M being the number of system
components. For large multi-state systems, the number of states increases dramatically,
rendering the model diﬃcult to construct and expensive to compute.
The UGF was introduced to address the state explosion problem of the MC. It
allows the algebraic derivation of a system's performance from the performance distri-
bution of its components [75, 86]. However, both the UGF and MC are limited in the
number of reliability and performance indices they can quantify. In [85], Lisnianski
introduced the Lz-Transform and the inverse Lz-Transform concepts to enhance the
derivation of instantaneous reliability measures like, the system reliability, the instan-
taneous availability, and the instantaneous output, with the UGF [51, 86]. The UGF
is a powerful tool, its applicability has been extended even to systems with depen-
dent components, as illustrated by Levitin [76,77]. However, like all multi-state system
reliability evaluation techniques, the UGF is maximum-ﬂow-based and assumes ﬂow
conservation across components. Also, though straight-forward for systems with simple
series/parallel architecture, it requires substantial eﬀort for complex topology systems.
These considerations have hindered its application to certain multi-state systems.
Simulation techniques [125, 161] are the most suitable for multi-state system relia-
bility and performance evaluation, since they mimic the actual operation of the system.
Their advantages over other techniques are derived from the fact that they can support
any transition distribution, allow the eﬀects of external factors on system performance to
be investigated [161], and are easily integrated with other techniques [57,130]. Though
computationally expensive for large systems and small failure probabilities, techniques
that reduce the computation time and eﬀort now exist, thanks to recent advances in
computing. Variance reduction techniques and parallel computing can reduce the com-
putation time and eﬀort by substantial amounts when adopted. Also in extensive use
are Subset Simulation [8] and Line Sampling [32, 93], both improving the eﬃciency
of simulations. Inspite of their potential, however, some of the existing simulation
approaches [61, 81, 161] require prior knowledge of the system's path set, cut set, or
structure function. Even those, like the one proposed by Yeh et al. [152], which do not
require knowledge of these parameters, are applicable to binary-state systems only.
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2.2 Dependencies in Engineering Systems
Engineers and system designers are under immense pressure to build systems robust
and adequate enough to meet the ever increasing human demand and expectation.
Unavoidably, the resulting systems are complex and highly interconnected, which iron-
ically constitute a threat to their resilience and sustainability. The majority of the
systems we interact with exist as multi-state interdependent systems. Two systems are
interdependent if at least a pair of components (one from each system) are coupled by
some phenomena, such that a malfunction of one aﬀects the other. The coupling phe-
nomenon could be proximity in space [23], functional dependence/interdependence [159],
or both [158]. A water distribution network, where pumps and other electrical power-
driven appliances rely on the reliability and performance of the power grid is a typical
example.
The components of a system are normally prone to random failures arising from their
intrinsic properties or induced failures stemming from targeted attacks [13], extreme
environmental events [2], or erroneous human-system interactions. In interdependent
systems, an undesirable glitch in one system could cascade and cause disruptions in
coupled systems. The cascade could be fed back into the initiating system and the overall
consequences may be catastrophic [23,63]. This was made clear by the massive blackout
that struck Italy in September 2003, aﬀecting the internet network in the process. In
the same year, North America was hit by a 4-day blackout, aﬀecting parts of USA and
Canada [135]. To minimize the eﬀects of failures, some interdependent systems are
equipped with reconﬁguration provisions. This normally entails transferring operation
to another component, rerouting ﬂow through alternative paths, or shutting down parts
of the system. It is, therefore, vital to analyse the system's performance under the
spectrum of possible vulnerability conditions, for adequate planning of defences [160].
In general, the achievement of maximum overall system performance is desirable.
However, in many applications, it is more important to recover the required system
performance in the shortest possible time, after component failure. This is the case,
for instance, in nuclear power plant risk assessment, where the time-dependent recovery
probability of oﬀsite power is an important input to the overall safety of the plant [53].
Hence, system recovery time is not only a performance parameter, but a fundamental
safety parameter, as well. Given the positive correlation between costs and resources
(human, ﬁnancial, and material) required to maintain a system, under economic con-
straints, there may not be suﬃcient resources for a speedy recovery. Therefore, an
informed and robust decision making process would dictate that the decision support
tool used be capable of modelling the relevant realistic aspects of the system, including
the possibility of limited recovery response.
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Figure 2.1: Forms of interdependencies in engineering systems.
2.2.1 Forms of Interdependencies
Interdependencies in engineering systems are manifested at two levels: between com-
ponents (inter-component), which can be functional or induced and between sys-
tems/subsystems (inter-system). Functional dependencies are due to the topological
and/or functional relationships between components. For instance, a motor-operated
valve would not work if the electric motor controlling its actuator stopped due to a
breaker failure. In this case, the valve is said to be functionally dependent on the
breaker through the motor. Induced dependencies, on the other hand, are due to a
state change in one component (the initiator) triggering a state change in another (the
induced), such that even when the initiator is reinstated, the induced does not reinstate,
unless manually made to do so. In the valve-motor-breaker example, for instance, the
valve would resume its normal operation once the faulty breaker is replaced, highlighting
the dichotomy between functional and induced dependencies. Functional dependencies
are intrinsically accounted for by the innate attributes of the system reliability mod-
elling and evaluation technique while induced dependencies require explicit modelling.
Induced dependencies are further divided into Common-Cause Failures (CCF) and cas-
cading events, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Inter-system dependencies are due to functional or induced couplings between mul-
tiple systems. Unlike standalone systems, functional dependencies in these systems may
require explicit modelling. This is the case especially for components relying on mate-
rial generated and transmitted by those of another system, under which condition the
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reliability modelling technique used may prove inadequate.
2.2.1.1 Common-Cause Failures
Common-Cause Failures (CCF) are the simultaneous failure of multiple similar com-
ponents due to the same root cause [103105]. Their origin is traceable to a coupling
that normally is external to the system. Notable instances are shared manufacturing
lines/materials, shared maintenance teams, shared environments, and human error. A
group of components susceptible to the same CCF event is called a Common-Cause
Group (CCG). An important point to note about Common-Cause Failures is that, on
occurrence of the failure event, there is a probability associated with multiple compo-
nent failure and that the aﬀected components fail in the same mode. Consequently,
the number of components involved in the event ranges from 1 to the total number
of components in the CCG. CCF events may aﬀect an entire system or only a few of
its components. They have been shown (in [36], for instance) to decrease the reliabil-
ity and performance of multi-component systems. They, therefore, must be given due
consideration in system reliability evaluation, to minimise overestimation.
CCF modelling and quantiﬁcation has always attracted keen interest from both
researchers and practitioners of system reliability and safety engineering. A total of ﬁve
parametric models have been put forward to express the CCF probability associated
with a CCG. The original model, the Basic Parameter Model (BPM), expresses the
probability of a basic failure event involving a speciﬁc number of components. The
other models, the β-factor model, the Multiple Greek Letter Model (MGL), the α-
factor model, and the Binomial Failure Rate model, are mere reparameterizations of
the BPM. Of these, the MGL and the α-factor models are the most widely used in
system reliability and risk assessment. See Refs. [103, 104] for details on these models
and their relationships.
Rasmuson and Kelly reviewed in their work [116], the basic concepts of modelling
CCFs in reliability and risk studies. Rausand and Arnljot [117] proposed the square-root
method, a simple bounding technique that estimates the eﬀects of CCF on a system
but which, however, lacks a strong mathematical foundation to support its application
to practical systems. A robust Bayesian approach for quantifying the α-factor param-
eters of a CCG in the presence of epistemic uncertainties has also been put forward
by Troﬀaes et al. [133]. Their approach, however, is limited to component-level relia-
bility and, therefore, requires a second approach to obtain the system-level reliability
indices. For this, Fan's stochastic hybrid systems model [48], O'Connor's general cause-
based methodology [106], or Ramirez-Marquez's reliability optimization approach [114],
amongst others, would do, and only if the reliability analyst is willing to turn a blind
eye to their respective drawbacks - these models are built on reliability evaluation tech-
niques that do not segregate the topological from the probabilistic attributes of the
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system. As such, they are computationally expensive for problems involving multiple
reliability analysis of the same system. They also have yet to be applied to multi-state
systems, as well as systems susceptible to both cascading and common-cause failures.
2.2.1.2 Cascading Failures
Cascading failures are those with the capacity to trigger the instantaneous failure of
one or more components of a system. They can originate from a component or from
a phenomenon outside the system boundary. The likelihood of the initiating event
originating from within the system, distinguishes them from CCF. Another point of
dichotomy is that the aﬀected components do not necessarily have to be similar or fail
in the same mode. In addition, at the occurrence of the initiating event, the probability
of all the coupled components failing is unity, save for the case when they are in a state
rendering them immune. A few prominent examples of initiating events external to the
system are extreme environmental events, natural disasters, external shocks, erroneous
human-system interactions, and terrorist acts.
Various models have been developed to study the eﬀects of cascading failures on
complex systems [108, 160]. However, a good number of these models only assess their
response to targeted attacks, variation in some coupling factor, or the relative impor-
tance of system components [23, 121, 159]. According to Ouyang [108], these models
alone cannot suﬃciently analyse the performance of interdependent systems. He inti-
mated that ﬂow based approaches, taking into account material or service ﬂow across
the system were required. When faced with the additional situation of random com-
ponent failures, a complete reliability and availability analysis should be performed.
However, renowned analytical multi-state system reliability evaluation techniques like
BDD [146,156], Sum-of-Disjoint-Products (SDP) [151], and UGF [75,77,89] are of very
little use to the evaluation of these systems. Their inapplicability is ampliﬁed if, com-
ponents can undergo non-Markovian transitions, their restoration can be delayed, the
system is reconﬁgurable, or in the case of BDD and SDP, the system is complex, such
that state enumeration is infeasible. In spite of these challenges, there are a few success-
ful attempts at their application to systems with some form of dependencies. Levitin, for
instance, in Refs. [76] and [77], respectively applied the UGF approach to systems with
lateral dependencies and systems prone to CCF. Both instances, however, involved only
one system with a single commodity. Stochastic PN [92,95] and Bayesian Networks [70]
are another set of powerful computational tools for the reliability modelling of sys-
tems with dependencies. However, they also require state enumeration when applied to
multi-state systems, which may be infeasible for some complex system architectures.
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2.3 Maintenance Modelling of Complex Systems
Owing to the rapid growth of the human population and the proliferation of new elec-
trical technologies, the demand for sustainable electricity is on a steady rise. Coupled
with a competitive market, the electrical power operator is under increasing pressure
to deliver an adequate, safe, aﬀordable, and uninterrupted supply. However, they are
constrained by the impossibility of continuously operating the system without outages,
because of component failures and maintenance. To minimize the impact of these out-
ages on consumer satisfaction, the maintenance strategy adopted should be robust, meet
operator expectations, extend the life of the system, and be carefully executed [33,119].
From an operator perspective, a robust strategy is one that ensures maximum system
throughput and keeps the operating cost to a minimum.
In addition to its impact on system performance, maintenance accounts for a signif-
icant proportion of the total operating cost of power systems. To a signiﬁcant extent,
deﬁnes the revenue generated and the overall investment sustainability. In summary,
the principles of modern maintenance engineering do not only require meeting techni-
cal and operational goals, but achieving them through the most cost-eﬀective means.
This constraint dictates that maintenance follow a strategy imposing minimum system
output loss with the least possible cost. It is true even for other systems, as illustrated
by Andrews et al., for an unmanned well-head [5] and a railway track [5], Lansey et
al. [71], for a water distribution network, and Van der Duyn et al. [35], for a production
system.
2.3.1 Maintenance Strategy Optimization
Maintenance can be optimized against various reliability and performance indices. The
indices used depend on the application and the goal of the analyst. For instance, in
nuclear and other safety-critical systems, failure probability and recovery likelihood are
the most frequently used indices. However, regardless of the application and the indices
used, the goal is, ﬁnding the optimum balance between costs and beneﬁts, whilst not
ignoring any important system constraints [33]. This process involves comparing the
monetary equivalent of the beneﬁts, to the costs incurred in their attainment. Con-
sequently, cost minimization has been the subject of many maintenance optimization
models [14,58,74,82,91,96,97,119,131,142,154]. A limiting factor, therefore, would be
the convertibility to monetary gains, of these beneﬁts.
While some optimization models consider the system as a single unit (for instance
[94,96,119]), many are enhanced for multi-component systems. With respect to imple-
mentation eﬀort, multi-component models are more demanding, due to the presence of
multiple system dynamics and structural complexities. Nevertheless, various researchers
have successfully implemented maintenance optimization models on multi-component
systems [14,58,74,82,91,97,154]. A comprehensive review can be found in [10,59,99].
16
The cost of maintaining a system involves various parameters, varying according to
the external dynamics surrounding the system and the intrinsic properties of its building
block. Prominent amongst these are the reliability and maintainability of the compo-
nents, cost of spares, labour cost, and the frequency and duration of preventive mainte-
nance actions. An accurate model, therefore, accounts for all of these parameters. With
a few exceptions focusing on reliability-centered maintenance [58, 154] or maintenance
contract assessment [90], most models are dedicated to determining either the optimal
preventive maintenance schedule, inspection, or component replacement intervals. Of-
ten, they are hinged on the assumption that there are suﬃcient maintenance teams to ac-
complish maintenance functions, [14,58,74,90,91,96,142,154], and delays imposed by lo-
gistic and administrative constraints are usually ignored [14,58,74,90,91,96,97,142,154].
Instantaneous preventive maintenance or inspection is another assumption frequently
invoked [14, 74, 91, 94, 97]. While these assumptions are reasonable for some systems,
they may be completely unrealistic for many. A notable instance being, a system with
large maintenance durations that is maintained by limited maintenance teams. These
large durations, normally due to logistic or human resource constraints, aﬀect system
performance negatively. They also render the cost and number of spares used worth
considering, a factor many maintenance optimization models have ignored.
When the possibility of maintenance interruptions exists, constraints on the states
of components during periods of maintenance suspension become important. A compo-
nent's maintenance is suspended if it requires spares whose availability is delayed or if
the maintenance team is reassigned to a more critical component. During suspensions,
the component may either be put back into operation (assuming it is only partially
failed or under preventive maintenance) or kept out of operation until maintenance is
completed. The careful scheduling of these maintenance actions may also mitigate their
eﬀect on throughput losses. This is the case, especially for planned preventive mainte-
nance and corrective maintenance of partially failed components. Hence, there is the
need for an optimization framework that derives the combination of procedures (mainte-
nance strategy) minimizing system losses, as well as the maintenance cost. Maintenance
strategy here refers to a set of procedures specifying the following.
1. The number of maintenance teams employed and how they are assigned.
2. Whether or not maintenance should be carried out by the same team.
3. Whether the state of the system or a relevant subsystem should be taken into con-
sideration in deciding when to commence the preventive or corrective maintenance
of partially failed components.
4. What happens to a component when its maintenance is suspended.
Signiﬁcant strides have already been made toward maintenance optimization in the pres-
ence of some of these, including other dynamics like ageing, imperfect, and condition-
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based maintenance [9, 14, 97, 98]. However, the techniques proposed in these works are
suited only to binary-state systems. An approach considering all the constraints in
question and in a multi-state, multi-component environment, has yet to emerge.
2.4 Nuclear Power Plant Safety
Nuclear power is produced by harnessing the heat generated from a ﬁssion reaction
chain, in a reactor vessel. The reactor vessel is placed in a concrete containment to shield
the environment from the potential release of radioactive materials. Core damage occurs
when the core temperature exceeds a certain threshold or the nuclear fuel elements in
the vessel are uncovered. This event may trigger containment breach, inﬂicting huge
environmental and economic catastrophe.
Severe accident mitigation is achieved in part, by ensuring reliable cooling water
circulation in the reactor vessel. This objective, during normal plant operation, is
achieved through heat exchange between the primary and secondary loops of the plant's
main cooling system. The process, however, ceases on plant shut-down and backup
cooling systems are required to sustain decay heat removal. Like the main cooling
system, the backup cooling systems rely on Alternating Current (AC) provided by
sources outside the plant (oﬀsite power). When these sources fail (loss of oﬀsite power,
LOOP), emergency sources on-site are started, to drive the plant's safety systems. If the
emergency sources are also unavailable or unable to function as required, the plant is said
to be in a Station Blackout (SBO). The backup cooling systems, however, are equipped
with alternative turbine or diesel-driven pumps to help the plant cope with SBO. These
systems, on the downside, require monitoring and control via Direct Current (DC) from
DC power banks. Their sustainability, therefore, regardless of inherent reliability, is
limited by the DC battery depletion time. This time, and the boil-oﬀ rate of reactor
coolant, deﬁne the maximum tolerable AC power recovery duration [43].
SBO accidents are the largest contributor to nuclear power plant risk, accounting
for over 70% of the core damage frequency at some plants [43,44]. LOOP events, which
initiate these accidents, are classiﬁed on the basis of their origin. A grid-centred LOOP
is due to the failure of the transmission network outside the plant, switchyard-centred
LOOP arises from failures in the switchyard on the plant premises, plant-centred LOOP
is triggered by the operational dynamics of the plant itself, while weather-related LOOP
is attributed to failures induced by severe and extreme weather [43, 44]. The eﬀective
SBO risk is the sum of the core damage frequencies induced by the various LOOP types.
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2.4.1 Station Blackout Risk Quantiﬁcation
SBO risk quantiﬁcation starts with LOOP event tree analysis [25], where the Emergency
Power System availability is checked in the ﬁrst heading. This event failure, whose
frequency is the SBO frequency, transfers the analysis to the SBO event tree [43]. In
the latter, the successes of the various mitigating actions, including oﬀsite power and
the recovery of the emergency diesel generators at speciﬁc times are also queried. These
times, however, vary across plants and depend on the status of a plant's mitigating
systems. At the Maanshan nuclear power plant in Taiwan, for instance, power recovery
is queried at 1, 2, 4, and 10 hours into SBO. Each top event probability in the SBO
event tree requires one or more static fault trees [26,122,139] for its quantiﬁcation.
Static fault tree analysis employs an analytical approach, as such, it carries the
important advantage of being computationally eﬃcient. For this reason, its sensitivity,
importance, and uncertainty analysis capabilities are outstanding, relative to simulation
techniques. These attributes explain its wide use for risk analysis in the nuclear, aviation
[140], and chemical process industries [66]. Unfortunately, however, the static nature of
fault trees limits their applicability in many ways. For instance;
1. Implementing certain types of interdependencies is either tedious or completely
impossible.
2. The analyst has to assume SBO is coincident with LOOP and that all power
recovery eﬀorts start simultaneously after SBO sets in. As a consequence:
(a) the SBO frequency and non-recovery probability are overestimated in most
cases, since the repair of a failed element is normally initiated immediately.
(b) for plants with multiple emergency power systems, it is impossible to de-
termine which sequence of response minimises the SBO frequency and max-
imises the recovery probability simultaneously.
(c) it is also diﬃcult to investigate the eﬀects of external factors like logistical
problems, extreme environmental events, and human resource constraints on
the recovery process.
3. The analyst is forced to assume the non-occurrence of a second SBO after power
recovery. This assumption, however, loses its validity if the emergency sources are
recovered ﬁrst. In this case, a second failure could initiate another SBO sequence
before oﬀsite power recovery.
4. Finally, there is the problem of inconvenience due to repetitive modelling. Since
the non-recovery probability is normally required for multiple instances, each
would require a dedicated fault tree.
19
There are numerous instances of remarkable attempts at extending the applicability
of fault trees to systems with interdependencies and various forms of dynamic inter-
actions [122, 127]. Kaiser et al. [64], for instance, introduced a state/event fault tree
approach that translates fault-trees to Deterministic & Stochastic Petri Nets. Similarly,
Zhou et al. [157], quite recently proposed an approach that converts static fault trees
to Dynamic Uncertain Causality Graphs in order to tackle the dynamic and uncer-
tainty attributes of practical engineering systems. However, like Kaiser's approach [64],
Zhou's [157] is restricted to binary-state components and systems. Even though the
performance of most components could be partitioned into two levels, the existence of
multiple failure modes makes binary-state models inadequate. Also, from a modelling
perspective, there are occasions when the analyst would need to model a binary-state
element as a multi-state one in order to fully deﬁne its behaviour. Such ﬂexibility re-
quires a framework supporting multi-state modelling. Bobbio's fault tree to Bayesian
Network mapping procedure [12] eﬀectively solves this problem. However, like Kaiser's
and Zhou's approaches, Bobbio's mapping procedure is also susceptible to deﬁciencies
(3) and (4) outlined above.
Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) [28,39,41,115] are perhaps the closest researchers have
come to solving the limitations of static fault trees. Various approaches have been
proposed for their solution but Markov analysis [39,41,101] remains the most popular.
Markov modelling, however, like static fault tree analyis, becomes intractable with large
systems and is only applicable to exponentially distributed transitions. Nevertheless,
state explosion is no longer an issue, with the introduction of intuitive DFT software [40,
60]. Even with these developments, most of the DFT solution approaches are susceptible
to deﬁciencies (3) and (4) outlined above. These deﬁciencies can only be addressed by
approaches oﬀering the ﬂexibility to replicate the exact behaviour of the system. Such
an approach, however, was put forward by Rao et al. [115], which they used to model the
power supply system of a nuclear power plant. The approach simulates a system's DFT
and addresses most of the limitations of static fault trees. However, like the majority
of system reliability models, Rao's work is only applicable to binary-state components.
The development of a more universal simulation framework, therefore, is desirable.
2.5 The Concept of Survival Signature
The operating status of an M -component system at time t can be deduced from its
state vector, x  px1, x2, ..., xM q, where xi is the state of the ith component at that
time. For binary-state systems, xi  1, if the ith component is working and 0, if failed.
Consequently, x P t0, 1uM and xs P t0, 1u, where xs is the state of the system.
By considering all the possible state vectors of a system, a function that maps
the states of its components to its states can be obtained. This mapping, otherwise
known as the structure function, ϕ pxq, of the system, is an expression taking the
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value 1 when the system works, and 0, otherwise. It is an algebraic representation of
the system's topology, and dissociates the connectivity of its components from their
probabilistic attributes. Given its structure function alone, the reliability of a system
can be computed directly from the reliabilities of its components.
The structure function also ﬁnds use in system indexing and comparison [124]. How-
ever, being an algebraic expression, the possibility of multiple equivalent expressions
for the same system exists. This is the case especially for topologically complex sys-
tems, which was why Samaniego [124] proposed an alternative representation of the
system structure. The new representation, which he called the system signature, is
an M -dimensional probability vector whose ith element denotes the probability of the
ith component failure leading to system failure. It was hinged on the assumption that
all the components of the system are identical, with independently distributed failure
times. This assumption, however, is unrealistic in two ways; ﬁrst, most practical sys-
tems are composed of a variety of components. Second, as discussed in Section 2.2,
interdependencies exist in most systems, rendering their component failures correlated.
In response, Coolen et al. [30] proposed a new formalism, the system survival sig-
nature, to generalise Samaniego's system signature. With the survival signature, the
assumption of identical components is no longer mandatory but they still must fail
independently. The survival signature, Sτ pl1, l2, ..., lKq, of a system with K diﬀerent
types of components, is the probability that the system will work when l1 components
of type 1, l2 components of type 2, l3 components of type 3, and so on, are working.
2.5.1 Theoretical Basics
Consider a system with K component types, with Mk components of type k P
t1, 2, ...,Ku, such that
°K
k1Mk  M . Let the random failure times of components of
the same type be identical and independently distributed. Consequently, components
of the same type can be grouped and deﬁned by the set ρtku. Each ρtku@k P t1, 2, ...,Ku
is considered an independent subsystem, which gives rise to a total of K subsystems, at
the system level. The system state vector can then be written as, x  tx1,x2, ...,xKu,
where xk is the state vector for subsystem k (type k components).
Now, let's modify x to denote the actual number of available components of each
component type, at a given instance. The modiﬁed system state vector, x1, is a K-
element vector, such that x1  tx11, x
1
2, ..., x
1
Ku, where x
1
k, the number of available type
k components, is equivalent to
°
xk. Since components of the same type are identical,
there are
 
Mk
x1k

state vectors, xk, where exactly x
1
k of the Mk components are working.
Therefore, there are
±K
k1
 
Mk
x1k

system state vectors, x, corresponding to x1. If this set
of vectors is denoted by X, following from the deﬁnition of the survival signature (see
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Section 2.5) and the fact that all the state vectors in X are equally likely,
Sτ
 
x1



K¹
k1

Mk
x1k

ﬀ1

¸
xPX
ϕ pxq (2.1)
where Sτ px1q is the survival signature of the system, given x1.
Let Fk ptq be the common cumulative failure time distribution for all type k compo-
nents, then the probability of exactly x1k components being in operation and MK  x
1
k,
failed, is deduced from the binomial theory as,
 
Mk
x1k

rFk ptqs
MKx
1
k r1 Fk ptqs
x1k . Hence,
the occurrence probability, P px1q, of the state vector, x1, is expressed as,
P
 
x1


K¹
k1

Mk
x1k


rFk ptqs
MKx
1
k r1 Fk ptqs
x1k (2.2)
Therefore, the expected survival function of the system, given x1, is the product,
Sτ px
1q  P px1q. The survival function or the reliability, R ptq, of the system, is the
sum of the expected survival functions yielded by all its modiﬁed state vectors. For a
system with K component types, there are
±K
k1 pMk   1q such state vectors and,
R ptq 
¸
x1PX 1

Sτ
 
x1

 P
 
x1

(2.3)
where X 1 is the global set containing all the modiﬁed state vectors, x1, of the system.
2.5.2 Applications and Limitations
Equation 2.3 segregates the structure function of the system from the probabilistic
properties of its components, and exempliﬁes the key advantage of survival signatures in
reliability analysis. Since a system's structure function changes only with changes in its
topology, survival signature-based approaches are a computationally eﬃcient alternative
for maintenance optimization, uncertainty, and sensitivity analysis problems, where
only the probabilistic attributes of the system change. For these problems, the survival
signature of the system is computed just once and reused in multiple reliability analyses.
Other techniques, however, would require the evaluation, directly or otherwise, of both
the probabilistic and topological attributes of the system, on every reliability analysis.
Since its introduction, the survival signature has been invoked in various ways,
gradually gaining popularity in system reliability analysis. Aslett et al. [7], for instance,
incorporated it into their Bayesian framework for system reliability analysis. Reed [118]
used BDD to develop an eﬃcient and exact algorithm to compute system survival
signatures. Feng et al. [49] went a step further by proposing an analytical approach
for analysing systems with imprecision in component failure time distributions. Patelli
et al. [111], on the other hand, proposed a generic simulation approach for computing
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the reliability of complex systems, using the survival signature. However, these works
assume full independence between the component failure times. In fact, only Coolen,
Eryilmaz, and Coolen-Maturi have made realistic attempts at extending the notion of
survival signature to systems with interdependencies. In 2014, Coolen and Coolen-
Maturi proposed a predictive model [31] that deduces the number of components that
fail, as well as the subsequent reliability of the system, following a CCF event. Their
model, however, stops short at computing the overall eﬀect of CCF on the system and is
applicable only to systems with a single component type. Most importantly, it does not
consider the second type of induced failure, cascading failures. Eryilmaz, Coolen, and
Coolen-Maturi later adapted the survival signature to compute the importance measures
[46] and mean residual life [47] of coherent systems with dependent components. Their
adaptations were based on the theory of weak exchangeability [45] of component failure
times. With this theory, components of the same type can be dependent and have
exchangeable failure times while components of diﬀerent types may or may not be
dependent. Its only downside, however, is its need for knowledge of the joint survival
function of the components, prior to system analysis. While this is not impossible, it is
in no way straight-forward for complex systems with nested cascade failures.
The survival signature is also inapplicable to multi-output systems with competing
demand, as well as multi-state systems, suggesting that it has yet to be made applicable
to most practical systems.
2.6 Chapter Summary
Complexities are an inevitability in practical engineering systems. A system can be
deemed complex from the point of view of its topology, the interdependencies between
its components, or the size of its state-space. The latter, strictly speaking, is not an
element of complexity but an attribute rendering the reliability analysis of the system
tedious. Hence, reliability analysts have always perceived it an element of complexity.
In this chapter, an overview of complex systems, the basis of their classiﬁcation, and
a review of the available computational tools for their reliability modelling, have been
presented. These tools can either be analytical or simulation-based. Analytical tech-
niques exhibit a superior computational eﬃciency over their simulation counterparts.
However, they suﬀer a setback when solicited for realistic systems. Often, the reliability
analyst is not only interested in the steady-state or instantaneous reliability measures
but also the underlying probability distributions governing the behaviour of the system.
The eﬀects of external factors (e.g., restrictive maintenance schemes, human, environ-
mental and other stochastic external factors) on the values assumed by these measures
are another area of keen interest. When faced with such requirements, simulation is
the most feasible alternative. In summary, both analytical and simulation procedures
are restricted by their various unique limitations. The development, therefore, of a
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framework combining some or all of the desirable attributes of these procedures would
be very valuable.
Failure is inherent in all mechanical and electronic components, either as a conse-
quence of their material properties or as a consequence of their operating conditions. To
minimize the frequency and duration of failures in a system, the operator adopts pre-
ventive and corrective maintenance, respectively. There is, therefore, no way a system
can operate without scheduled and unscheduled interruptions. In a multi-component
system, maintenance activities have to be scheduled and executed with prudence, to
satisfy both performance and cost constraints. The planning of maintenance to satisfy
system performance and cost constraints is maintenance optimization. An overview of
this process, with a detailed review of the available techniques, has also been discussed.
Finally, the chapter presents an overview of the basic operating principles of a nuclear
power plant, placing emphasis on station blackout accidents, the largest contributor to
its risk. Station blackout accidents are initiated by the loss of the external AC power
supply to a plant. They occur on the complete failure of the plant's standby power
systems before the restoration of the external power supply. Their risk is computed via
a static fault tree analysis which applicability is inhibited by its inability to intuitively
model induced interdependencies, as well as complex maintenance strategies and other
operational dynamics in systems. The chapter has presented a detailed review of the
applicability of fault trees and other risk modelling frameworks, to station blackout risk
modelling and quantiﬁcation.
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Chapter 3
Multi-state System Reliability
Modelling & Evaluation
3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, we learned that, the structural complexity of systems, coupled with their
multi-state characteristics, renders their reliability evaluation diﬃcult. Notwithstanding
the emergence of various techniques dedicated to multi-state system analysis, simulation
remains the only approach applicable to realistic systems. However, most simulation
algorithms are either system-speciﬁc or limited to simple systems when solicited for
multi-state system reliability analysis. This is due to their inability to compute the
actual ﬂow corresponding to a given system conﬁguration. Therefore, they require the
enumeration of all the possible system states, deﬁning the cut sets associated with
each state, and monitoring their occurrence. In addition to being extremely tedious for
large and complex systems, state enumeration and cut-set deﬁnition require a detailed
understanding of the system's failure mechanism. In this chapter, a simple and generally
applicable simulation approach, enhanced for multi-state systems of any topology, is
presented. In the approach, each component is deﬁned as a semi-Markov stochastic
process and via discrete-event simulation, the operation of the system is mimicked. The
principles of ﬂow conservation are invoked to determine the ﬂow across the system for
every performance level change of its components, using the interior-point algorithm
[68, 100]. This eliminates the need for cut set deﬁnition and overcomes the limitations
of existing techniques. The methodology can be exploited to account for the eﬀects of
transmission eﬃciency and loading restrictions of components on system reliability and
performance. The principles and algorithms developed, and which are published in [55],
are applied to two numerical examples, to demonstrate their applicability.
The remainder of this chapter is organised into ﬁve sections. A detailed overview
of the proposed approach and its advantages over existing techniques are presented in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the modelling procedure for components, followed
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in Section 3.4, by a description of how the system is modelled. The latter section also
contains the details of the simulation procedure, as well as its associated limitations. The
numerical case studies are presented in Section 3.5, which also analyses the simulation's
computational expenses. Finally, a summary of the chapter constitute Section 3.6.
3.2 Overview of Proposed Approach
The approach is based on the fact that if the properties of the components of a system
are known, its performance can be deduced from its network model. Therefore, each
component is modelled as a multi-state object with a deﬁned state-space and property
set for each state. The operation of the system is simulated by initially sampling
the next state and transition time (hereafter referred to as transition parameters) of
each component. The component with the earliest transition time is identiﬁed and its
sampled next state made its current state. At this stage, the system state vector (vector
of the current capacities of all the components of the system) is updated and used to
compute the output of the system via a linear programming algorithm. Using its new
state, the next transition parameters of the component whose transition has just been
forced are sampled and the component that will make a transition next identiﬁed. This
cycle of sampling the transition parameters of the components, forcing the required
transitions, and computing the output of the system continues until the mission time is
just exceeded. As the simulation progresses, the system performance computed at every
component transition is captured and saved. From this saved history, the reliability
and performance indices of the system are computed at the end of the simulation. To
replicate the actual operating principles of most practical systems, a special component
shut-down and restart procedure is incorporated. In this procedure, the availability
of each system component is tested against its predeﬁned reference minimum input
load level at every transition. With this, the eﬀects of functional interdependence (see
Section 2.2) on the failure probability of the components are accounted for.
A common feature exhibited by the components of most realistic systems is transmis-
sion ineﬃciency, a term ascribed to the phenomenon where an intermediate component
transmits only a fraction of the ﬂow received from its preceding component. The com-
ponent, in other words, acts as a partial sink and dissipates part of the ﬂow, such that
the ﬂow transmitted to the next component is less than that received. Under this con-
dition, ﬂow is no longer conserved, and techniques built around the ﬂow conservation
principle become obsolete. To illustrate the eﬀect of transmission ineﬃciency on system
reliability, consider a 50MW power generator supplying a 45MW load through a 75MW
transformer. If there are no power losses in the transformer, 45MW will be transmitted
to the load. However, if its eﬃciency declines to 75%, it now takes all 50MW from
the generator but transmits only 37.5MW. In both cases, the apparent diﬀerence be-
tween capacity and demand remains constant but the power drawn from the generator
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increases and the eﬀective power supplied to the load declines. Other examples are a
power transmission line prone to losses and an oil pipeline in which a mode of failure
could be a hole in a pipe or gasket failure at some ﬂange.
The transmission ineﬃciency of the components of a system most often exert unde-
sirable eﬀects on its performance and reliability. It is, therefore, worthwhile considering
this eﬀect in its reliability evaluation process. In the scenario discussed in the preceding
paragraph, the generator would need to be rated at least 60MW to match demand.
Therefore, if the system is not equipped with adequate controls, such that the capacity
constraint is always satisﬁed, the generator may fail due to overloading, even though
the demand remains well below its rated capacity. Considering this in the proposed
approach, each component state is assigned a performance level and a sink index, re-
spectively deﬁning the maximum ﬂow accepted or generated by the component and the
proportion dissipated when residing in that state.
The convenient representation of a system's architecture and evaluating its output
from the state changes of its components are the two prime diﬃculties encountered
in the simulation of complex multi-state systems. These diﬃculties are overcome in
the proposed approach by using adjacency matrices invoked from network theory to
deﬁne the structure of the system. Adjacency matrices are a square array of 1's and 0's
depicting the connectivity of a network and can easily represent any system architecture.
They can be manipulated to obtain system ﬂow equations, which are solved to determine
the magnitude of ﬂow through every node of the system. Their eﬃciency stems from
their elimination of the need to deﬁne the cut sets of the system or enumerate its states,
prior to analysis. Complex network theory is a widely used concept and ﬁnds application
in many engineering and real-life problems. It is particularly useful in representing and
analysing complexities in system structure. As a result, many researchers have applied
its principles to a variety of problems, yielding excellent results. For instance, Dwivedi et
al. [42] used it in the vulnerability analysis of a power system, Todinov [132] established
his optimization of repairable ﬂow networks entirely on it, and Chen et al. [29] used it
to analyse the reliability/availability of the Manhattan street networks.
3.2.1 Advantages Over Existing Techniques
The following list highlights the key contributions of the proposed technique for multi-
state system reliability evaluation.
1. Being simulation based, it inherits all the advantages of simulation approaches to
system reliability and performance evaluation. With respect to other simulation
algorithms, it can implement any system structure with relative ease, since it
doesn't require knowledge of the minimal path or cut sets prior to system analysis.
2. It is not maximum-ﬂow-based. Instead, it calculates the actual ﬂow across every
node of the system. This, consequently, makes possible the following:
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Figure 3.1: State-space diagram of a particular multi-state component.
(a) analysis of systems with multiple source and sink nodes with competing
demand which can be static or instantaneous;
(b) analysis of systems prone to losses at nodes and across edges;
(c) the easy restart and shut-down of components, where necessary, so as to
replicate the actual operation of systems.
3. Node capacities and system demand can take on any positive value. They do not
necessarily have to be integer-valued, as required by other graph-based algorithms.
3.3 Component Modelling
Multi-state components and systems exist in only one state at a given instant but reside
continuously in that state until a transition occurs. The transition instantaneously
takes them to another state where they reside until the next transition [11]. These
transitions are deﬁned by time-dependent probability distributions or some stochastic
event outside the component boundary and whose underlying probability distribution
may or may not be known. The interactions between the states of an n-state component
and their corresponding transition probability density functions can be represented by
an n-order square transition matrix, T . As an example, Figure 3.1 shows the state-space
diagram of a certain ﬁve-state component, where the label beside each arc represents
the probability density function of the time-to-occurrence of the transition depicted. If
the transition from state x to y is represented by the pair, px, yq, and deﬁned by its
probability density function, fxy ptq, each element at position px, yq of T is equal to
fxy ptq. Assuming all the possible transitions from state x have the same priority, the
next state, ynext, of the component depends only on which transition occurs ﬁrst.
Occasionally, some component transitions are controlled by the direct eﬀect of events
outside the component boundary. For instance, in a series connected system, the failure
of one component, necessitates the shut-down of the components in operation. The
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shut-down components are restarted only after the failed component is restored. In
such a system, the shut-down and restart of a component is triggered by the failure
and repair of another component. However, the incidence and duration of these failure
and repair events are marked by uncertainty, which means it is impossible to assign
a time-to-occurrence probability distribution to the transitions they induce. Also, the
induced transitions may not be Markovian, in that, the component's next state can also
depend on its previous state(s). These transitions are regarded as forced transitions
throughout this thesis, as they are induced by events outside the component boundary.
The other transitions, deﬁned by known probability distributions and independent of
events outside the component boundary, are regarded as normal transitions. Hence, T
deﬁnes the stochastic behaviour of the component, as outlined in Equation 3.1.
T  tfxyptqunn | x  y px, yq P t1, 2, ..., nu
T px, yq 
$'''&
'''%
8, If (x,y) is a forced transition
0, If no transition between x & y
fxyptq, Otherwise
(3.1)
The capacity (performance), cx, of a binary-state component in state x is such that,
cx P t0, cmaxu, where cx  cmax, if the component is working, and 0, otherwise. The
capacity space of a multi-state component, on the other hand, is deﬁned by the set
0 ¤ cx ¤ cmax, cmax being the maximum capacity of the component. Each component
state has an associated capacity that deﬁnes the maximum ﬂow the component can
generate, transmit, or sink in that state. The performance, therefore, of a multi-state
component can be deﬁned by the vector, C, of state capacities, as in Equation 3.2.
C  tcxu
n | 0 ¤ cx ¤ cmax, n ¥ 2 (3.2)
ς  tεxu
n | 0 ¤ εx ¤ 1 (3.3)
Equation 3.3 deﬁnes the vector of sink indices of a multi-state component. The
sink index, εx, is the amount of ﬂow dissipated in the component when in state x, as
a fraction of the total ﬂow it receives. Applicable only to intermediate components
(components that are neither sources nor sinks/targets), this property ranges between
0 and 1. A value of 0 means outﬂow is equal to inﬂow while a value of 1 corresponds
to the case when all the ﬂow is dissipated in the component. With a sink index of
1, a component eﬀectively becomes a sink, explaining the choice of name. By default,
sources have a sink index of 0 and sinks, a sink index of 1.
Sometimes, a component may be subjected to loading restrictions, in order to pre-
serve its reliability and/or ensure its safe operation. This often requires the load to
exceed a threshold value but lie within the maximum load rating of the component.
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Figure 3.2: State-space diagram of 40MVA generator.
Outside this range, the component is either shut down or considered failed. The max-
imum load rating corresponds to the maximum capacity of the component but the
threshold load rating, however, may be greater than its minimum capacity. This is
so because the component may be prone to complete failures or maintenance states
characterised by 0 capacity. The minimum load rating Λ is such that 0 ¤ Λ ¤ cmax.
Ei  pT ,C, ς,Λ, x0q, (3.4)
Each parameter discussed determines a component's behaviour and subsequently, its
eﬀect on system performance and reliability. Therefore, with x0 as its initial state, a
component can be deﬁned by the quintuple Ei as expressed in Equation 3.4.
3.3.1 Application to Repairable Multi-state Components and Systems
A simple illustration will be used to describe the modelling of a multi-state component
with repairable partial failure modes. Consider a 40MVA generator subjected to a 20%
minimum load restriction and existing in three possible states as follows:
1. state 1, depicting operation at its nominal output level;
2. state 2, depicting operation below its nominal level due to partial failure;
3. state 3, depicting its total failure.
Shown in Figure 3.2 is a representation of the interactions between the states of the
generator. State 2 is the state of interest in this illustration and the objective is to
explore the possible events embedded in the restoration process from partial failure (that
is, transition 2 Ñ 1). The ﬁgure is based on the assumption that the generator remains
in operation whilst undergoing repairs from state 2 (on-line repairs). However, this is
not the case for components of many real-world engineering systems. Most components
would need to be taken out of operation before repair actions can be completed, which
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Figure 3.3: Alternative state representation of generator.
event may trigger the unavailability of other components, as explained in Section 3.3.
The assumption, therefore, may result in over/under estimation of certain reliability
indices, when wrongly applied.
Assume the generator is in series with an external breaker which can fail and un-
dergo oﬀ-line repairs (that is, the breaker needs to be taken out of operation during
maintenance). During the oﬀ-line repair of the breaker, the generator too would need
to be shut down. To account for this induced unavailability of the generator, a new
state, 4, is introduced into the state-space of the generator, as shown in Figure 3.3.
The restoration of the generator from state 2 to 1 may follow one of two possible
operational pathways:
1. Case 1: Repair is initiated as soon as the generator enters state 2. This, technically
means, the generator does not exist in states 2 and 3.
2. Case 2: Repair is delayed until the generator is not in operation. That is, either
when totally failed or when shut down from partial failure.
These considerations necessitate the introduction of a ﬁfth state, 5, to account for the
period when the generator is undergoing repairs from state 2 to 1. The state-spaces
of the generator for each of Case 1 and Case 2 are presented in Figure 3.3. In the
ﬁgure, forced and normal transitions are diﬀerentiated. Forced transitions, however,
would have to be manually eﬀected during simulation, as they may depend on the state
history of the component. For instance, the generator goes to state 5, from state 4, if
its previous state is 2, else, it goes to state 1, as shown in Figure 3.3(b). With reference
to Case 2, the parameters of the generator are as deﬁned in Equation 3.5. The sink
index for each state is 0, since the generator is a source. As a rule of thumb, the sink
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index is not required for sources and sinks, as will soon be evident.
T 


0 f12ptq 0 8 0
0 0 f23ptq 8 0
f31ptq f32ptq 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 8
f51ptq 0 0 0 0


C  p40 25 0 0 0q
Λ  8
(3.5)
The modelling technique described in this section can be extended to components
with multiple partial failure modes. This is achieved by introducing two states (one
each, for shut-down and repair) for each partial failure state.
3.3.2 Determining Component State Transition Parameters
Algorithm 1 Sampling procedure for transition parameters of a multi-state component.
Require: x and t are respectively the component's current state and simulation time
1: function Sample(x,T ,t)
2: J Ðset of possible transitions from state x
3: f Ðset of corresponding distributions
4: k ÐNumber of elements in J
5: for nÐ1 to k do  Loop over possible transitions
6: pttimes, nq Ð pf , nqs1  Generate 1 sample from the nth element of f
7: end for
8: tsample Ð min pttimesq  get the minimum sampled time
9: pÐtransitions corresponding to tsample
10: if numelppq ¡ 1 then  if multiple transitions
11: u ∼ r0, 1s  generate uniform random number
12: indexÐ pp, ru  numelppqsq
13: else
14: indexÐ p
15: end if
16: ynext Ð index  get next state
17: tnext Ð tsample   t  get next transition time
18: return (ynext,tnext)
19: end function
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The key to the simulation of multi-state systems is being able to correctly deter-
mine the next states and transition times (transition parameters) of its components.
The proposed algorithm for sampling the next transition parameters of a multi-state
component is based on the assumption that its next state depends only on its current
state. Starting with the component in state x at time t the algorithm is summarised
thus.
1. Locate all non-zero elements in row x of T , saving their next possible states in
the set, J , of possible transitions from x.
2. Deﬁne a set, f , containing the distributions corresponding to the elements of set
J in step 1.
3. Sample each element of f and save the sampled values in ttimes.
4. Find the minimum, tsample, of ttimes and deﬁne a set, p, containing the next states
corresponding to tsample, such that p  J .
5. The next state, ynext  p, if p has only one element. Otherwise, it is an element
randomly selected from p.
6. The next transition time, tnext, is the sum, tsample   t.
These steps are summarised as a pseudo-code by Algorithm 1. Its major advantage is its
capability to ensure an unbiased determination of the transition parameters of compo-
nents including, those exhibiting both deterministic and probabilistic state transitions.
The algorithm will never select a forced transition over one exhibiting Markovian prop-
erties. As a rule of thumb, it is not applied when the component resides in states from
which only forced transitions are possible (e.g, state 4 in Figure 3.3). The simulation
algorithm should, therefore, be equipped with special routines to force these transitions.
3.4 System Modelling
In complex network theory, system topology is deﬁned by a graph, which is a set of
nodes connected by edges or links across which some material (can be real or virtual) is
transmitted. This material may be the current ﬂowing in a circuit, the energy generated
by a power plant, the liquid pumped from a reservoir, the traﬃc ﬂow rate in a street
network, or any quantiﬁable quantity of interest. In a graph, there is a set, s, of
nodes generating the controlled information and another set, t, utilising the information.
Nodes belonging to s are source nodes whilst those belonging to t are sink or target
nodes. Between the sources and sinks, are nodes facilitating the transmission process,
ensuring the sources and sinks remain connected. These are intermediate nodes and
they, with the sources, inﬂuence the quality and success of the communication process.
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If ﬂow is in only one direction through every edge, the graph is said to be directed.
Otherwise, it is undirected or bidirectional.
3.4.1 The System as a Directed Graph
As established in Chapter 2, engineering systems are designed to accomplish a speciﬁc,
often quantiﬁable process. Process ﬂow may be possible in any direction, depending
on the connectivity of the system and the properties of its components. However,
at any instance, the direction of the process is known and ﬁxed [42]. Systems are
normally a collection of components performing diﬀerent but speciﬁc roles, and these
components, together, determine the success of the process. Some of the components
may be responsible for initiating the process whilst some are just links to ensure its
progression. There is also another actor normally external to the system that utilises the
process and drives it through the system. The set of components initiating the process
are analogous to sources in a graph, the components serving as links, to intermediate
nodes, and so is the external factor driving the process analogous to sinks. Hence, the
topology of the system can be accurately represented by a directed graph.
G  pV ,Aq (3.6)
Since the aim in system reliability evaluation is to investigate the eﬀects of compo-
nent failure on system performance and life-span, the structure of the system can be
represented by a directed graph with components and output points considered nodes
connected by perfectly reliable edges i.e., edges do not fail. If G is a directed graph,
the structure of the system is deﬁned by G, as in Equation 3.6, where V is the set of
nodes and A, the adjacency matrix. When modelling systems like power distribution
networks, with unreliable links, each unreliable link should be treated as a component.
A  taijuMM | aij 
$&
%1 If ﬂow is iÑ j0 Otherwise (3.7)
e  ti, juk2 | k 
M¸
j1
M¸
i1
aij @pi, jq P V (3.8)
Let the components of the system, including load/demand points be consecutively
numbered from 1 to M . The adjacency matrix is an M -order square matrix deﬁning
the connectivity of nodes. A connection between nodes i and j is represented by a `1' at
the intersection of row i and column j of A, if process ﬂow is from node i to j (iÑ j)
and a `0', if a connection does not exist. The node pair, pi, jq, representing a connection
and ﬂow, from node i to j, is known as an edge/link, eij , of the system. The set of
edges of the system is deﬁned by a k 2 matrix, e, where k, the total number of edges,
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is equal to the sum of the elements of A. Equations 3.7 and 3.8 respectively deﬁne the
adjacency and edge matrices of the system.
A  taijuMM | aij 
$&
%αij If ﬂow is iÑ j0 Otherwise (3.9)
The physical links, in some systems, may be reliable but ineﬃcient, which condition
imposes negative eﬀects on the system's reliability and performance. Let αij be the
eﬃciency of edge eij , such that 0   αij ¤ 1. Links with zero eﬃciency are sinks, and
should, therefore, be treated as nodes. The adjacency matrix could be redeﬁned to
convey the information about the eﬃciency of the links, as well. Equation 3.7 could,
therefore, be generalised, as expressed by Equation 3.9 and k redeﬁned as the total
number of non-zero elements of A, such that, k 
°M
j1
°M
i1paij ¡ 0q.
G  pV ,A,Lq (3.10)
Algorithm 2 Procedure for deriving the edge and incidence matrices of a system.
Require: A, the adjacency matrix of the system
1: function GetMatrix(A)
2: M Ð sizepA, 1q  get number of nodes
3: k Ð
°M
j1
°M
i1 paij ¡ 0q  get number of edges
4: eÐ t0uk2  Predeﬁne e
5: for nÐ 1 to M do  Loop over nodes
6: ∆Ðset of columns of A with non-zero entries
7: w Ð numelp∆q  get number of elements in ∆
8: e pó wq Ð

n t1uw1 ∆
T

 update next w rows of e
9: end for
10: delete all zero elements in e
11: ΓÐ t0uMk  predeﬁne the incidence matrix by an M by k array of zeros
12: iÐvector of elements in column 1 of e
13: j Ðvector of elements in column 2 of e
14: positionÐ jT   t0, 1, ..., k  1u M
15: position1 Ð i  pj  1q M
16: pΓ, positionq Ð pA, position1q  update incidence matrix
17: position2 Ð iT   t0, 1, ..., k  1u M
18: pΓ, position2q Ð 1  update incidence matrix
19: return (e,Γ)
20: end function
In addition to ineﬃciency considerations, the links of most realistic systems, trans-
mission lines in power distribution systems, for instance, have a maximum load they
can safely transmit. Let lij denote the maximum allowable load for link eij , such that
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0   lij ¤ 8, with the upper bound of the range corresponding to the case when no
load restrictions are imposed on the edge. The capacity matrix, L, is introduced as
a third property of the system graph model, to account for restrictions on how much
load each link can safely transmit. Though unrealistic, especially for power systems,`no
load restriction' is useful in maximum ﬂow analysis of distribution networks. Like A,
L | L  tlijuMM is an M -order square matrix, with each element corresponding to
an element in the former. Equation 3.6, therefore, can be adapted to deﬁne both the
structure of a system and the properties of its links, as expressed by Equation 3.10.
Γ  tγpquMk | γpq 
$'''&
'''%
1, p  i
aij , p  j
0, otherwise
@pi, jq P e
(3.11)
Given the adjacency, edge, and capacity matrices of a system, a fourth matrix deﬁn-
ing the relationship between its edges and nodes, with respect to the direction of process
ﬂow, will be introduced. This matrix, referred to as the the incidence matrix, Γ, has a
dimension of M  k, with its rows and columns corresponding to the nodes and edges
of the system, respectively. If the edges are numbered from 1 to ke and nodes, from 1
to M , for link eij , the element in the column of Γ, corresponding to the edge number
of the link (that is, the index of (i,j) in matrix e) and row i is assigned the value 1 and
the element in row j (the incident/local target node), assigned the value aij . This
process is repeated for all the links of the system, and the vacant locations in Γ are
each ﬁlled with a `0'. Mathematically, Γ is deﬁned as expressed by Equation 3.11. The
variable q  1, 2, ..., k (the edge number) is the index of edge eij in e and p  1, 2, ...,M .
Given the adjacency matrix alone, e and Γ can be derived by applying Equations 3.8
and 3.11, as summarised by Algorithm 2.
3.4.2 System Representation and Flow Analysis
The transition matrix is usually unknown for the output nodes of a system, prior to its
reliability analysis. Their sink indices, too, are not required, as evident in the system
ﬂow equations. For these nodes, therefore, Equation 3.4 simpliﬁes to Ei  pC,Λq.
S  pG,Eq | E  tEiuM , i  1, 2, ...,M (3.12)
If E is the set containing the properties, Ei, of each node of the system, the system
structure and property can be deﬁned by the set, S, as expressed by Equation 3.12.
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Figure 3.4: Flow visualisation in a particular 5 node system.
3.4.2.1 Derivation of System Flow Equations
To understand the ﬂow of processes in systems, it is worthwhile thinking of sources as
reservoirs and intermediate nodes as valves in a pipe network. The total ﬂow through
the system depends on the amount of liquid in the reservoir and the resistance to
ﬂow, which properties are a function of the capacities of the source and intermediate
nodes, respectively. As the source and intermediate nodes perform their functions, their
capacities change, leading to changes in the resistance of some ﬂow paths. The result is
the existence of paths with high resistance and some with a low resistance, triggering
diﬀerential ﬂow redirection. The amount of ﬂow through a path is directly proportional
to the capacity of the smallest node in that path. Hence, more ﬂow will be redirected
through the path of least resistance (highest capacity), as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
In Figure 3.4, node 1 is a source, node 5, a sink, and nodes 2, 3 & 4 are intermediate
nodes. Initially (see Figure 3.4(a)), all the intermediate nodes have the same capacity,
resulting in equal path resistance for the upper and lower paths between source and sink.
Therefore, the 1 unit of ﬂow from the source is split equally between them, as shown. In
Figure 3.4(b), the capacity of node 4 reduces to 0.2, thereby creating a diﬀerence in the
resistances of the two paths. Since the maximum capacity of the upper path is 1, 0.8
units of ﬂow are redirected through it and 0.2 through the lower path. If at this stage,
the capacity of node 3 is also reduced to 0.5 (see Figure 3.4(c)), the eﬀective capacity
of the upper path reduces to 0.5. This explains why only 0.5 units are transmitted
along the upper path and 0.2 along the lower path. It is, however, worthwhile noting
that while the ﬂows in Figures 3.4(a) and (b) are valid, they are only a subset of the
possible ﬂow combinations that can be transmitted between nodes 1 and 5, without
violating the ﬂow conservation and capacity constraints of the system. In Figure 3.4(a),
for instance, all the 1 unit of ﬂow could be transmitted along any of the two paths,
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and nothing along the other. Similarly, in Figure 3.4(b), all the 1 unit of ﬂow could be
transmitted along the upper path, and nothing along the lower path. Regardless of the
ﬂow combination, however, the total ﬂow at the output node is always the same. Flow
redirection may be simple and straight-forward for simple systems but presents itself as
an optimization problem for systems with complex topology. The problem consists of
multiple parameters and constraints, and involves calculating the ﬂow along each link
of the network. Even when the full capacity of the sources can be transmitted across
the network, it is impossible to determine, without resorting to linear programming, the
magnitude of ﬂow into each output node, save for the case when every node operates
at its maximum capacity.
Let Xij be the magnitude of ﬂow in link eij , f i ; the set of nodes connected to the
inlet of node i, fi ; the set of nodes connected to its outlet, and c
tiu
x ; its current capacity.
The total inﬂow for sources is zero and for sinks, the total outﬂow is zero. This implies,
i P s, if f i  ∅ and i P t, if f

i  ∅. The constraints, and by extension, the equations
governing the optimization procedure, hinge on the following assumptions.
1. The system is equipped with adequate controls, such that ﬂow does not exceed the
capacity of a node. This means, for intermediate and sink nodes, the total inﬂow
should not exceed the node capacity. This is known as the capacity constraint,
and it is expressed for intermediate and sink nodes as,
¸
jPf i
Xjiαji ¤ c
tiu
x | pi, jq P e, f i  V (3.13)
For sources, the statement implies the total outﬂow should not exceed the node
capacity. Hence, ¸
jPfi
Xij ¤ c
tiu
x | pi, jq P e, fi  V (3.14)
By applying Equation 3.13 to all intermediate and sink nodes and Equation 3.14,
to all sources, a single equation, Equation 3.15, expressing the capacity constraint
on the system can be obtained. Θ will be called the inequality constraint matrix.
ΘtXijuk1 ¤ tc
tiu
x uM1 | pi, jq P e, @i P V (3.15)
Θ  tθiquMk | θiq 
$'''&
'''%
γiq, i P s
γiq, γiq   0
0, otherwise
(3.16)
Θ is related to the incidence matrix, Γ, of the system by Equation 3.16.
2. Flow in the system is conserved. That is,
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 The total ﬂow generated by sources equals the sum of ﬂow consumed by sinks
and any losses at intermediate nodes.
 The total inﬂow at an intermediate node, i | i P pV  psY tqq, equals its
total outﬂow plus any losses at the node.
¸
jPfi
Xij 
¸
jPf i
Xjiαji  0 | pi, jq P e (3.17)
ΦtXijuk1  t0uð1 @pi, jq P e (3.18)
Γ 


Γ1
Γ2
.
.
.
ΓM1
ΓM


 tΓpu
M | p  1, 2, ...,M (3.19)
Φ 


Φ1
Φ2
.
.
.
Φð1
Φð


 tΦλu
ð | Φλ  Γp, λ  1, 2, ...,ð
ð  M, f : λÑ p @p P pV  psY tqq
(3.20)
Expressing the second statement mathematically, Equation 3.17 is obtained. By
applying this equation to all the intermediate nodes of the system, the ﬂow con-
servation constraint equation, Equation 3.18, is obtained. ð is the number of
intermediate nodes and Φ will be called the equality constraint matrix.
If the incidence matrix, Γ, is expressed in terms of its rows, Γp, as in Equation 3.19,
Φ and Γ are related as expressed in Equation 3.20. By arranging the intermediate
nodes in ascending order of their ID, Equation 3.20 suggests, the λth row of Φ
is identical to the pth row of Γ, where p is the λth element of the ordered set of
intermediate nodes. Φ, therefore, is a sub matrix of Γ, containing all the rows of
the latter corresponding to intermediate nodes.
¸
jPfi
Xij  p1 ε
tiu
x q
¸
jPfi
Xjiαji  0 | pi, jq P e (3.21)
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Φ  tφλquðk | φλq 
$&
%p1 ε
tpu
x qγpq, γpq   0
γpq, otherwise
λ  1, 2, ...,ð, ð  M
f : λÑ p @p P pV  psY tqq
(3.22)
However, a close look at Equation 3.17 would reveal that the ineﬃciency of the
intermediate nodes has been ignored, in its formulation. When this is considered,
Equation 3.17 is rewritten as in Equation 3.21, where εtiux is the sink index of node
i. With this consideration, the equality matrix, Φ, is generalised by Equation 3.22.
O  
¸
jPfi
¸
iPs
Xij
 tψqu1ktXijuk1 | ψq 
¸
iPs
γiq
q  1, 2, ..., k
(3.23)
3. If the capacity of a node changes, the ﬂow in the system is reconﬁgured to match
the prevailing system conditions. The ﬂow generated by sources is such that the
total ﬂow into the sinks is maximised. The objective of the optimization problem,
therefore, is to determine the minimum source ﬂow that maximises the system
ﬂow. Hence, the objective function, O, is as deﬁned in Equation 3.23.
4. The minimum ﬂow through link eij is 0 but its maximum ﬂow, Ωij , is deﬁned by
the capacities of its nodes, as well as its own capacity, lij . That is, 0 ¤ Xij ¤ Ωij .
If lb and ub are the vectors respectively containing the minimum and maximum
ﬂows across each link of the system, then,
lb  t0uk1, ub  tΩijuk1
Ωij  mintc
tiu
max, c
tju
max, liju @pi, jq P e
(3.24)
Equations 3.15, 3.18, 3.23, and 3.24 form the basis of the optimization procedure, which
can be implemented by a variety of well-known algorithms. However, the numerical
examples presented in this thesis are based on the interior-point algorithm [68, 100].
Of the parameters required, only Φ and the set, tctiux uM1, of current node capacities,
vary during simulation. In fact, even Φ does not vary for systems with no losses at the
nodes.
Ωgh  0 | pg, hq 
$&
%pj, iq If Xij ¡ Xjipi, jq Otherwise (3.25)
So far, only unidirectional links have been considered. Without loss of generality,
the equations proposed in this section, are valid for bidirectional links, as well. Such
links are normally represented by two reciprocal edges i.e., edges connecting the same
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pair of nodes but allowing ﬂow in opposing directions. For instance, edges e12 and
e21 are reciprocals. The optimization procedure sometimes results in ﬂow across both
edges. However, since in practice the edges represent the same physical link and ﬂow
at any instance is in only one direction (see Section 3.4.1), the calculated values should
be normalised, to obtain the eﬀective ﬂow through the link. The eﬀective ﬂow direction
is the same as the direction of the larger ﬂow while its magnitude is obtained by tem-
porarily setting the maximum capacity of the edge with the smaller ﬂow to zero and
repeating the optimization procedure, as expressed by Equation 3.25.
Following the termination of the linear programming algorithm, the vector, η, of
ﬂows through the nodes of the system is given by ΘMktXijuk1.
3.4.2.2 Output Calculation and Node Reconﬁguration
In a system, the failure and repair of one component can impose a corresponding change
in the outputs of other components. The change, therefore, may trigger the shut-down
of operating components and the restart of components in shut-down. It is imperative
that these shut-down and restart events are accounted for in the simulation of the
system, as the failure of most components depends on the time spent in operation.
Shutting down a component aﬀects all other components connected to it and hence,
process ﬂow in the system. Therefore, the eﬀective output of a node after the transition
of another node, is the ﬂow through it after the last component is shut-down. For this,
an iterative procedure is employed to calculate the system output. The procedure is
based on the following assumptions and principles.
1. The availability of a node is determined by the magnitude of its input ﬂow only.
2. A node which current capacity is non-zero is shut-down when the ﬂow through it
is zero or below its predeﬁned threshold.
3. Nodes are shut-down in descending order of their rank.
4. Nodes with zero input ﬂow are placed higher on the scale.
5. Non-zero input ﬂow nodes are ranked in order of their degree of inadequacy (i.e
percentage by which the input falls short of the threshold)
6. Equally ranked nodes have the same priority and are shut-down randomly.
Highlighted below is the iterative procedure proposed for system output calculation.
1. Calculate the system ﬂow, using Equations 3.15, 3.18, 3.23, and 3.24.
2. Find the nodes requiring shut-down and deﬁne a set, U0, to hold the ones with
zero-input and a set, U , for the rest. Go to step 7 if U0 and U  are empty.
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3. Shut down all the nodes in U0.
4. For each node shut down,
(a) save its next transition parameters, set its current capacity to zero, its next
transition time to inﬁnity, and add the node to the set, δ.
(b) add it to the maintenance list if a transition to a maintenance state from
shut-down is possible and force maintenance.
(c) remove the node from its set.
5. Rank the nodes in U , shut down the top ranked node, and call step 4.
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5.
7. Determine the magnitude of ﬂow through the output node.
When nodes are shut down, a complementary restart operation is carried out to restore
them to their previous states. Enumerated below are the steps entailed.
1. Provided δ  H, calculate the system ﬂow using equations 3.15, 3.18, 3.23, and
3.24 with the sink indices and capacities, before shut-down, of the nodes in δ.
2. Select a node in shut-down.
3. Check if its input ﬂow satisﬁes its threshold requirements.
4. If it does, determine the time, tspent, it spent in shut-down.
5. Restore the node to its previous state and update its next failure time. The new
failure time, t1next, of the node becomes tnext   tspent.
6. Remove the node from the maintenance list if it is repairable only in shut-down.
7. Remove the node from δ and repeat steps 2 to 6 until δ  H.
8. End procedure
3.4.3 Simulation Procedure
Summarised below are the systematic steps proposed for the simulation of structurally
static homogeneous time-dependent systems. Homogeneous systems, as used in this
thesis, are those transmitting only one type of ﬂow/material.
1. Initialise the system, in preparation for simulation. This involves the following,
(a) initialization of the vectors, tctiux uM1; to save the current capacities,
tε
tiu
x uM1; to save the current sink indices, and τ | τ  t8uM1; to save the
next transition times of nodes. Also initialise the vectors to save the perfor-
mance and state history (where necessary) of all the nodes of the system.
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(b) setting the required number of simulations, N , and mission time, Tm.
2. Set the simulation time, t  0, the set of nodes in shut-down, δ  H, sample the
next transition parameters of source and intermediate nodes, and update τ .
3. Compute the ﬂow across the system and save the ﬂow through each node.
4. Shut down nodes, where necessary, as described in Section 3.4.2.2.
5. Set the current simulation time to the minimum of τ . That is, t  min pτ q.
6. Check for nodes with tnext  t, and for each,
(a) eﬀect the required transition and sample its next transition parameters.
(b) update τ , tctiux uM1, tε
tiu
x uM1 and its state and performance history.
(c) add to the maintenance list if the new state is a maintenance state or if
transition to a maintenance state from this new state is possible.
7. For each node on the maintenance list, force maintenance.
8. Compare the previous and current values of tctiux uM1 and tε
tiu
x uM1. If a diﬀer-
ence is observed in at least one of the two vectors,
(a) restart any nodes in shut-down
(b) determine the new value of matrix Φ
(c) calculate system ﬂow, using the new values of Φ, tctiux uM1, and tε
tiu
x uM1
and shut down nodes, where necessary. Note that all other parameters of
Equations 3.15, 3.18, 3.23 and 3.24 remain static throughout the simulation
(d) update the ﬂow/performance history of nodes for which the current ﬂow
diﬀers the ﬂow at the previous system transition.
9. Repeat steps 5 to 8 until t  Tm, updating τ , tc
tiu
x uM1 , tε
tiu
x uM1, as well as
the state and ﬂow histories of nodes, at every transition.
10. Repeat steps 2 to 9 N times, saving the node histories at each trial.
Given the state and performance histories, the desired reliability and performance
indices can be obtained using standard statistical analyses. These analysis, however,
fall outside the scope of this chapter but details can be found in [56, 89], as well as
Chapter 4 of this thesis. Indices such as failure distribution, failure frequency, reliability
function, average availability, instantaneous availability, instantaneous output, state
probabilities, capacity factor, meant-time-to-fail, mean-time-between-failures, and the
actual distributions of forced transitions, are obtainable from the simulation histories.
The proposed state duration-based simulation technique achieves superior accuracy,
relative to the standard sequential Monte Carlo simulation described in [125], when
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applied to repairable systems. The upper hand is due to the shut-down and restart of
nodes, as a consequence of the failure and repair of other nodes. The standard tech-
nique, on the other hand, assumes the nodes are statistically independent. It should
be stressed, however, that this shut-down and restart procedure reduces the computa-
tional speed of the proposed technique. The proposed procedure may also require both
the state and ﬂow changes of all the nodes to be saved, as the simulation progresses.
This increases its computational burden and reduces its speed. In practice, the state
histories of all the nodes is required only for maintenance optimization problems. For
basic system reliability and availability analysis, the ﬂow history of sink/output nodes
only, is required. The user, therefore, must use their discretion in deciding which aspect
of the algorithm to adopt and which to modify, based on the problem being solved.
3.4.4 Limitations of the Proposed Approach
The proposed simulation procedure is challenged by two major limitations. The ﬁrst
is consequent of the assumptions used for shutting down and restarting nodes. In the
approach, the availability of a node is determined by the magnitude of its input ﬂow only,
restricting its applicability to homogeneous and independent heterogeneous systems.
However, it can be easily extended to interdependent systems by incorporating fault
trees (or a more ﬂexible tool) and redeﬁning the conditions for shut-down and restart.
The second limitation is due to the capacity constraint imposed on source and in-
termediate nodes. This implies the eﬀects of cascading failures resulting from ﬂow
redistribution cannot be studied. However, the approach can be used in system design
to estimate the required system parameter values to prevent these failures.
3.5 Case Studies
The principles and algorithms derived and described in the preceding sections were
translated into a Matlab-based application and applied to two case-studies. The random
variable generator available in the open-source uncertainty quantiﬁcation tool, Open-
Cossan [110], developed at the Institute for Risk and Uncertainty of the University of
Liverpool, was incorporated to enhance sampling from any probability distribution.
3.5.1 Case Study 1: A Simple Pipe Network
Consider the 3-component pipeline shown in Figure 3.5, adapted from [89]. A maximum
of 4 tons of oil could be pumped from the source, Xin, to the output, Xout, where the
demand is ﬁxed at 3.5 tons. The state-space of each of the other components is shown,
with the number beside each state denoting the capacity of the component in that state.
Beside each arc is the transition rate (in transitions per year) of the transition depicted.
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The problem under review was initially solved by Lisnianski et al. [89] using Markov
Chain, whilst assuming on-line repairs to node 4. The system, in this case study, is
analysed, also, for this scenario and an additional two scenarios, as summarised thus.
1. Assuming on-line repairs to node 4 (the scenario originally analysed).
2. Node 4 is taken out of operation during repairs, which repairs commence almost
instantaneously as the node enters a degraded state.
3. Node 4 is taken out of operation during repairs, which repairs only commence
after the component is shut down due to the failure of another node.
3.5.1.1 Analyses
The equivalent graph model of the system is shown in Figure 3.6. Notice the two extra
nodes, 1 and 5, representing the source and sink, respectively. Assuming the eﬃciency
and capacity of the links are of no interest in the analysis, they can be assumed to be
100% eﬃcient. Similarly, if there are no losses in the system, the vector of sink indices
is deﬁned as, t0uM1. The available information is suﬃcient to formulate the linear
programming problem and derive its parameters. The ﬁrst step in this is to deﬁne the
adjacency matrix, since all the other parameters depend on it. From Figure 3.6, the
adjacency, edge, and incidence matrices are as expressed by Equations 3.26 and 3.27.
A 


0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0


(3.26)
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e 


1 2
1 3
2 4
3 4
4 5


Γ 


1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1


(3.27)


1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1




X12
X13
X24
X34
X45


¤


4.0
1.5
2
4
3.5


(3.28)


1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1




X12
X13
X24
X34
X45





0
0
0

 (3.29)
lb 


0
0
0
0
0


ub 


1.5
2
1.5
2
3.5


(3.30)
O 

1 1 0 0 0
	


X12
X13
X24
X34
X45


(3.31)
Θ 


1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1


(3.32)
With A, e, and Γ known, the linear programming problem is formulated as follows.
1. At time 0, all the components are in their best states. The inequality and equality
constraints, therefore, are expressed as in Equations 3.28 and 3.29, respectively.
2. The bounds on the ﬂows through the edges are deﬁned by Equation 3.30.
3. Finally, the objective function is as expressed in Equation 3.31.
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By comparing Equations 3.28 and 3.15, Equation 3.32 can be deduced. Similarly, com-
paring Equations 3.29 and 3.18 would reveal Equation 3.33.
Φ 


1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1

 (3.33)
With the relevant parameters, the system was analysed and the results compared,
to deduce the eﬀects of the various assumptions on its reliability and performance.
The multi-state models of its nodes are illustrated in Figure 3.7, where state `CM' is a
corrective maintenance state. The models are based on the proposition in Section 3.3.1.
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3.5.1.2 Results and Comments
For a mission time of 4 years and 2 104 simulation samples, the reliability and perfor-
mance indices of the system obtained from the simulation are presented in Figures 3.8
and 3.9. As shown, modelling node 4 according to case 1 would result in over estimation
of the performance indices, if the system were operated according to case 2 or 3.
Though the problem analysed is simple, it illustrates the eﬀects of modelling error
on the accurate estimation of a system's reliability and performance indices.
3.5.2 Case Study 2: A Multi-State Bridge Network
Bridge networks are a typical example of structural complexity exhibited by engineering
systems. The reliability analysis of even the simplest bridge network is cumbersome,
when compared to the analysis of a similarly sized simple system.
To illustrate the applicability of the proposed approach to complex systems, the
arbitrary multi-output and non-repairable bridge network shown in Figure 3.10, is con-
sidered. In the network, nodes 1, 2, and 3, respectively designated S1, S2, and S3 are
sources while nodes 4, 5, and 6 are sinks labelled Xout1, Xout2, and Xout3, respec-
tively. The sources have identical failure characteristics (note that failure times are in
hours) but the capacity of S1 is 1.5 times the individual capacities of the other sources.
Also, the demand at the sinks is ﬁxed but that at node 6 (70 units) is twice those at
nodes 4 and 5. Each source exists in three states, Working (W), Partial Failure (PF),
and complete failure (F) while the intermediate nodes are either working or completely
failed. In addition, all the diagonal links in the network are unidirectional, with ﬂow
from left to right. The intermediate nodes, according to their position in the system and
similarity in failure characteristics, are grouped and arbitrarily designated as follows.
1. Nodes 7 to 13 and node 21, referred to as central nodes.
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2. Nodes 14 to 16, referred to as vertical bridge nodes.
3. Nodes 17 to 20, referred to as horizontal bridge nodes.
3.5.2.1 Analyses
The network was analysed for three cases, as summarised thus.
1. The vertical bridge nodes are bidirectional but ﬂow through the horizontal bridge
nodes is from left to right.
2. Both the vertical and horizontal bridge nodes are bidirectional.
3. Both the vertical and horizontal bridge nodes are bidirectional and their complete
failure state is replaced with a failure state that has the same capacity as their
working state but with a reduced eﬃciency of 80%.
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Table 3.1: System node properties.
Node Type Transition Distribution Capacity
1-2 Expp10q
S1 1-3 LogNp20, 2q p60 45 0 0q
2-3 LogNp4.5, 1.2q
Central Nodes 1-2 LogNp15, 3q p70 0 0q
Bridge Nodes 1-2 Wbp12, 2q p35 0 0q
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Figure 3.12: Graph for case 1.
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Table 3.2: Reliability indices for Xout1.
Indices Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
0.1072 0.1074 0.1070
State Probability 0.4040 0.4683 0.5276
0.4887 0.4244 0.3655
Capacity Factor 0.4345 0.4433 0.4059
Availability 0.5113 0.5756 0.6345
MTTF 10.2306 11.5172 12.6959
No. of Failures 0.9996 0.9996 0.9995
Figure 3.11 shows the state-space representations of the system nodes, which prop-
erties are presented in Table 3.1. State `S' is a shut-down state, introduced to denote
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Figure 3.15: System reliability at Xout1.
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Figure 3.16: System reliability at Xout2.
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Figure 3.17: System reliability at Xout3.
the period a node is out of operation as a consequence of the failure of another node.
Sources are modelled as shown in Figure 3.11(a) and the central nodes, as in Figure
3.11(b), in all three scenarios. The vertical and horizontal bridge nodes, however, are
modelled as in Figure 3.11(b) in cases 1 and 2, and Figure 3.11(c), in case 3. Their
capacity and sink index vectors are respectively, p35 35 0q and p0 0.2 0q, in case
3. With this as the only exception, the sink index vector is irrelevant for this system,
since there are no ﬂow losses in the other scenarios. The properties of sources S2 and
S3 have not been included in Table 3.1 because they can be deduced from those of S1.
3.5.2.2 Results and Comments
Shown in Figures 3.12 and 3.13 are the graph models of the system for all three scenarios,
with an indication of the maximum allowable load through each link. The system was
simulated for a mission time of 20 hours and 6  104 samples, in each case. Table 3.2
summarises the average values of the popular reliability and performance indices at node
4. The failure time distribution of the same node, under each of the three assumptions,
is plotted in Figure 3.14. Failure (state 3) is deﬁned as the complete absence of ﬂow
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Figure 3.19: Instantaneous output at Xout2.
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Figure 3.20: Instantaneous output at Xout3.
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at the node. The other states, states 1 and 2, denote the periods when the ﬂow at the
node matches demand and when it is below demand but non-zero, respectively. The
choice of node 4 is arbitrary, as the goal is to demonstrate the possibility of computing
any reliability index of interest, from the system simulation history.
The reliability at nodes 4, 5, and 6, are presented in Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 3.17,
and their instantaneous outputs, in Figures 3.18, 3.19, and 3.20, respectively. System
reliability, in this case study, is deﬁned as the probability of a non-zero ﬂow at a node.
The instantaneous output of a node on the other hand, is the ratio of its ﬂow to its
capacity as a function of time. From the results, the reliability at node 6 does not vary
with case, though its instantaneous output does. This observation is a consequence of
the reliability function, as deﬁned in this case study, not regarding the relative mag-
nitude of ﬂows. For instance, a ﬂow of 0.4 units has the same reliability value as a
ﬂow of 30 units. Therefore, node 6 being a terminal node, system conﬁguration and
eﬃciency variations trigger a corresponding variation in the magnitude of ﬂow realised
at its input but not in its complete failure. Consequently, its availability is greater than
its instantaneous output for about 95% of the mission, as shown in Figure 3.21.
This case study illustrates the eﬀects of system conﬁguration, as well as component
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Table 3.3: Actual computational cost per case study.
Case Studies
1 2
Average time per sample (s) 3.92 0.93
Estimated total time (s) 78400 55722
Actual simulation time (s) 3163 2128.27
Improvement factor 24.79 26.18
Flow Calculation 80%
Update Output 6%
Sampling 3%
Reconfiguration 5%
Others 6%
Figure 3.22: Allocation for case study 1.
Flow Calculation 89%
Update Output 6%
Sampling 3%Others 3%
Figure 3.23: Allocation for case study 2.
eﬃciency, on the reliability and performance of a system. It exempliﬁes why reliability
should not be used as the only parameter to study the response of a multi-state system
to design and operational variations. It also shows that the response of an output node
depends on its position in the system relative to other output nodes and sources.
3.5.3 Computational Cost of Approach
To investigate the computational requirement of each subroutine of the simulation algo-
rithm, a series of computational experiments were performed on the systems presented
in the case studies. The results, summarised by Table 3.3 with Figures 3.22 and 3.23,
are based on the average of the simulation times recorded in the experiment. Table 3.3
compares what the simulation times would be if samples were run serially on a single
core with the actual times spent using 24 cores running in parallel. The estimated time
is the product of the simulation time per sample and the total number of samples (20000
and 60000 for case studies 1 and 2, respectively). Ideally, the improvement factor, the
ratio of estimated to actual simulation time, should be slightly less than the number of
parallel cores, due to initialization and overhead communication among workers. How-
ever, certain system initialization tasks which would be repeated for every sample in
the serial simulation, are performed only once and broadcast across the 24 cores.
Flow calculation, as depicted by Figures 3.22 and 3.23, is the most computationally
intensive subroutine. Its computational expense depends on the nature and size of the
system (that is, whether or not the system is repairable), mission time, and the total
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number of simulation samples. There were on average, 142 calls to the ﬂow calculation
subroutine per simulation sample in case study 1, with each call lasting 0.0221 seconds.
Case study 2 had an average of 20 calls per simulation sample, each lasting 0.0430 sec-
onds. Incorporating variance reduction techniques, to reduce the number of simulations
samples, should improve the simulation speed. Depending on the system, additional
gains can also be derived from the complete omission of the reconﬁguration subroutine.
Reconﬁguration (the shut-down & restart of nodes) is unnecessary for non-repairable
systems and systems for which components are assumed to be statistically independent.
In summary, the size and degree of system activity determine the simulation time.
However, as evidenced in Table 3.3, the 21-node non-repairable system with less activity,
required less simulation time than the 5-node repairable system, even though 3 times
more simulation samples were used for the former. Therefore, the degree of system
activity takes precedence over system size, in determining the simulation time.
3.6 Chapter Summary
Complex systems occur in various engineering applications but their reliability analy-
sis is impaired by their very complexity and imposed operational loops. Even in the
presence of these impediments, a credible estimate of the relevant reliability and perfor-
mance indices is required. Diverse assumptions are often invoked to achieve this feat,
and though handy, they are also a threat to the correctness of the outcome.
In this chapter, a novel and generally applicable simulation approach to the reli-
ability and performance analysis of complex multi-state systems has been proposed.
Unlike existing techniques, it enhances the easy incorporation of system dynamics like
ﬂow losses, loading restrictions, and maintenance delays, in the reliability evaluation
process. Applicable to repairable and non-repairable systems of any topology, the pro-
posed approach can analyse systems with multiple inputs and outputs, without prior
knowledge of their cut sets, path sets, or structure function. The case studies presented
have also illustrated it mitigates the need for unrealistic system modelling assumptions.
Like all simulation-based techniques, the approach, however, is computationally in-
tensive. Some practical steps to addressing this problem have, therefore, been suggested
in the chapter and will be explored in a future research. The approach, also currently,
is limited to static systems but given its ﬂexibility, it can be extended to standby re-
dundant systems, as well as to investigate cascading and common-cause failure models.
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Chapter 4
Availability Assessment of
Interdependent Multi-state Systems
4.1 Introduction
Realistic engineering systems often possess attributes that complicate their availability
assessment. Notable examples being complex topology, multi-state behaviour, compo-
nent interdependencies, and interactions with external phenomena. For such systems,
analytical techniques have limited applicability, and eﬃcient simulation techniques are,
therefore, required. A load-ﬂow simulation approach for the reliability analysis of multi-
state systems was proposed in Chapter 3. In the approach, each system node is modelled
as a semi-Markov stochastic process and the system structure, as a directed graph. An
event-driven Monte Carlo simulation is used to reconstruct the random failure and repair
events of the system components. As the components go through their cycle of failures
and subsequent repairs, their capacities change, and the interior-point algorithm [68]
is invoked to determine the performance of the system. The approach employs an ad-
jacency matrix to deﬁne the structure of the system and derives the equations of ﬂow
across the entire system in the form of matrices. This particularly makes it suitable and
intuitive for any system architecture and easily programmable on a digital computer.
In terms of applicability, it outperforms other multi-state system reliability analysis ap-
proaches, since it does not require state enumeration or cut set deﬁnition. It considers
realistic system aspects like ﬂow losses, reconﬁguration, forced transitions, and multiple
competing demands. Load-ﬂow simulation, however, is only applicable to homogeneous
independent systems and does not consider restrictions on the number of simultaneous
maintenance actions that can take place in the system or limited maintenance teams.
In this chapter, the load-ﬂow simulation proposed in Chapter 3 is extended to sup-
port component interdependencies and simplify the availability assessment of realistic
engineering systems. The resulting approach is simple and generally applicable to sys-
tems, including those with limited maintenance teams, reconﬁguration requirements,
55
and multiple commodity ﬂows. A novel metric for assessing maintenance inadequacy
and a real-time component ranking procedure are also introduced. In real-time ranking,
failed components are assigned maintenance priorities during simulation in accordance
with how much their availability improves system performance and how many idle main-
tenance teams there are. This eliminates the need for component importance ranking
algorithms prior to simulation, which for some systems may be unnecessary. The ap-
plicability of the approach is demonstrated by analysing an oﬀshore plant producing
oil, gas, and water. The solution obtained is compared against another Monte Carlo
simulation-based solution that requires the enumeration of the plant's cut-sets. The
proposed approach is shown to be more intuitive, robust to human-induced errors, and
require less human eﬀort. Details of the plant and relevant results are published in [56].
The remainder of this chapter is constituted by 6 sections. The next section provides
a general overview of the proposed approach, its scope, and novelty. Section 4.3 is ded-
icated to providing an overview of the relevant modiﬁcations to the load-ﬂow approach
to include interdependencies. In this section, a generalised procedure for assessing the
availability of interdependent multi-state systems is also presented. Details of the sim-
ulation procedure and availability assessment algorithms are respectively provided in
Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Section 4.6 addresses the availability assessment problem of an
oﬀshore multi-commodity plant, which is used to illustrate the systematic roll out of the
solution strategy developed in Section 4.3 to a problem of industrial relevance. The use-
fulness of the new metric for maintenance inadequacy and real-time component ranking
are also illustrated here. The implications of the results, eﬃciency of the approach, and
its limitations, climax this section. Finally, the closing remarks; drawing conclusions on
the proposed approach constitute Section 4.7.
4.2 Overview of Proposed Approach
Though largely built on the principles proposed in Chapter 3, this work makes a series
of new contributions as highlighted thus.
1. A straight-forward procedure for uncoupling interdependencies in systems and an
intuitive mathematical model for their adequate representation are proposed. In
this chapter, interdependencies refer to cascading events and functional depen-
dencies requiring explicit modelling. CCF will be treated in Chapter 7.
2. Two recursive algorithms are proposed to accurately account for these interdepen-
dencies and compute the performance of the system during simulation.
3. To enhance the eﬃcient extraction of system availability and performance indices
from the simulation result, easily implementable algorithms have been proposed.
Availability, as used here, refers to the ability of a system to function as expected.
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Figure 4.1: An example of a typical interdependent system.
It, therefore, encompasses the reliability, the output characteristics, and the re-
covery probability of the system after its deviation from expected performance.
4. Reliability and output characteristics are already very common system availability
indices. Recovery probability and a new metric for assessing the adequacy of the
maintenance process are used as additional system performance indices.
5. A real-time component ranking procedure to identify the sequence of maintenance
response that maximises system performance is proposed. The system operator
would use this procedure for scenarios dictating preferential maintenance.
6. Finally, a simple but important modiﬁcation is also made to the original system
ﬂow calculation procedure, resulting in appreciable gains in computation time.
In summary, this work extends the applicability of the load-ﬂow simulation approach
and improves its computational eﬃciency.
4.3 Implementation
In this section, the relevant principles governing the modelling of an interdependent
system and its components are described. Since these principles are more or less an
adaptation of those proposed in Chapter 3, premium is placed only on the necessary
modiﬁcations. For this purpose, consider the arbitrary system shown in Figure 4.1,
which could be a binary-state system or a multi-state ﬂow network [149]. It consists
of 4 subsystems and 13 nodes, transporting 4 commodities. The number of subsystems
is normally deﬁned by the number of commodities or more generally by the number of
closed-loops. This implies, a system could compose of multiple subsystems even when
only one commodity type is involved. Nodes 1, 2, and 3, transporting commodity-B,
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respectively require commodity, A, C, and D to operate and nodes 9 and 13 in subsystem
S3 rely on ﬂow from subsystem S1. Also, a certain failure mode of node 5 in subsystem
S1, triggers the partial failure of node 7 in subsystem S4. This type of interdependency
is called a one-way dependence, since the failure of node 5 aﬀects node 7, but state
change events in the latter have no eﬀects on the former. The system under review is
a perfect example of systems with functional dependencies (the one between nodes 6
and 9, for instance) requiring explicit modelling and cascading dependencies (the one
between nodes 5 and 7, for instance). Even for a system this simple, deriving all its
cut-sets is time-consuming and error-prone. In the remainder of this section, a generally
applicable procedure to overcome these complications is presented.
4.3.1 Decoupling the System
To start the modelling process, all the elements aﬀecting the operation of the system are
identiﬁed and numbered as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This is followed by the identiﬁcation
and deﬁnition of all the node dependencies. Constituent systems (hereafter referred
to as subsystems), determined by the diﬀerent commodities ﬂowing in the system or
the number of closed-loops, are assigned subsystem IDs. Each subsystem's associated
nodes are identiﬁed, graph model developed, and relevant ﬂow equation parameters
obtained (see Chapter 3 for details). In identifying the nodes of a subsystem, only
those with actual commodity ﬂow are considered. Nodes representing external common-
cause initiators, environmental events, or human-system interactions, do not belong to
a subsystem. The possible states of each node are then identiﬁed and modelled as
outlined in Chapter 3.
Consider the system presented in Figure 4.1, with focus on load dependencies. Node
2, for instance, uses commodity-C to drive its operation but transmits commodity-
B. One would say it exhibits a dual operation mode, operating both as a sink and a
transmission node. The sink mode directly inﬂuences ﬂow in S3, while the transmission
mode has a direct inﬂuence on ﬂow in S2. It is, therefore, logical to separate the node
into its constituent nodes, each representing a mode of operation. The node representing
the sink mode is assigned a new ID while the other retains the ID of the original node.
A load-source dependency exists between the nodes, since the transmission node is
incapacitated if ﬂow into the sink node is inadequate. They, therefore, make a load-
source pair, with the transmission node being the load, and the sink node, the local
source. Local sources, otherwise known as support nodes in load-source pairs, are
modelled as binary-state objects. State 1, designated active, and assigned a capacity, l,
signiﬁes the availability of the dependent node. State 2, with 0 capacity, and designated
inactive, depicts otherwise. l is the minimum level of support required to operate the
node in the transmission mode, and in practical cases represents the load rating of
that component. A 4kW rated 3-phase centrifugal pump, for instance, would have its
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Figure 4.2: Interdependent system showing load-source pairs.
l  4kW . By applying the decoupling procedure described to all load dependency
relationships in the system, the following load-source pairs, t2, 14u, t3, 16u, t1, 18u,
t13, 15u, and t9, 17u, are obtained, as highlighted in Figure 4.2.
To incorporate induced and functional interdependencies in the component model
proposed in Chapter 3, two additional parameters, L and D, are introduced. Let i be
the index of a node, with Li  tj, lu deﬁning its load dependency with node j. The
dependency deﬁned by Li is interpreted as, node i requiring a minimum of l level of ﬂow
from node j to operate. When i and j belong to diﬀerent subsystems, the subsystems
are said to be interdependent, since a state change in either node aﬀects ﬂow in both
subsystems. If i has load dependency relationships with multiple nodes, Li takes the
form of a 2-column matrix, with each row deﬁning the node's relationship with another
node. Parameter Di  tdj1, dj2, dj3, dj4uu4 | j  1, 2, ..., u  1, u deﬁnes the single-
way causal-eﬀect relationship between node i and other nodes. This type of coupling
speciﬁes induced state changes in other nodes following a state change in i. dj1 is the
state of i triggering the event, dj2; the aﬀected node, dj3; the state the node has to be
in to be aﬀected, and dj4; its target state on occurrence of the event. Each row of Di,
therefore, deﬁnes the behaviour of an aﬀected node, and u, the number of relationships.
If i and the aﬀected node, dj2, belong to diﬀerent subsystems, the subsystem the latter
belongs to is dependent on the subsystem of the former. In Figure 4.2, for instance, S4
depends on S1, consequent of the relationship between nodes 5 and 7.
Suppose state 3 of node 5 triggers the partial failure (state 2) of node 7. If this
happens only when node 7 is in state 1, their dependency is deﬁned by D5 as,
D5 

3 7 1 2
	
(4.1)
Equation 4.1 eﬀectively deﬁnes the state change induced in node 7 by a state change in
node 5. Using the notation described in the preceding paragraph, the expression states
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Figure 4.4: Dependency tree: Subsystem ranking procedure.
if node 5 makes a transition to state 3 whilst node 7 is in state 1, the latter is forced
through a transition to state 2. Similarly, if a state change in node 7 triggered a state
change in node 5 or any other node, D7 would be required to express this.
The ﬁnal step entails the derivation of the dependency tree relating the subsystems
and the ranking of these subsystems according to their position on the tree. Figure
4.3 shows the dependency tree for an arbitrary 4-subsystem system (diﬀerent from the
system in Figure 4.1), where the designation ra, bs speciﬁes that the rank of subsystem
a is b. In the ranking procedure, the independent subsystem is chosen as reference and
assigned rank 1. The other subsystems are ranked in increasing order of their longest
distance from this reference. If two subsystems are interdependent, their mutual link
on the tree is discarded, and the ranking done as earlier described. However, if after
discarding the mutual links, a node is totally cut oﬀ from the rest of the tree, it is
assigned the same rank as its dependent pair on the tree. If it is in relationship with
multiple nodes, its rank, b, is given by max pRq, R being the set of ranks of all the
subsystems it is associated with. Figure 4.4 is an illustration of the procedure, for a
system of six subsystems, with interdependencies. Starting with the tree on the left, all
mutual links are discarded, leaving node 2 as the only node without a parent. Hence, it
is taken to be the reference, and the nodes ranked to complete stage 1 of the procedure.
Discarding the mutual links, however, leaves node 3, which is in relationship with nodes
2 and 4, ranked 1 and 3 respectively completely isolated. Node 3, therefore, is assigned
rank 3, the maximum of the ranks of the nodes it is connected to.
Let S1, S2, S3, and S4 be the sets of nodes respectively belonging to subsystems
S1-S4 of the system presented in Figure 4.1. From Figure 4.2, S1  t4, 5, 6, 15, 17, 18u,
S2  t1, 2, 3u, S3  t9, 10, ..., 14u, and S4  t7, 8, 16u. With numbers 1-4 chronolog-
60
[1,1]
[2,2]
[4,2]
[3,2]
Figure 4.5: Dependency tree for sample interdependent system.
ically assigned to subsystems S1-S4, the system's dependency tree is shown in Figure
4.5. With all the subsystems ranked, an indicator register, I, of zeros, such that each
element corresponds to a subsystem, is deﬁned. This register indicates (by logic 1 in
the relevant position) the subsystem(s) aﬀected by the last node transition.
4.3.2 Accounting for Dependencies
Let µ be the vector holding the current performance levels of system nodes. When
node i makes a transition that results in a change in its performance level, the current
capacity of its load-source pair, j, is modiﬁed. If ctiu
x
is the node's capacity before
transition and ctiux , its current capacity, the capacity of node j changes according to
Equation 4.2. Where pµ, jq denotes the jth element of µ.
pµ, jq  ctjux 
$&
% 0 If c
tiu
x
¡ 0 and ctiux  0
l If ctiu
x
 0 and ctiux ¡ 0
(4.2)
A recursive algorithm is required to account for the causal-eﬀect relationships between
nodes because of the possibility of nested dependencies. If Di and xi are respectively
the dependency matrix and current state of node i, the following steps summarise the
algorithm;
1. Deﬁne a register to hold aﬀected nodes and their target states.
2. Find all nodes aﬀected by the state change (using Di and xi) and update the
register deﬁned in step 1.
3. Select the last entry, node j, of the register, set its current state to its target state
and delete its records from the register.
4. Using Dj and xj obtained in step 3, in place of Di and xi, repeat steps 2 and 3.
5. Repeat steps 2 through 4 until the register deﬁned in step 1 is empty.
On each node transition, µ is updated and any load dependencies accounted for, as
described by Equation 4.2.
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4.3.3 Node Reconﬁguration
Node i is shut down if its ﬂow falls to or below its threshold, Λi, or if ﬂow through its
load-source pair, j, falls below l. If a node is shut down, its current and next states
are saved, its next transition time set to 8, and its current capacity, to 0. When the
condition leading to shut-down is resolved, the node is restarted and restored to its
previous state. The period, tspent, spent in shut-down is accounted for by shifting its
next transition time to tnext  tspent, where tnext is its transition time before shut-down.
This time shifting is repeated also for the node's next preventive maintenance due time,
if its preventive maintenance interval is a function of the time spent in operation.
In practice, maintenance durations are not aﬀected by node shut-down events.
Therefore, if the next state of a node is superior in performance and reliability to
its current, only its current capacity is modiﬁed. Modifying its next transition time
would mean delaying its restoration, which may negatively aﬀect the simulation out-
come. Algorithms for shut-down and restart of nodes are presented in Chapter 3, which,
however, should be modiﬁed to incorporate component interdependencies.
Let δ be the set of nodes currently in shut-down state and η, the vector of system
node ﬂows. Node i is added to δ if and only if its shut-down is due to the condition,
pi,ηq ¤ Λi. As a rule-of-thumb, nodes that do not satisfy the threshold ﬂow condition
are shut down ﬁrst. Next, ﬂows through sink nodes that have load-source pairs are
assessed. If for a sink node, j, pη, jq   l, its load-dependent node, i, is shut down. The
same order is followed for node restart, where node ﬂows are assessed for satisfaction
of the relevant conditions. If the condition pη, jq  l is met for a sink node, its load-
dependent pair, i, in shut-down is restarted.
4.3.4 Determining system performance at time t
The goal of system analysis is to determine the amount of commodity ﬂow through
output nodes. This, in turn, requires that ﬂow is calculated after every transition
that results in a performance level change of a node. Given node interdependencies,
a state change in one node may give rise to state changes in a series of other nodes.
The system may go through a number of performance levels in the process, but the
eﬀective performance is the one attained after the last transition. A recursive algorithm,
therefore, is employed for this purpose during system simulation, as outlined thus;
1. Deﬁne µt; a temporary variable and set its value to µ (i.e., µt  µ). Where µ is
the vector of current node capacities.
2. In µt, set the capacities of all the nodes in δ to their values before shut-down.
This step is required to determine which nodes in shut-down can be restarted.
3. Using I, select the highest ranked subsystem which indicator is 1 and calculate
its ﬂow using µt. The highest ranked subsystem corresponds to the subsystem
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with the smallest rank. If multiple subsystems meet this requirement, randomly
select a candidate. Go to step 8 if there are no non-zero elements in I.
4. Set in I, the indicator for the subsystem in step 3 to 0.
5. Restart and shut down nodes according to the procedure outlined in Section 4.3.3.
6. Following a node transition, the subsystem hosting the node is identiﬁed, and its
position in I set to 1. This is only required if the shut-down or restart of the node
is a direct eﬀect of a state change in its load-source pair (see Section 4.3.1).
7. Repeat steps 1 to 6, making sure interdependencies are accounted for and µ
updated on every transition.
8. Get the ﬂows through the output nodes, save as a function of time, and terminate
algorithm.
4.4 The System Simulation Procedure
Simulation normally entails repeated calculation of system output, as nodes undergo
their transition cycles. Calling the interior-point algorithm for every transition, as pro-
posed in [55], may impose unprecedented computational burden. This is because, a
certain system conﬁguration may be attained more than once, making multiple calcula-
tions for the same conﬁguration a possibility. To overcome this problem, it is desirable
to determine node ﬂows for all the possible combinations of system node performance
levels prior to simulation. Let β be the matrix holding these combinations and Ctiuu ,
the set of unique performance levels of node i. β is an M 
±M
i n
tiu matrix, M being
the total number of nodes, excluding external nodes, and ntiu, the number of unique
performance levels of node i. For instance, if the capacity of node 1 is deﬁned by
C  t10, 20, 0, 0, 10u, Ct1uu  t0, 10, 20u and nt1u  3. For each combination of per-
formance levels, the corresponding node ﬂows are calculated and recorded in a second
matrix, F. During simulation, β is searched for the combination of node performances
corresponding to the current system conﬁguration, and its pre-stored node ﬂows in F
simply read oﬀ. By this, ﬂow calculation for every conﬁguration is carried out only once.
It, however, is worthwhile noting that for large systems, β gets prohibitively large, such
that the time to search for a conﬁguration exceeds its ﬂow calculation time. The search
time, however, can be reduced by smart allocation and search procedures. Therefore,
it is advised that the average times to complete both procedures are compared prior to
simulation.
For an interdependent system like the one in Figure 4.1, the procedure described
above is carried out for each subsystem, and in each case, only nodes belonging to that
subsystem are considered.
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4.4.1 Forcing Maintenance
Algorithm 3 Forcing maintenance: Limited dedicated maintenance teams.
Require: n1, λ1, n2, λ2, h1 and h2
1: k Ð 1  initialize indicator
2: while k ¤ 2 do
3: v Ð nk  λk  get idle teams
4: while v ¡ 0 and hk  H do
5: select node according to priority
6: make maintenance state the current state x
7: sample next transition using x
8: delete node from hk
9: v Ð v  1, λk  λk   1
10: end while
11: k Ð k   1
12: end while
With limited maintenance teams, the commencement of maintenance is not always
instantaneous. Therefore, the transition from a degraded state or to Preventive Main-
tenance (PM) has to be manually executed during simulations. Let n1 denote the
number of teams dedicated to Corrective Maintenance (CM), n2, the number of Pre-
ventive Maintenance teams, λ1, the number of busy CM teams, and λ2, the number
of busy PM teams. Following its transition, a node is added to the set, h1, of nodes
requiring repairs if its new state is directly linked to a CM state, and to h2, if its PM
is due. At time, t, maintenance is forced if there are idle maintenance teams and h1 or
h2 is not empty. This procedure is described by Algorithm 3, where k  1 and k  2
respectively denote CM and PM.
If PM is carried out only when the system is perfect, the algorithm is terminated
after the task for k  1 if at least one of h1  H, λ1 ¡ 0, and λ2 ¡ 0 is true. Each
of these conditions means either there is a failed component waiting to be repaired or
maintenance is in progress, any of which suggests the system is not in a perfect state.
In most applications, the PM of a node is delayed if it is in a degraded state, until
after CM. If this is the case, a node belonging to both h1 and h2 is rejected when
selected during the PM task (k  2) of the algorithm. Also, most systems are assumed
to operate under a perfect maintenance scenario. This means, nodes are repaired to an
as-good-as-new condition, making any pending PM tasks for a repaired node no longer
necessary. In such cases, a node's records are deleted from both h1 and h2 after CM.
Algorithm 3 is based on the assumption that CM and PM are carried out by diﬀerent
teams (dedicated maintenance). It is, however, adaptable to systems where the same
team can carry out both maintenance actions (shared maintenance). Let nt be the
total number of maintenance teams, λt, the number of busy maintenance teams, and
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ht  ph1 Y h2q, the set of nodes in the maintenance queue. Algorithm 4 outlines the
procedure for forcing maintenance in shared maintenance scenarios.
Algorithm 4 Forcing maintenance: Limited shared maintenance teams.
Require: nt, λt, ht
1: v Ð nt  λt  get idle teams
2: while v ¡ 0 and ht  H do
3: select node according to priority
4: make maintenance state the current state x
5: sample next transition using x
6: delete node from queue (h1 or h2)
7: v Ð v  1, λt  λt   1
8: end while
4.4.2 Maintenance Priority & Real-time Component Ranking
In practical applications, system availability is computed based on some predeﬁned
maintenance priority ranking of nodes [161]. However, for complex systems, node pri-
ority ranking is either impossible, time-consuming, error-prone, or requires component
importance ranking algorithms [49, 69]. Priority maintenance is required to reduce the
maintenance response inadequacy for critical nodes, a measure of how long a node waits
in the maintenance queue. It depends on the number of CM teams, the failure charac-
teristics of nodes, and the eﬃciency of the maintenance teams. This implies, a system
may have fewer CM teams than nodes and still not require priority maintenance if node
failures are rare or maintenance durations are relatively short. For such systems, pre
simulation priority ranking is a mere waste of time and computing resources. In view
of this, real-time node ranking, where nodes are ranked during simulation is proposed.
Prior to forcing maintenance, failed nodes are arranged into groups, based on the
number of available CM teams. Let v1  n1  λ1 be the number of idle CM teams
at time t, and g, the number of failed nodes. If there are more failed nodes than
there are available CM teams (i.e., v1   g | v1  0), all the possible combinations
of nodes that can be repaired are generated, producing
 
g
v1

groups, each containing
v1 failed nodes. The nodes in the ﬁrst group are temporarily set to their expected
performance levels after CM, whilst those in the other groups remain in their current
states. The expected system performance, given the new node states is determined, and
the procedure repeated for all the node groups. The maintenance of the nodes in the
group with the best system performance is then initiated. Real-time ranking, therefore,
does not only take into consideration the current system conditions but happens only
when necessary, the latter being a computational eﬃciency boost, especially for complex
systems. This ranking procedure is applicable to shared maintenance scenarios, as well.
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4.4.3 The Simulation Algorithm
With the relationships between system nodes deﬁned, a Monte Carlo simulation algo-
rithm is required to reconstruct the operation of the system and derive its availability
indices. An eﬃcient event-driven and non system-speciﬁc simulation algorithm is pro-
posed for this purpose. It proceeds by going through sampled node transitions, deter-
mining the ﬂows through the output nodes, and collecting these ﬂows. Starting with the
nodes in their initial states at time, t  0, the system's initial performance is determined
and the next transition times of nodes sampled. The simulation jumps to a new time,
t  tmin, where tmin is the minimum of the next transition times of nodes. Nodes with
transition times equal to tmin are identiﬁed, the required state changes eﬀected, their
next transition times sampled, the new system performance deduced, and the next sim-
ulation jump determined. This continues until the mission time, Tm, is exceeded. The
relevant availability and performance indices are derived at the end of the simulation
from the saved system performance history. To ease the computational burden, ﬂow is
calculated only if at time, t, the current and previous system node capacity vectors (µ
and µold) are diﬀerent. The simulation procedure is summarised as follows.
1. Initialise the register to store the output node history and calculate ﬂows across all
the subsystems, as described in Section 4.4. Deﬁne the mission time, Tm, number
of simulation samples, N , and number of maintenance teams, pn1, n2q.
2. Deﬁne µ from the initial states and capacities of nodes. Set τ  t8uM , µold  0,
δ  h1  h2  H, t  λ1  λ2  0, and all the elements of I to zero.
3. Sample the next transition time for all the nodes and update τ . Also determine
their PM due times (if applicable), and store in τ pm.
4. Identify the nodes with transition time equal to t, updating their current states,
µ, h1, and accounting for any interdependencies.
5. For each node in step 4, determine its subsystem and set the indicator element
for the subsystem in I to 1. Sample the node's next transition and update τ . If
it is just from PM, determine its next PM due time and update τ pm.
6. Determine nodes whose value in τ pm equals t and add them to h2.
7. Force maintenance as described in Section 4.4.1 if there are nodes in the mainte-
nance queue and provided there are available maintenance teams. That is, h1  H
and n1  λ1 ¡ 0 or h2  H and n2  λ2 ¡ 0.
8. If µold  µ, determine the system performance, as outlined in Section 4.3.4.
9. Set µold  µ and determine the next system transition time, t, given by the
minimum of all the possible transition times. The next simulation jump, therefore,
occurs at time, t  minpminpτ q,minpτ pmqq.
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Figure 4.6: System performance history for
one Monte Carlo realisation.
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Figure 4.7: System performance history
showing failure and recovery times.
10. Repeat steps 4 through 9 until t exceeds Tm.
11. Repeat steps 2 through 10, N times and compute the relevant availability indices.
4.5 Obtaining the Availability and Performance Indices
Details on the frequently used availability and performance indices are available in
many standard reliability texts [27,77]. However, the following indices; reliability, recov-
ery probability, instantaneous availability, steady-state availability, instantaneous output,
and expected output have been considered, for completeness.
Ψ  tψiu
j | ψi P C, T  ttiuj | 0   ti ¤ Tm (4.3)
During system simulation, a node transition results in system transition only if it
leads to the attainment of a new system performance level. The main task, therefore, is
the collection of these performance levels and their corresponding attainment times. For
a simulation sample, let the system performances be stored in Ψ as they are attained
and the corresponding transition times, in T. If these are deﬁned according to Equation
4.3, where ti is the ith transition time, ψi, the corresponding system performance, and
j, the total number of system transitions. C  tφ1, φ2, ..., φnu is the set of possible
system performances obtained from the simulation, where φz | z P t1, 2, ..., nu is the zth
system performance level and n, the number of possible performance levels.
Figure 4.6 shows the performance history of a hypothetical 3-performance-level sys-
tem. A system simulation of N samples contains N such histories, which are used to
derive the various reliability and availability indices of the system. The algorithms pro-
posed for this purpose are based on an eﬃcient binary-state translation of the system
simulation history. Translating the multi-state performance history, Ψ, to a binary
string eﬀectively reduces the multi-state reliability problem to its simpler binary-state
counterpart. This enhances the application of well-known binary-state system reliability
algorithms to the calculation of multi-state system reliability and performance indices.
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4.5.1 System Reliability and Recovery Probability
The reliability of a repairable system at time, t, is the probability that the system will
not fail between times 0 and t, given it was new or repaired to as-good-as-new at time
0. Failure is relative, and depends on the type of system and the success criteria set by
the analyst. For multi-state systems, it is deﬁned with respect to the system operating
below a certain performance level. The likelihood that the system will be restored to
this performance level in time, t, after failure, is deﬁned by its recovery probability, rptq.
Consider the system represented by Figure 4.6, and let it be considered failed when
operating below φ3. Figure 4.7 shows its performance history for one simulation sample,
with annotations portraying the physical meanings of failure and recovery. tfi is the
time the system takes at φ3 before the ith failure, and tri , the corresponding recovery
duration. If the transitions resulting in system performance of φ3 are replaced with 1,
and 0, otherwise, the system performance history is translated into a string of 1's and
0's, as shown in Figure 4.7. This string is used in conjunction with T to derive the
reliability and other performance indices of the system. For instance, system failures
and recovery are easily identiﬁed by the positions of the sub strings, `1 0' and `0 1',
respectively, in the string. If these positions are deﬁned by vectors σf and σr, the sets
of system failure and corresponding recovery times can be obtained from T. These sets
respectively deﬁne the failure and recovery time density functions, fptf q and fptrq, of
the system. Their corresponding cumulative density functions, F ptf q and F ptrq, are
used to deduce Rptq and rptq from 1 F ptf q and 1 F ptrq, respectively.
For a multi component system assumed initially perfect (which is the case if relia-
bility is of interest), only the ﬁrst failure times, tf1 , of each simulation sample are used
to deﬁne fptf q. This is explained by the fact that, depending on the structure and
properties of its components, a system may have one or more components in a degraded
state and still attain/maintain the required performance. It is the case, for example,
in a 2-branch, purely parallel system, where, one branch is suﬃcient to attain nominal
system performance. Though both yield the same performance, the system with only
one branch available has a higher probability of failure. System failure times yielded
in this case, therefore, underestimate the reliability of the system. A system's perfor-
mance history alone cannot say exactly the states of its nodes at system recovery. It is,
therefore, impossible to determine whether the higher order failure times, tf2 , tf3 , ..., tfj ,
were yielded by the perfect system. Though this is possible by collecting the system
state vector at every transition, it is a computationally expensive option. Hence, system
reliability, redeﬁned as a function of ﬁrst failures only, is expressed as, Rptq  1F ptf1q.
A system's reliability and recovery probability have been shown to be derived from
the cumulative density functions of its failure and recovery times, respectively. These
density functions are directly obtainable from the system performance history via an
approximation technique. With the failure and recovery times collected, the mission
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time, Tm, can be divided into time-steps, δ, and the average contribution of each failure
time, tfi , and recovery time, tri , to each time-step estimated. The accuracy of the
estimates is determined by how small δ is, relative Tm. It is, however, worthwhile
noting that the discretisation is only required to estimate the instantaneous performance
indices, the actual simulation does not require time-steps. Outlined below are the steps
for deducing Rptq and rptq from the system performance history.
1. Deﬁne δt; the total number of time-steps, such that δt  rTm{δs and φref , the
performance of interest. Set Rptq  r1ptq  t0uδt , i  1 and c  0, where c is the
number of recovery times computed, and i, the index of the current history.
2. Given Ψi and Ti are the performance history of the ith simulation sample, modify
their contents to include system performances at t  0 and t  Tm. The perfor-
mance, ψj , at the last system transition is made the performance at t  Tm.
3. Deﬁne a binary string, $  t$kuj | k  1, 2, ..., j, such that $k  1 if ψk ¥ φref ,
and 0, otherwise.
4. Obtain σf and σr; the locations of failures and recoveries in $ with their corre-
sponding times, Tf and Tr, such that Tf 
 
T, σf   1

and Tr  pT, σr   1q.
5. Take the ﬁrst element of Tf , determine j0; the number of time-steps it repre-
sents and increment the ﬁrst j0 elements of Rptq by 1. That is, pRptq, 1 Ñ j0q 
pRptq, 1 Ñ j0q   1; where, j0  rpTf , 1q {δs.
6. Discard the last element of Tf if it has more elements than Tr, and determine the
recovery durations, ∆r, such that, ∆r  Tr  Tf .
7. Take the ﬁrst element of Tr, determine j0 and increment the ﬁrst j0 elements of
r1ptq by 1, such that, pr1ptq, 1 Ñ j0q  pr1ptq, 1 Ñ j0q   1 and j0  rp∆r, 1q {δs.
Also increment the recovery time counter, c, by 1, such that, c  c  1.
8. Repeat step 7 until all the elements of ∆r have been covered, and increment the
simulation index counter, i, by 1, such that, i  i  1.
9. Repeat steps 2 to 8 until i  N   1, N being the number of simulation samples.
10. Compute the reliability as, Rptq  Rptq{N , the non-recovery probability, as r1ptq 
r1ptq{c, the recovery probability as 1 r1ptq, and terminate the algorithm.
4.5.2 Instantaneous Availability and Expected System Output
The instantaneous availability, Aptq, of a system is the probability that its performance
at time, t, is greater than or equal to some reference, φq. The expected system perfor-
mance at this time deﬁnes the instantaneous output, Xptq.
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Let P ptq  tpzptquk be the vector of instantaneous state probabilities; the probabil-
ities of the system being in each of its performance levels at time, t. If the elements of
C are ordered such that, φz   φz 1   ...   φk, Aptq and Xptq are deﬁned as follows.
Aptq 
k¸
z¥q
pzptq, Xptq 
k¸
z1
φzpzptq (4.4)
The average values of Aptq and Xptq over the mission time, respectively deﬁne the
steady-state availability and the expected system output. They are obtained from
Equation 4.4 by replacing the instantaneous state probabilities, pzptq, with their average
values, pz. Where, pz is the fraction of the mission time spent at performance level
z. Therefore, obtaining a system's state probabilities is key to its availability and
performance assessment. The following steps describe how this is eﬃciently achieved.
1. Deﬁne δt; the number of time-steps, n; the number of performance levels, and set
z  1. Where, z is the system performance level under consideration.
2. Set pzptq  t0uδt , τz  0, and i  1. Where, τz is the total time spent at
performance level z and i, the index of the current simulation history.
3. Modify Ψi and Ti to include system performances at t  0 and T  Tm.
4. Deﬁne a binary string, $  t$kuj | k  1, 2, ..., j, such that, $k  1 if ψk  φz,
and 0, otherwise.
5. Set the last element of$ to 0. This ensures the period between the last transition
and Tm is accounted for, given the transition was to performance level z.
6. Obtain σ; the locations of the sub string, `1  0' in $. Compute T1  pT, σq,
T2  pT, σ   1q, and τz, such that, τz  τz  
°
pT2  T1q.
7. Deduce j1 and j2; the number of time-steps the ﬁrst elements of T1 and T2 re-
spectively represent and increment elements j1 to j2 of pzptq by 1.
8. Repeat step 7 for the remaining elements of T1 and T2, and set i  i  1.
9. Repeat steps 3 to 8 until i  N   1, compute pz  τz{NTm, pzptq  pzptq{N , and
set z  z   1.
10. Repeat steps 2 to 9 until z  n  1 and terminate the algorithm.
With the system state probabilities known, Aptq is obtained from Equation 4.4. Often,
however, only the availability with respect to a set of states or a range of performances
is required. In both cases, deriving all the system state probabilities is unnecessary
and time-consuming. The good news is that, the algorithm described above remains
applicable, albeit with minimal modiﬁcations. The availability with respect to a given
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Figure 4.8: Bounds on maintenance response inadequacy of a sample system.
condition is obtained by disregarding step 10 and modifying step 4 to reﬂect the desired
condition (s). For instance, the availability with respect to system performance being
between 10 and 20 would be implemented as, $k  1 if 10 ¤ ψk ¤ 20 in step 4.
4.5.3 Maintenance Response Inadequacy
When there are as many maintenance teams as repairable nodes, the latter spend negli-
gible time in failed or degraded states before maintenance intervention. This is not the
case with limited maintenance teams, as failed nodes would have to wait in the main-
tenance queue until a maintenance team is available. The probability that at time, t, a
node is in the maintenance queue deﬁnes the system's maintenance response inadequacy
relative to that node. It is a measure of how severe the eﬀect of limited maintenance is
on the node's availability and contribution to system performance.
With the basis for increasing the maintenance team size established, a system's
maintenance response inadequacies can be used to determine which nodes to priori-
tize, assuming certain node repairs require speciﬁc specialist skills. The maintenance
response inadequacy of a node is a right-continuous increasing function that approaches
a steady-state value with time. It is obtained by adding the instantaneous state prob-
abilities of the node's repairable failed and degraded states. At the system level, the
maintenance response inadequacies of a system's nodes can be combined, and a bound
on the probability of at least one of them being in the maintenance queue obtained.
These bounds provide a means of comparing the eﬃciency of two maintenance teams
without explicit reference to system performance. They also indicate when, during the
mission a maintenance team size scale-up is actually necessary, an attribute useful to
ageing systems. Figure 4.8, for instance, suggests maintenance team size scale-up for
the sample system is necessary only after t  t1.
Though the maintenance response inadequacy indicates the need to increase the
maintenance team size, it does not state its actual eﬀect on system performance. In order
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Figure 4.9: Schematic of an oﬀshore installation.
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Figure 4.10: State-space diagrams of components.
to justify this need under cost constraints, its eﬀect on system performance should be
established. This entails comparing the performances yielded by the system under zero
maintenance response inadequacy and with the current maintenance team size. Zero
maintenance response inadequacy is obtained by setting the number of maintenance
teams to inﬁnity. The diﬀerence in performance represents the maximum achievable
gain from scaling up the maintenance team. Its monetary value can be obtained and
compared against the minimum maintenance team scale-up cost, thereby enhancing a
robust decision-making process.
4.6 Case Study: An Oﬀshore Oil Installation
Using the system originally presented in [161], the applicability of the proposed approach
to interdependent systems prone to limited maintenance teams is illustrated here.
4.6.1 Problem Formulation
Figure 4.9 shows the schematic of an oﬀshore installation which failure and repair tran-
sitions of six of its components are described by Figure 4.10. The remaining components
are assumed to be perfectly reliable and the notations in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 are de-
ﬁned thus, TG; Turbo Generator, TC; Turbo Compressor, TEG; Try-ethylene Glycol
72
Table 4.1: Component repair priority.
Priority Component System Condition
1
TEG -
TG other TG unavailable
TC other TC unavailable
2
EC -
TC other TC available
3 TG other TG available
Unit, EC; Electro-Compressor, λmn; failure rate from state m to n, and µmn; repair
rate from state m to n. State 0, in Fig. 4.10 denotes the relevant component in its
normal operating mode, and state 1, its partial failure mode. When partially failed, the
component maintains its nominal performance but with an increased failure probability
to state 2, where it is completely failed.
The Well nominally produces 5.0  106 units of gas, 26500 units of oil, and 8000
units of water a day. These are separated at the Separation Unit and transmitted via
independent dedicated paths, as shown in Figure 4.9. The nominal gas demand is 3106
units at 60bar, and when gas production exceeds demand, for safety reasons, the excess
is burnt as ﬂare. Additional details on the oﬀshore plant are available in [161].
4.6.1.1 Interdependencies & Reconﬁguration
The major components of the plant (TEG, EC, oil pump and water pump) require
continuous supply of electricity to function. This reliance creates a functional coupling
between the electricity network and the paths transporting the three commodities. A
second functional coupling is introduced by the reliance of TCs and TGs on dried
compressed gas, for their functioning. Each TG is rated 13MW, the TEG and EC
consume 6MW each, while the two pumps consume 7MW each. When only one TG is
available, the EC and the water pump are shut down to maintain the production of oil
and gas. To ensure nominal production, a fraction of dried compressed gas (1.0  106
units) is diverted, compressed by the EC to 100bar, and re-injected into the Well. If
the EC is unavailable, the gas is injected directly into the well at 60bar, resulting in a
production at 80% of nominal levels. With no gas injection, production drops to 60%.
4.6.1.2 Maintenance Policy
Corrective maintenance is carried out according to a predeﬁned priority, as expressed in
Table 4.1. Repairs, once initiated, remain unaﬀected by the failure of other components,
regardless of their superiority on the priority list. In addition to corrective maintenance,
TCs and TGs undergo three types of preventive maintenance interventions, while the
EC undergoes one. To ensure minimal eﬀect on performance, preventive maintenance
is carried out only when the system is perfect. Table 4.2 outlines the various PM
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Table 4.2: Component preventive maintenance schedule.
PM Type Component Interval(h) Mean Duration(h)
1 TC,TG 2160 4
2 EC 2666 113
3 TC,TG 8760 120
4 TC,TG 43800 672
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Figure 4.11: State-space for EC and TEG.
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Figure 4.12: State-space for TC and TG.
types, their intervals, and mean duration. The latter are assumed to be exponentially
distributed, and the former, as the absolute time between successive PM interventions.
4.6.1.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
In [161], the goal was to determine the production availability of the plant under the
maintenance policy described. It was approached by enumerating the plant's production
levels, reconstructing the cycle of component failures & maintenance, and monitoring
production level occurrences. Identifying the production level corresponding to a given
plant conﬁguration during the simulation had required the use of an innovative approach
based on cut sets. In practice, each production level is identiﬁed by a pair of cut sets
deﬁned as minimum and maximum cut sets. Although the solution proposed was very
eﬃcient and innovative, it required the manual identiﬁcation of those cut sets and their
corresponding production levels. This, even for a moderately sized system, can be quite
time-consuming, error-prone, and may become impractical for some systems.
4.6.2 Solution Procedure
Given the challenges of the Monte Carlo simulation approach used by the original au-
thors, the approach proposed in this chapter was applied to the plant.
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are modiﬁcations of the state diagrams of the plant's compo-
nents presented in Figure 4.10. The modiﬁcations are such that the realistic operation
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Figure 4.13: System model showing dependencies.
of components, consequent of system dynamics is reﬂected. The state, shut-down (S), is
introduced to account for restart and shut-down (reconﬁguration of the component). In
the plant, PM takes place only when all its components are in their perfect states. This
explains why the transition to PM in the modiﬁed state diagrams is from state 0. With
the exception of state 4 in Figure 4.12, a component has 0 capacity when in any of the
shut-down, CM and PM states. State 4 is an exception because it represents a minimal
repair, and, therefore, does not require the component to be taken out of operation.
Hence, its capacity from state 2 is retained. Transitions to the maintenance states, CM
and PM, are forced, as they depend on the availability of an idle maintenance team. A
component for instance, remains in state 3 indeﬁnitely until an idle maintenance team
initiates its repair. Similarly, transitions to shut-down are forced, since they denote an
induced unavailability of a component due to the unavailability of another component.
D16 
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(4.5)
4.6.2.1 Modelling the Plant
Shown in Figure 4.13 is the plant's schematic, with the relevant nodes and their re-
lationships. The Well is separated into three nodes, 1, 2, and 3, each supplying gas,
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Figure 4.14: Plant network model.
oil, and water respectively. Its third production level is unreachable, since there is no
gas lift only if the entire system is failed. Therefore, each of the three nodes exists in
only two states, 100% (state 1) and 80% (state 2) nominal output. A third state, with
capacity 0 is introduced to account for the period when the plant is completely shut
down, consequent of either PM or component failure. Transitions between the non-zero
output levels are triggered by the EC, and are, therefore, considered forced transitions.
The alternative path for gas lift, node 17, is activated on the unavailability of node 16
and deactivated when available. It, therefore, has a standby relationship with the latter
and exists in two states, active (state 1) and standby (state 2). Nodes 1, 2, and 3 are
aﬀected accordingly on its activation or deactivation, as speciﬁed in Equation 4.5.
Xgas  `

η6 Xlift 
¸
iPw
ctiux

Xoil  η11, Xwater  η13
(4.6)
The plant is separated into two subsystems, on the basis of commodity transported.
The paths transporting gas, oil, and water are considered a single subsystem (production
subsystem), by virtue of their independence. The ﬂare is excess gas, and it is, therefore,
discarded, since it has no eﬀect on the gas output. The demands at nodes 7, 11, and 13
are respectively taken as the nominal Well output of gas, oil, and water. The capacities
of nodes 8, 9, 14, and 15 are each 0.1 106 units of gas, and those of nodes 16 and 17,
1106 units of gas. These nodes, according to the plant's schematic (Figure 4.13) appear
to be competing with node 7 for the gas output from the TEG. In reality, the quantity
of gas required to keep the TGs and TCs in operation and the gas lift are used up ﬁrst,
and any excess exported via node 7. This, however, is not considered by the subsystem's
network model. Therefore, the gas output (ﬂow through node 7), as deduced from the
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network model should be corrected. The eﬀective gas output is the diﬀerence between
the gas ﬂow into the TEG, the quantity used for gas lift (Xlift  1  106), and the
gas consumed by any available TCs and TGs. Following ﬂow calculation, the eﬀective
outputs, Xgas, Xoil, andXwater, of gas, oil, and water are given by Equation 4.6. Where,
ηi is the ﬂow through node i, w  t8, 9, 14, 15u, and ` is an indicator function that takes
the value 1 when η7 ¡ 0, and 0, otherwise.
Figure 4.14 shows the plant's network model, with the maximum ﬂow along each link
indicated. Flow along the gas production line is in Mega units, the oil and water lines,
in kilo units, and the electricity line, in MW . The electricity network is considered a
separate subsystem, as shown in Figure 4.14. Nodes 21 to 24 are demand points (local
sources) for nodes 12, 10, 16, and 6 from the production subsystem. They, therefore,
exist in two states, active, when their respective dependent nodes are working, and
inactive, otherwise. Node 20 is a dummy node, assumed perfectly reliable, and assigned
a constant capacity of 26 units, the combined maximum output of the TGs. The
minimum threshold ﬂows, Λ21 and Λ23, of nodes 21 and 23 are set to 5.99 and 6.99
units, respectively, to account for the unavailability of one TG. With only one TG
available, the ﬂows through nodes 21 and 23 fall below their thresholds, and are shut
down, as explained in Section 4.3.3. This augments the ﬂows through nodes 22 and 24
to their required levels and keeps the EC and the oil pump in operation. The demands
at the three output nodes are ﬁxed, and the oil and water pumps, as well as node
20, are perfectly reliable. Their reconﬁguration (shut down and restart), therefore,
is unnecessary. This condition has been implemented by assigning a negative value
to their threshold ﬂows. With this manipulation, the shut-down requirement due to
their eﬀective load is never satisﬁed, since the actual load ﬂows are non-negative. The
remaining nodes are assigned a 0 minimum threshold ﬂow requirement.
4.6.2.2 Production Level Determination
To determine the production availability of the plant, the evolution of Xgas, Xoil, and
Xwater are recorded as the simulation progresses. At the end of the simulation, the
possible performance levels of each commodity are determined from the performance
history of its relevant output node. The possible combinations of performance levels of
the three commodities are generated, and their occurrences in the simulation history
identiﬁed, to deduce the possible plant performance levels.
4.6.3 Simulation Results
A Matlab application was developed to model the plant under the following scenarios,
CM only by one team (Case 1), CM only by two teams (Case 2), and both CM and
PM by two teams; one dedicated to each maintenance type (Case 3). 1  105 Monte
Carlo simulation samples of the plant's performance evolution for a mission time, Tm 
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Table 4.3: Production levels of individual commodities.
Production Level
Commodity
Gas (106) Oil (103) Water (103)
1 0 0 0
2 0.9 21.2 6.4
3 1 23.3 7
4 2.6
5 2.7
6 3
Table 4.4: Gas production level probabilities.
Production Level
State Probabilities
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
6 9.22 101 9.30 101 7.78 101
5 3.85 102 3.60 102 8.95 102
4 4.80 103 4.70 103 4.09 102
3 2.50 103 1.10 103 5.90 103
2 3.06 102 2.76 102 8.19 102
1 1.90 103 7.84 104 3.80 103
Table 4.5: Oil production level probabilities.
Production Level
State Probabilities
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
3 9.52 101 9.57 101 8.58 101
2 4.62 102 4.19 102 1.38 101
1 1.90 103 7.84 104 3.84 103
Table 4.6: Water production level probabilities.
Production Level
State Probabilities
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
3 9.52 101 9.57 101 8.58 101
2 5.20 103 4.80 103 4.26 102
1 4.29 102 3.79 102 9.90 102
Table 4.7: Plant production levels identiﬁed.
Output Type
Production Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Gas (106) 3 0.9 2.7 1 2.6 0.9 0
Oil (103) 23.3 23.3 21.2 21.2 21.2 21.2 0
Water (103) 7 7 0 0 6.4 6.4 0
1 103 hours, were studied in cases 1 and 2 while 3 104 samples for a mission time of
2 105 hours were studied in case 3. A much larger mission time was used in case 3 to
accommodate several cycles of PM type 4, occurring once every 43800 hours.
Six production levels of gas and three each, of oil and water were identiﬁed by the
simulation algorithm. These were ordered from lowest to highest and assigned produc-
tion level numbers, as shown in Table 4.3. Their steady-state probabilities are given in
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Table 4.8: Comparison of plant production level probabilities.
Production Level
State Probability
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
1 9.22 101 9.30 101 7.74 101
2 2.99 102 2.74 102 8.03 102
3 3.84 102 3.60 102 8.93 102
4 2.50 103 1.10 103 5.90 103
5 4.70 103 4.70 103 4.09 102
6 3.11 104 1.43 104 1.70 103
7 1.90 103 7.84 104 3.80 103
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Figure 4.15: Expected instantaneous plant performance under CM only.
Tables 4.4-4.6. At the plant level, 7 production levels were identiﬁed, as presented in
Table 4.7. The probabilities of the plant residing in any of these levels during a mission
are presented in Table 4.8. Figure 4.15 shows the instantaneous production under CM
only, for both 1 and 2 maintenance teams. As expected, the plant performs better with
two maintenance teams. Overall, its availability at the nominal level improves, albeit
slightly (see Table 4.8). However, both scenarios yield the same performance, within
the ﬁrst 30 to 45 hours of operation. This is explained by the high initial reliability of
components, such that there are only a few failures, which can be conveniently covered
by even a single maintenance team. As fatigue creeps in, failed components begin to
queue, and more than one maintenance team is required. It is evident in Table 4.8 and
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Figure 4.17: Plant availability relative to state 1.
Tables 4.4-4.6 that the overall performance drops with PM. This is attributed to the
fact that components exhibit exponential failure characteristics. PM increases their un-
availability without improving their reliability [161]. Consequently, the smooth curves
in Figure 4.15 are replaced by the rough curves in Figure 4.16, the deep drops in per-
formance being due to the PM of critical components like the TEG. A similar trend is
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Table 4.9: Expected annual production.
Commodity
Expected Cumulative Output
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Gas 1.062 109 1.069 109 1.007 109
Oil 8.453 106 8.464 106 8.366 106
Water 2.446 106 2.456 106 2.292 106
Table 4.10: Expected annual production compared with Zio's result.
Commodity
Expected Cummulative Output
Case 1 Case 3
Proposed Approach Zio's Approach % Error Proposed Approach Zio's Approach % Error
Gas 1.062 109 1.065 109 0.28 1.007 109 1.069 109 5.80
Oil 8.453 106 8.482 106 0.34 8.366 106 8.154 106 2.60
Water 2.446 106 2.447 106 0.04 2.292 106 2.446 106 6.30
portrayed by the plant's instantaneous availability, as shown in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.18: Plant reliability and recovery probability relative to state 1.
4.6.3.1 Expected Production
A frequently used indicator of performance is the expected cumulative amount of com-
modity ﬂow through output nodes within a speciﬁed period. Using the data in Tables
4.4 to 4.6 and the identiﬁed production levels of each commodity, the expected annual
outputs of gas, oil, and water are as presented in Table 4.9. These values are compared
to those obtained by Zio et al. [161], as shown in Table 4.10. Only the results for cases
1 and 3 have been used here because case 2 was not considered by Zio et al.
4.6.3.2 Reliability and Recovery
The reliability and recovery of the plant are deﬁned with respect to its nominal produc-
tion level (state 1). Using the algorithm proposed in Section 4.5.1, the two quantities
were obtained as shown in Figure 4.18. The structure and properties of the plant are
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Figure 4.19: Maintenance response inadequacies for one CM team.
such that, the unavailability of any component leads to the plant's deviation from nom-
inal performance. Since maintenance comes into play only after component failure,
plant reliability is unaﬀected by the number of maintenance teams. Also, as outlined
in Table 4.2, four types of PM actions are applicable but the earliest starts after 2160
hours. This implies, plant performance during the ﬁrst 2160 hours is unaﬀected by PM.
These considerations explain why the same reliability curve was obtained for all the
three cases, as Figure 4.18(a) shows. Unsurprisingly, Figure 4.18(b) suggests 2 correc-
tive maintenance teams ensure a higher recovery probability, explained by the increased
response to component failures. For recovery within the ﬁrst 22 hours of deviation from
nominal performance, the policy implementing CM and PM gets the upper edge. This
is because a signiﬁcant proportion of these deviations is due to type-1 PM, with a mean
duration of only 4 hours. In most instances, however, the PM of some component may
be due while another component is under corrective maintenance. Given PM is only
carried out when the plant is in its perfect state, the component's PM is deferred un-
til all failed components are repaired. Even though the plant momentarily returns to
nominal performance after the last repair, this is not regarded a recovery, as nominal
performance is lost instantaneously when the queueing component is shut down for PM.
This explains why the recovery probability for case 3 is on average the least.
4.6.3.3 Eﬀects of Real-time component ranking
The plant's production availability was reassessed using real-time component ranking,
and by maximizing gas production. Though the same outcome yielded by the prede-
ﬁned priority ranking shown in Table 4.1 was obtained, real-time ranking presented an
intuitive alternative with little additional computational burden.
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Table 4.11: Maximum gains from maintenance team scale-up.
Commodity Expected Output
Percentage Gain
Case 1 Case 2
Gas 1.070 109 0.75 0.09
Oil 8.467 106 0.17 0.04
Water 2.458 106 0.49 0.08
4.6.3.4 Eﬀects of limited maintenance teams
The plant's maintenance response inadequacy with respect to each of its six maintain-
able components was obtained. To enhance this, their state transitions during simu-
lation were collected and saved as a function of time. As shown by their state-space
diagram, TCs and TGs can be shut down from state 2 (see Fig. 4.12) but that does
not remove them from the maintenance queue. Since maintenance response inadequacy
deﬁnes how likely it is to have a component in the maintenance queue, transitions to
and from shut-down (state 6) were not recorded. Figure 4.19 shows the maintenance
response inadequacies of the plant under one corrective maintenance team.
To investigate the eﬀects of limited maintenance on system performance and quantify
the possible gains from a maintenance team scale-up, the plant was re-analysed with an
unlimited number of maintenance teams. The expected annual production levels were
obtained and compared with the values presented in Table 4.9. The expected output,
with unlimited maintenance teams and the possible gains in cases 1 and 2 are given in
Table 4.11. The table reveals, gas production is most eﬀected by limited maintenance,
and that case 2 is already close to the optimum number of maintenance teams.
4.6.4 Comments and Discussions
The proposed simulation and modelling approach has allowed us to obtain the same
production levels identiﬁed via hand calculation by the original authors [161]. In addi-
tion, it yielded availability values at the nominal level that are within 6% of the reported
values, even though 70% less samples were used in case 3. The expected output of the
plant has been used as the reference parameter to assess the accuracy of the proposed
approach because, it is normally the performance index of interest in multi-state system
availability analysis. The `noticeable' error in the results of Case 3 are attributable to
the much smaller number of samples used in the proposed approach. Using 19 cores
on a 1895.257MHz AMD Opteron(tm) 6168 processor, cases 1 and 2 took an average
of 10.69 minutes and case 3, a few hours. Cases 1 and 2 required an additional 2.13
minutes when the plant was re-analysed using real-time component ranking.
To verify the eﬀects of the modiﬁcations made to the ﬂow calculation procedure,
the case studies presented in Chapter 3 were re-analysed on the same computer. Prior
calculation of node ﬂows improved the simulation speed by 52.9% in case study 1 and
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39.73% when applied to an unpublished 14-node system. However, it was not a feasible
alternative when the 21-node system presented in the second case study was considered.
The veriﬁcation outcome suggests, the smaller the size of the matrix, β, (see Section
4.4), the more advantageous the alternative of calculating and storing node ﬂows prior
to simulation. In addition, storage problems may be encountered with large systems,
since node ﬂows for all the possible system conﬁgurations have to be stored. These con-
straints make ﬂow calculation during simulation inevitable for large systems, resulting
in increased computational burden. The increased burden, however, can be mitigated
with access to parallel computing, where the required number of simulation samples is
shared across several computers or several workers on a multi-core computer.
The plant under consideration can exist in 437 conﬁgurations, considering corrective
maintenance alone. Traditional approaches would require matching each of these to a
production level [161]. Since this procedure can be time-consuming and error prone,
Zio et al [161], proposed an innovative approach based on the minimal and maximum
cut-sets of each production level. This approach, however, requires considerable human
eﬀort and a detailed knowledge of the plant's operational dynamics. It also suﬀers the
setback of not being suﬃciently general and intuitive, as a system's cut-sets and perfor-
mance levels depend on its structure and the properties of its components. Therefore,
every system would require a unique approach and a unique degree of diﬃculty.
Though the approach this chapter proposes is computationally more demanding
than Zio et al's [161], it does not require the manual identiﬁcation of production levels
and enumeration of system cut sets. All it requires are the deﬁnition of inter-component
relationships, component properties, and the structure of the system. The rest of the
analysis is carried out by eﬃcient algorithms. These attributes, coupled with the fact
that it allows system structure to be deﬁned by an adjacency matrix, make the pro-
posed approach easily applicable to any system structure. Considering the time and
human eﬀort involved in the manual identiﬁcation of production levels and the possi-
bility of costly errors, the proposed approach is an eﬃcient and credible alternative. Its
advantages particularly stand out when applied to complex systems.
4.7 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, an eﬃcient and powerful simulation tool has been presented for the
availability assessment of complex multi-state systems with interdependencies, multi-
commodity ﬂows, and limited maintenance teams. Algorithms for quantifying the rel-
evant system availability and performance indices, including a new metric for the in-
adequacy of maintenance response have also been presented. The proposed simulation
approach can implement reconﬁguration requirements and derive system performance
without reference to the system cut-sets or predeﬁned system performance levels. Tra-
ditional approaches, however, would require the manual listing of all the system per-
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formance levels and their associated cut-sets, which diﬃculty increases with system
complexity and size. This attribute, therefore, is a key advantage and an illustration
of its intuitiveness. Its applicability has been demonstrated by assessing the avail-
ability of a multi-commodity oﬀshore plant operated by limited maintenance teams.
By only deﬁning the intra and inter component relationships, the approach provided
(within an acceptable time frame) an outcome similar to one in literature, without prior
knowledge of the plant's production levels or cut-sets. This renders it less dependent
on human eﬀort, intuitive, robust to human-induced errors, and suitable for any sys-
tem architecture. It is implemented in the open-source uncertainty quantiﬁcation tool,
OpenCossan [109,110], and, therefore, readily available to academics and industry.
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Chapter 5
Probabilistic Risk Assessment of
Station Blackout Accidents
5.1 Introduction
Adequate AC power is required for decay heat removal in nuclear power plants. Station
blackout accidents, therefore, are a very critical phenomenon to their safety. Though
designed to cope with these incidents, nuclear power plants can only do so for a limited
time, without risking core damage and possible catastrophe. Their impact on a nuclear
power plant's safety is determined by their frequency and duration, which quantities,
currently, are computed via a static fault tree analysis that deteriorates in applicability
with increasing system complexity. This Chapter proposes a novel alternative frame-
work based on a hybrid of Monte Carlo methods, multi-state modelling, and network
theory. It is, in other words, an adaptation of the frameworks in Chapters 3 and 4
to station blackout modelling. The intuitive framework is applicable to a variety of
station blackout problems and can provide a complete insight into their risks. Most
importantly, its underlying modelling principles are generic, and, therefore, applicable
to non-nuclear system reliability problems, as well. When applied to the Maanshan
nuclear power plant in Taiwan, the results which are also published in [54], validate the
framework as a rational decision-support tool in the mitigation of station blackouts.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows; the next section reviews the
proposed approach, highlighting its merits over the existing techniques. Section 5.3 pro-
vides a detailed description of the proposed station blackout (SBO) accident modelling
framework. The simulation procedure, the computation of the relevant SBO indices, as
well as their incorporation into the existing fault tree modelling formalism, are discussed
in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents a practical case study, illustrating the application
of the proposed modelling framework. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the proposed
framework in Section 5.6, with insights into its applicability and future development.
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5.2 The Proposed Approach and Scope
As evidenced in Rao's, Rocha's, and Lei's works [72, 115, 120], Monte Carlo simulation
(MCS) is ﬂexible enough to model any system attribute. Its problem, however, is that
most of the existing MCS algorithms are system-speciﬁc and require either the structure
function, cut sets, or path sets of the system. An intuitive event-driven MCS procedure,
oﬀering multi-state component modelling opportunities was proposed in Chapter 3. This
procedure is general and does not require the deﬁnition of the system's path & cut sets
or structure function, thanks to its embedded graph model.
In this chapter, the graph and multi-state models proposed in Chapter 3 are adopted.
The graph model is used to model the topology of the system and allow the performance
of the system to be directly computed from the performance of the components. This
attribute eliminates the need for an explicit association of component failure combina-
tions to the state of the system. The multi-state model, on the other hand, is used
to model the behaviour of the components, overcoming the assumption of a perfectly
binary behaviour. It is particularly useful to the multiple failure mode and dynamic
attribute representation of the Emergency Power Systems. This model, for instance,
could be exploited to investigate the eﬀects of limited maintenance teams (see Chapter
5, for instance) or the unavailability of spares on the Emergency Power Systems recov-
ery [52]. The original model is extended to incorporate interdependencies by means of
a dependency matrix and an eﬃcient recursive algorithm to propagate the eﬀects of
failures across the system. Completing the framework, a simple MCS algorithm that
induces LOOP in the system, replicate the ensuing sequence of events, and monitor
the availability of power at the various safety buses, is proposed. The number of avail-
able safety buses, as a function of time, is computed after each system event. From
the simulation history, any SBO index can be computed, thereby providing an oppor-
tunity for more insights into SBO risks. The multi-state component model, together
with the dependency matrix, adequately captures and represents the redundancies in
the emergency power system of the plant. Consequently, the explicit modelling of these
redundancies, which sometimes poses a signiﬁcant challenge, is eliminated.
5.2.1 Merits & Novelty of Proposed Approach
The framework proposed is limited to grid and switchyard induced LOOP, given their
dominance [44]. Its preliminary results were ﬁrst presented at the 13th Probabilistic
Safety Assessment and Management conference [53]. However, this chapter proposes
several improvements. Firstly, an extensive review of the suitability of fault trees and
their derivatives, to SBO analysis has been included. The eﬀects of Common-Cause
Failures (CCF), unavailability due to test or maintenance, and human error on the
SBO frequency and recovery probability have also been considered. The chapter also
shows how the results obtained from the framework can be incorporated into the existing
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model. Finally, the number of computable SBO indices are extended and the eﬀects of
system conﬁguration and sequence of operator response on system recovery, considered.
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the ﬁrst documented application of load-
ﬂow simulation to a complete SBO risk assessment. With respect to the existing models
discussed in Section 2.4.1, the proposed framework exhibits the following advantages.
 Adequacy & Flexibility - it models realistic attributes of the plant's power
recovery and provides more insights into SBO risks. For instance, it enhances the
investigation of the possibility of a second SBO after the ﬁrst.
 Convenience & Generality - it is convenient in the sense that the modeller does
not need to deduce the combination of component failure leading to system fail-
ure. They also do not need to explicitly model component redundancies, as these
are implicitly captured by the modelling framework. In addition, the modelling
framework is applicable to many system reliability problems.
5.2.2 Solution Sequence
The proposed approach is applied as summarised by the following chronological steps.
1. Identify the key elements of the system, deﬁne its topology, and derive its ﬂow
equation parameters.
2. Develop the multi-state model for each system element.
3. Model the interdependencies between the elements.
4. Force a LOOP event and simulate the behaviour of the standby power systems.
5. Compute the SBO indices from the simulation history.
5.3 Station Blackout Modelling
A nuclear power plant's power system consists of the grid, the switchyard, the emer-
gency power systems, alternative emergency power systems, and the safety buses. The
alternative emergency power systems are additional emergency sources (such as gas tur-
bine generators) available at some plants to boost their LOOP/SBO recovery capability.
In this section, it is shown how the plant's power system is accurately modelled and
analysed, in line with the solution sequence outlined in Section 5.2.2.
5.3.1 The System Topology
The topology of the plant's power system is represented by a graph which nodes depict
the components of the system. Connecting the nodes are perfectly reliable links por-
traying the direction of power ﬂow. Flows from all the safety buses are terminated on a
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virtual node introduced to represent the total available power. This virtual node would
later be used to compute the non-recovery probability of AC power.
A  taijuMM | aij 
$&
%1 If ﬂow is iÑ j0 Otherwise (5.1)
ΘtXijuk1 ¤ tc
tiu
x uM1 | pi, jq P e, @i P V (5.2)
Let the nodes of the system be numbered from 1 to M and represented by the set
V  t1, 2, ...,Mu, as proposed in Chapter 3. Since the links are perfectly reliable, the
adjacency matrix, A, of the system is as deﬁned by Equation 5.1. The topology of the
system, therefore, can be deﬁned by G | G  pV ,Aq. Using the parameters of G only,
the ﬂow equations of the system can be derived (see Chapter 3). These equations can
then be used in synergy with the current state properties of the system nodes to deduce
the performance of the system. For this, a linear programming algorithm is employed,
given the possibility of ﬂow redirection and the need to satisfy the capacity constraints
of the nodes and their links. The objective is to ﬁnd the ﬂow across each link of the
system that maximizes the ﬂow into the virtual node. If Xij is the ﬂow across the link
between nodes i and j and given there are k such links for all pi, jq P e, where e is the
edge matrix of the system as deﬁned in Chapter 3, the linear programming problem
is formulated by Equations (5.2), (5.5), (5.7), and (5.8). Equation (5.2) expresses the
inequality constraints to be satisﬁed, where ctiux denotes the capacity of node i when in
state x. tctiux uM1, therefore, is the vector of current capacities of all the nodes of the
system. The inequality matrix, Θ, is related to the incidence matrix, Γ, as follows.
Θ  tθiquMk | θiq 
$&
%1, γiq  00, otherwise (5.3)
Γ  tγpquMk | γpq 
$'''&
'''%
1, p  i
1, p  j
0, otherwise
(5.4)
Γ is related to A by (5.4), where q  1, 2, ..., k (the edge number) is the index of the
edge between nodes i and j in e and p  1, 2, ...,M . Equation (5.5) expresses the
ΦtXijuk1  t0uð1 @pi, jq P e (5.5)
equality constraint to be satisﬁed, where Φ and Γ are related as in Equation 5.6.
Φ  tφλquðk | φλq  γpq
λ  1, 2, ...,ð | ð  M f : λÑ p @p P psY tq1
(5.6)
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lb  t0uk1, ub  tΩijuk1
Ωij  mintc
tiu
max, c
tju
maxu @pi, jq P e
(5.7)
ð is the number of intermediate nodes, s, the set of source nodes, which comprises the
grid and standby power systems, and t, the virtual node denoting the total output.
Φ, in eﬀect, is a sub matrix of Γ, containing all the rows of the latter corresponding
to intermediate nodes. Equation (5.7) deﬁnes the lower and upper bound vectors, lb
and ub, of the ﬂow through the links. Finally, the objective function of the linear
programming problem is expressed in Equation (5.8).
O  tψqu1ktXijuk1 | ψq 
¸
iPs
γiq (5.8)
The total output of the system is given by the tth element, pη, tq, of η. Interestingly,
all the parameters, but tctiux uM1, required to compute η remain static during system
simulation. The main task, therefore, is to update tctiux uM1 after each system event.
The derivation of Equations (5.2) to (5.8) is available in Chapter 3.
5.3.2 The System Components
Each component is deﬁned by a multi-state model that takes into account the vari-
ous parameters that characterise its operation. Since the links have been assumed to
be perfectly reliable, each component is deﬁned as Ei  pT ,C, x0q. T contains the
density function objects for all the transitions depicted in the multi-state model of the
component and C deﬁnes the capacity of the component in each state.
Each state capacity is expressed as a non-dimensional number deﬁning the propor-
tion of total system output the node can supply or transmit whilst residing in that state.
If m is the total number of power trains at the plant, χ, the number of power trains the
node simultaneously supplies, u, the proportion of power train demand it can satisfy, its
capacity when working perfectly is, χum1. This positive number expresses the total
system output as a fraction of the number of power trains/safety buses present at the
plant. On this note, the grid and switchyard nodes are each assigned unity capacity
when available and 0, otherwise. The virtual output node has a ﬁxed capacity of 1, and
each safety bus, a ﬁxed capacity of m1.
5.3.2.1 Modelling the Grid and Switchyard
The grid is modelled as a 2-state node; `Working', when available and `Failed', otherwise.
Though grid failures are mostly random, they are modelled as forced transitions, since
they already are incorporated in the LOOP frequency. Most often, plants tap their AC
power from multiple oﬀsite sources, and grid failure is deﬁned as the failure of all of
these sources. The repair of at least one of the failed sources, however, is suﬃcient to
achieve grid recovery. For this reason, the transition from `Failed' to `Working' is deﬁned
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Figure 5.1: Multi-state model for Grid and Switchyard nodes.
by the upper bound of the envelope around the cumulative density functions (CDF) of
the individual source repair distributions. Given this, sampling the grid recovery time
entails generating a uniform random number and reading oﬀ its corresponding time
from the envelope CDF, interpolating where necessary. An important point to note is,
this approach slightly underestimates the grid recovery probability, as it assumes the
individual source repair actions are initiated concurrently. In practice, the sources do
not necessarily fail simultaneously and their recovery actions may commence at diﬀerent
times. This implies, by the time the last source fails, the restoration of already failed
sources would have begun. The actual grid recovery time, therefore, is less than that
given by the envelope CDF. This, however, is acceptable, as the goal in risk management
is to ensure risk levels are acceptable, even in worst case scenarios.
Similarly, switchyard operation is deﬁned by a 2-state node. If the plant is enhanced
with multiple switchyards, switchyard recovery is treated as in the case of multiple grid
sources. Figure 5.1 shows the multi-state model for the grid and switchyard.
5.3.2.2 Modelling the Standby Power Systems
The emergency power system is constituted by the emergency diesel generators, and in
this work, gas turbine generators constitute the alternative emergency power system. In
this section, only the multi-state behaviour of the standby power systems is modelled.
The eﬀects of redundancies on their operation is considered in a latter section. The
following assumptions are invoked in developing these models.
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Figure 5.2: Models for emergency diesel and gas turbine generators without human error.
1. The initiation of test/maintenance is coincident with LOOP, and at any instance,
there is not more than one source in test or maintenance.
2. Sources in test or maintenance remain unavailable through the sequence.
3. Repairs are commenced immediately.
4. A generator just from maintenance cannot fail to start, implying a perfect main-
tenance scenario.
The alternative emergency power System recovery is assumed oﬀsite power recovery
in [53]. This assumption is on the premise that their failure is included in the LOOP
frequency. However, the assumption is impractical, given they are mostly a standby
source. Their multi-state model, therefore, is modiﬁed to include running failures,
rendering them an on-site source.
Failure-to-start and failure-to-run are considered the only failure modes an emer-
gency diesel generator is susceptible to. Failure-to-start refers to the emergency diesel
generator failure to start from cold-standby and failure-to-run denotes its failure to
function for the duration of the LOOP. While the former is deﬁned by a crisp proba-
bility, the latter is characterised by a time-to-failure probability density function. The
Standardised Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model [43] considers a third emergency diesel
generator failure mode, failure-to-load, deﬁning the case when the emergency diesel gen-
erator starts but cannot power the load. This failure mode is considered failure-to-start,
in the proposed framework. Two additional states, `Working' and `TM', are introduced
as shown in Figure 5.2, to account for the perfect operation of the emergency diesel
generator and its unavailability due to test or maintenance, respectively. Except other-
wise, the transition from cold standby to working is instantaneous, whilst the transition
from cold standby to failure or TM is also instantaneous but conditional. Conditional
transitions are a special type of forced transition depending on a probabilistic event that
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Figure 5.3: Multi-state model for switchyard with human error consideration.
is external to the component and with a known likelihood [52]. Conditional and forced
transitions have the same representation in the transition matrix of the component.
The gas turbine generators behave in almost the same way as the emergency diesel
generators, save for the diﬀerence in their start-up and manual alignment times. For
this, a start-up state is inserted between their cold-standby and working states, as shown
in Figure 5.2. Whilst in start-up, they could fail, explaining the transition 4 Ñ 2.
5.3.2.3 Accounting for Human Error
Human error is very important in the risk assessment of engineering systems. In SBO
recovery, human errors mostly manifest themselves as delayed response to a certain
SBO mitigation action. For instance, the switchyard is forced into a temporary shut-
down state during grid failures. On grid recovery, the plant personnel manually initiate
its restoration, which process is susceptible to human-induced delays. Accounting for
these delays, two additional states are introduced in the 2-state model discussed in
Section 5.3.2.1, as shown in Figure 5.3. The transitions from `Working' to `Shut-down'
and from `Shut-down' to `Delay' (D), are inﬂuenced by grid failure and recovery respec-
tively. `shut-down' denotes grid recovery-in-progress, while `Delay' represents switching-
in-progress. The latter determines the diﬀerence between the potential and actual bus
recovery times. If this diﬀerence is negligible or the potential, instead of the actual bus
recovery time is required, the model in Figure 5.1 is retained.
Similarly, the gas turbine generators and some emergency diesel generators require
manual start-up and alignment, which is the case for shared diesel generators. A gen-
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Figure 5.4: Models for emergency diesel and gas turbine generators with human error.
erator is said to be shared if it can substitute several units but, however, can only
replace one unit at a given instance. Therefore, in the case of sequential multiple unit
failures, only the ﬁrst unit is replaced. For simultaneous failures, any of the units can
be replaced, since they normally are identical. Since these replacements are manually
executed, they are susceptible to delays, contrary to what most models suggest. Fig-
ure 5.2, for instance, assumes the transition from cold standby to the fully functional
or failure state to be instantaneous. This, by extension, implies, any maintenance ac-
tion (if the generator fails to start) is initiated at once. However, with human error,
the start-up procedure may be initiated later than scheduled. Two additional states,
therefore, are introduced, one each, between cold standby & working and failure & cold
standby, as shown in Figure 5.4, to account for these delays. The plant personnel have
been assumed to be well trained, experienced, and ﬁt to perform their assigned tasks as
expected. Consequently, the possibility of inappropriately executed actions is ignored.
Transitions 6 Ñ 1 with 4 Ñ 7 and transition 7 Ñ 4 with 5 Ñ 8, of Figure 5.4,
account for human error in the recovery of manually operated emergency diesel and gas
turbine generators, respectively. In practical applications, human error is expressed in
terms of the probability of not completing a given action within a speciﬁed time. If
this probability is known for multiple times, a CDF could be ﬁtted through the points.
For this, the Weibull distribution is recommended, since it can yield a wide range of
distributions. Recall the CDF of a Weibull distribution is 1  ept{aq
b
, where a and b
are its scale and shape parameters, respectively. Given the human error probabilities
are the likelihoods of inaction, they deﬁne the complement of the human reaction time
CDF. Therefore, the Weibull parameters, a and b, are obtained by ﬁtting the set of
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probability values to the function ept{aq
b
.
5.3.3 Modelling Component Interdependencies
To ensure resilience, system designers often employ multiple layers of defence, either in
the form of redundancies or shared components. This proactive strategy inadvertently
introduces interdependencies in the system, resulting in modelling accuracy issues. In-
terdependency is deﬁned in a more general sense as the potential for a state change
in one element to trigger a state change in another. Two models, the CCF and the
cascading failure models, are proposed to implement these interdependencies.
5.3.3.1 The CCF Model
This model is used when the random failure of any member of a group of similar
components, performing the same task could cause the failure of one or more of the
remaining components [104]. Following from Section 2.2.1.1,
 there is a set of probabilities associated with the number of components involved
in any random failure event. Let this set of probabilities, for group k, be deﬁned by
θtku | θtku  tθ
tku
r uMk , where r is the number of components involved in the failure
event, Mk, the total number of components in the group, and
°Mk
r1 θ
tku
r  1.
 all the components in a CCG fail in the same mode. Implying, the CCG for
start-up failures cannot inﬂuence the CCG for running failures, for instance.
Each CCG, therefore, can be deﬁned by the quadruple,

ρtku, β
tku
1 , β
tku
2 ,θ
tku
	
. Where,
ρtku is the set of components in the CCG, βtku1 , the common failure mode, and β
tku
2 ,
the state the components have to be in to be susceptible to this failure mode. The
algorithm for propagating CCF is summarised as follows.
1. When a component fails, determine k and check if its new state matches βtku1 .
2. Go to step 5 if there is no match. Else, determine the number of components, r,
that will fail.
3. Go to step 5 if r  1. Else, remove from ρtku, the component initiating the failure
event. From the remainder, randomly select r  1 components.
4. For each component selected in step 3, check if its current state matches βtku2 and
set this to βtku1 .
5. End procedure.
The procedure above requires θtku to be in conformity with the α-factor model [104].
CCF probabilities expressed in other models would need to be converted as in [104].
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5.3.3.2 The Cascading Failure Model
This model is used for interdependencies not satisfying the CCF criteria. For instance,
the redundancies among the standby power systems and the dependence of the latter
on the grid and switchyard. An important assumption invoked in this model, however,
is that on occurrence of the trigger event, the dependent event occurs immediately.
Initially proposed in Chapter 4, the model deﬁnes interdependencies by a dependency
matrix. The dependency matrix, Di, for node i, deﬁnes the eﬀects of the node's state
transition on other nodes. It takes the form,Di  tdj1, dj2, dj3, dj4uv4 | j  1, 2, ..., v
1, v, where dj1 is the state of i triggering the event, dj2, the aﬀected node, dj3, the state
the node has to be in to be vulnerable, and dj4, its target state after the event. Each row
ofDi deﬁnes the behaviour of an aﬀected node, and v, the number of relationships. For
example, consider a 2-component system, with each component existing in 3 possible
distinct states. When component 1 makes a transition to state 3, component 2 is forced
to make a transition to state 2 as well, if and only if the latter is currently residing in
state 1. Since component 1 is the trigger, the interdependency is deﬁned by D1 as,
D1 

3 2 1 2
	
(5.9)
Let a third 3-state component be added to the system. In addition to its eﬀect on
component 2, let the transition of component 1 also aﬀect component 3, such that the
latter is forced to state 1 if it is in state 3 at the time of the trigger event. To represent
the overall behaviour of component 1, D1 is updated as shown in Equation 5.10, which
indicates that each row of the dependency matrix represents a possible outcome.
D1 

3 2 1 2
3 3 3 1

(5.10)
Occasionally, a state change in a node can only aﬀect another node if a third node
is in a certain state. This type of dependency is known as a joint dependency, and it
is outside the scope of the initial model in Chapter 4. The joint dependency matrix,
D1  td1j1, d
1
j2, d
1
j3, d
1
j4uv4, is introduced (in this chapter) to resolve this problem.
Element d1j1 deﬁnes the state the third node must be in to satisfy the joint dependency
while d1j2, d
1
j3, and d
1
j4 have the same meaning as dj2, dj3, and dj4 respectively. Assuming
a certain state change in node i only aﬀects, say node x, if node ω is in state σ,Di deﬁnes
the relationship between nodes i and ω, while D1ω deﬁnes the relationship between ω
and x. Nodes i, ω, and x are the trigger, intermediate, and target nodes, respectively.
The intermediate node does not undergo a state change, meaning its target state is
the same as its vulnerable state. Therefore, in Di, the 3rd and 4th elements of the
row corresponding to the intermediate node are equal. Given j  1, for Di, d12  ω,
d13  d14  σ and for D1ω, d
1
11  σ, d
1
12  x. The remaining elements retain their
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meaning, as deﬁned earlier.
D1 

3 2 1 2
3 2 2 2

D12 

2 3 3 1
	
(5.11)
Let, for illustrative purposes, the dependency between components 1 and 3 (second
row of D1 in Equation 5.10 only hold if component 2 is in state 2. To represent
this attribute, the second row of D1 is modiﬁed to reﬂect the relationship between
components 1 and 2, and the relationship between components 2 and 3, deﬁned by
D12, as shown in Equation 5.11. Notice D
1
2, instead of D2, has been used, since the
relationship between components 2 and 3 is due to a joint dependency.
D1 

3 2 1 2
3 2 3 3

D12 

3 3 3 1
	
(5.12)
The dependency and joint dependency matrices, indeed, can be used to represent a
wide range of dependencies. However, there are instances that may result in large ma-
trices, which cases require an intuitive manipulation, to keep the matrix size moderate
and prevent errors. A negative sign is introduced in front of the trigger or vulnerable
state to signify that the dependency is satisﬁed only if the component is not in that
state. This notation is analogous to the NOT-gate in fault trees. For instance, if com-
ponent 1, in the scenario above, aﬀects component 3 only if component 2 is in states 2
or 1, it is eﬃcient to exploit the NOT notation, instead of inserting an additional row
in each of D1 and D12. Recalling that component 2 has 3 states, state 2 OR state 1 is
logically equivalent to NOT state 3. Hence, D1 and D12 are as given in Equation 3.14.
A recursive algorithm is proposed to implement the dependency matrices. If xi
denotes the new/current state of node i, the algorithm is summarised as follows.
1. Deﬁne a register, R, to hold the aﬀected components, their vulnerable, and target
states.
2. Using Di and xi , ﬁnd all components aﬀected by the state change and update R
with elements 2 to 4 of the rows representing the components.
3. Select the last row of R and check if its last two elements are equal. This row
deﬁnes the dependency induced in component ω by component i.
4. If the response to the query in step 3 is in the aﬃrmative, designate the equal
elements, , delete the last row of R, and,
(a) using ω, D1ω, and xω as inputs, call steps 1 to 7, noting that a row in D
1
ω is
aﬀected by the state change only if its ﬁrst element is .
(b) Continue from step 3.
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Else, proceed to step 5.
5. Force the designated transition as determined in step 3 and delete the last row
of R. If the aﬀected node is in standby, and its target state, Working, Delay, or
Start-Up, initiate its start-up procedure.
6. IfDω exists, repeat steps 2 to 6, replacingDi and xi withDω and xω respectively.
7. Repeat steps 3 to 6 until R is empty, and terminate the procedure.
5.4 System Simulation & Analysis
The system's operation is imitated by generating random failure events of components
and their corresponding repairs. For every component transition, the capacity vector,
tc
tiu
x uM1, of the system is updated and used to deduce the ﬂow, pη, tq, through the
output node. At time t  0, the grid and switchyard nodes are in operation, while the
emergency power systems and alternative emergency power systems are in cold standby.
LOOP is initiated by setting the grid (for grid centred LOOP) or the switchyard to its
failure state. The next transition parameters of the standby systems are sampled, and
the simulation is moved to the earliest transition time, t. Components with next transi-
tion time equal to t are identiﬁed, the required transitions eﬀected, their next transition
times sampled, the new system performance computed, and the next simulation time
determined. This cycle of events continues until oﬀsite power is recovered.
Let µold hold the node capacities at the previous system transition, τ , the vector of
next node transition times, N , the number of simulation samples, and S  tsjuN , the
register indicating the occurrence of an SBO. The indicator register, S, is such that,
sj  1 if an SBO occurs in the jth sample, and 0, otherwise. The simulation algorithm
is summarised as follows.
1. Initialize the register storing the ﬂow through the output node, set N  1, S  tu,
and deﬁne the simulation stopping criterion. The stopping criterion could be the
number of LOOP, number of SBO, or convergence of the SBO probability.
2. Determine which component will be unavailable due to test or maintenance.
3. Set sN  0 and τ  t8uM , where M is the number of nodes in the system.
4. Force LOOP, as described earlier, accounting for interdependencies according to
the procedures described in Sections 5.3.3.1 and 5.3.3.2. Remember to sample the
next transition parameters after every node transition and update τ . See Chapter
3 for the procedure for sampling the transition parameters of a multi-state node.
5. Deﬁne µ using the current states of the nodes, that is, µ  tctiux0 uM1 and set
t  0, µold  µ.
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6. Determine Xout | Xout  pη, tq and save as a function of time.
7. Set sN  sN  1 if Xout  0 and determine the next simulation time, t  min pτ q.
8. Find nodes with next transition time equal to t. For each node, force the required
transition, sample its next transition parameters (except for nodes returning to
cold standby), and update µ & τ .
9. Restart nodes returning from repairs if Xout   1.
10. If µold  µ,
(a) compute Xout and set sN  sN   1 if Xout  0.
(b) save Xout if diﬀerent from the previous.
(c) temporarily set the capacity of the switchyard node to 1 if it is in shut-down
and calculate the new system ﬂow. If this ﬂow is non-zero, set the switchyard
to start-up, sample its next transition parameters, and update τ .
11. Set µold  µ, t  min pτ q , and check if oﬀsite power is recovered.
12. Repeat steps 8 to 11 until oﬀsite power is recovered. Discard history N if sN  0
and set N  N   1.
13. Repeat steps 2 to 12 until the simulation stopping criterion is met, and terminate
algorithm.
14. Compute the relevant SBO indices
5.4.1 SBO Indices: Computation & Relevance
The SBO frequency, fs, makes the list of the most informative and desired SBO indices.
It deﬁnes the expected number of times, per year, an SBO occurs at a plant. If ptsbou1
deﬁnes the conditional probability of an SBO given a LOOP occurring at frequency, fl,
fs  flp
tsbou
1
p
tsbou
1 
°
pS ¡ 0q
N  1
(5.13)
per year, Equation 5.13 shows how fs and p
tsbou
1 are obtained from the system simulation
history. The fraction of fs occurring at start-up is deduced from the number of SBO at
time 0. This index could be used to assess the eﬃciency of the start-up procedure, as
well as the vulnerability of the on-site backup generators in cold standby.
The non-recovery probability, r1 ptq, deﬁnes the likelihood of recovery duration from
an SBO accident exceeding a given time. It is computed as detailed in Chapter 4, and
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Figure 5.5: An excerpt from the SBO event tree showing headings.
like ptsbou1 , belongs to the set of inputs to the SBO event tree. Given it deﬁnes the
unavailability of power at the plant, r1 ptq can be directly compared with the reliability
of the SBO mitigating mechanism. The outcome of such a comparison would help
ascertain the adequacy of the mitigating mechanism. In addition, fs  r1 ptq yields the
frequency of exceedance, a measure of the overall SBO risk at the plant. It also presents
a means of assessing the relative eﬀectiveness of multiple recovery responses.
Finally, the conditional probability of a second SBO, ptsbou2 , the ﬁrst is given by,
p
tsbou
2 
°
pS ¡ 1q°
pS ¡ 0q
(5.14)
Knowledge of ptsbou2 may shape the recovery response on the occurrence of a second SBO.
For instance, a plant with a large ptsbou2 would require the logistics used in the recovery
of the ﬁrst SBO left in the ﬁeld and the operations staﬀ kept on high alert. This reduces
human error, ensuring a lower non-recovery probability, r12 ptq, of the second SBO.
ptsboun 
°
pS ¡ n 1q°
pS ¡ n 2q
(5.15)
Generally, the conditional probability, ptsboun , of the nth SBO given the pn 1qth
SBO is expressed as in Equation 5.15. If, however, absolute probabilities are required
instead, the denominator of the right-hand side of the equation is replaced with N  1.
5.4.2 Incorporation into the Existing Framework
Shown in Figure 5.5 is an excerpt from the SBO event tree presented in [43]. Of its
12 headings, only four; T(PG), EM, ER1, and ER2 are of relevance to SBO recovery.
The ﬁrst depicts LOOP, and requires the LOOP frequency. The second represents
SBO occurrence, and requires the unavailability of the standby power systems. Here,
the chain of complicated fault trees in the existing model can be replaced with the
conditional SBO probability, ptsbou1 . The last two headings represent oﬀsite and standby
power recovery, respectively. These can be merged into one heading, say AC power
recovery, and the complicated fault trees replaced with a crisp value read from r1 ptq.
With these, the core damage frequency induced by the ﬁrst SBO is computed by solving
101
Figure 5.6: Layout of the Maanshan nuclear power plant AC distribution system.
the event tree using standard procedure. For the second SBO, the ﬁrst is regarded the
initiating event. The LOOP frequency, therefore, is replaced with fs, p
tsbou
1 with p
tsbou
2 ,
and r1 ptq with r12 ptq.
5.5 Case Study:The Maanshan Nuclear Power Plant
Maanshan is a two-unit, 1902 MW, Westinghouse PWR nuclear power plant operated
by the Taiwan Power Company. Its oﬀsite power is supplied by six independent sources,
four of which are connected to the 345 kV switchyard and the remainder, through the 161
kV switchyard. It is powered through two safety buses, AIE-PB-S01 and BIE-PB-S01,
each with a dedicated emergency diesel generator; DG-A and DG-B, respectively. A
shared emergency diesel generator, DG-5, connected as shown in Figure 5.6 is available
as backup in case any of the dedicated generators is unavailable. In addition to the
shared emergency diesel generator, are two gas turbine generators, GT1 and GT2,
connected via the 161kV switchyard. These generators form the alternative emergency
power system of the plant, each satisfying the demand on both power trains.
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Figure 5.7: Simpliﬁed schematic of plant's AC distribution system.
During normal plant operation, the safety buses are fed by the main plant generator,
G1, via the black lines and the normally closed breakers 19 & 01. On plant shut-down,
G1 becomes unavailable, and the safety buses are forced to tap power from the 345kV
switchyard (via the blue lines and the normally open breakers 17 & 03) or the 161kV
switchyard (via the black lines and the normally open breakers 15 & 05). When these
sources are also unavailable, DG-A and DG-B are automatically started and aligned.
DG-5 is manually started and aligned by operators on the failure of any of these. The
manual start-up and alignment procedure of GT1 and GT2 is initiated when at least 2
out of the 3 emergency diesel generators become unavailable. Following their successful
start-up, the gas turbine generators take about 30 minutes attain full functionality.
An assessment of the plant's SBO risk due to grid and switchyard LOOP is required.
5.5.1 Developing the System and Component Models
Figure 5.7 is the simpliﬁed schematic of the plant's AC power system, showing all the
elements relevant to an SBO. DG-5, though serving only one bus at a time, is assumed
connected to both buses in the system's adjacency matrix. This implies, its ﬂow is
divided between the buses, contrary to what obtains in reality. However, since the ﬂows
from the two buses are emptied into the virtual output node, t, the total ﬂow from the
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shared generator is accounted for. As shown, the six grid sources and the two switchyard
sources have each been represented by single nodes, as proposed in Section 5.3.2.1.
Nodes 1, 7, 8, and 9 are modelled as proposed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.2.1. The
switchyard, on the other hand, is modelled according to Figure 5.3, to account for human
error during its start-up from shut-down. Since DG-A (node 5) and DG-B (node 6) are
automatically started following a LOOP, they are not susceptible to human error, and,
therefore are modelled as shown in Figure 5.8. DG-5, GT1, and GT2, however, require
human intervention for their start-up and alignment. Node 10, therefore, is modelled
according to Figure 5.9 and nodes 3 and 4, according to Figure 5.10.
A 
p1, 2q 1
p2, 7q 1
p2, 8q 1
p3, 1q 1
p4, 1q 1
p5, 7q 1
p6, 8q 1
p7, 9q 1
p8, 9q 1
p10, 7q 1
p10, 8q 1
(5.16)
Justifying the values assigned to the state capacities of the generators, recall the
system consists of 2 safety buses (m  2), with each of DG-A and DG-B serving only
one (χ  1). Since these generators can, however, fully meet the demand on the bus
they serve (u  1), they are assigned a capacity of 0.5 when working, as proposed
in Section 5.3.2. The gas turbine generators, on the other hand, can fully serve both
buses simultaneously (χ  2), and therefore, have a capacity of 1 when working. From
the multi-state models, the capacity vector for the main diesel generators, the shared
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Figure 5.13: Eﬀective repair CDF for mul-
tiple switchyard sources.
diesel generator, and the gas turbine generators are t0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0u, t0.5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0u,
and t1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0u, respectively. Using these parameters in conjunction with Figure
5.7, the adjacency matrix of the plant, expressed as a sparse matrix, is given in Equation
5.16. Given the adjacency matrix, the other parameters of the system ﬂow equations
are obtained as described in Section 5.3.1, where s  t1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10u and t  9. Figure
5.11 is the system's graph model showing the maximum ﬂow along each link, derived
from the adjacency matrix and the maximum node capacities.
5.5.2 Component Reliability Data
Though realistic, the data used do not represent the actual data for the Maanshan plant.
They were, however, assumed with the view to reﬂecting the reliability data used in
Volumes 1 and 2 of the NUREG/CR-6890 report (see [43,44]).
105
Table 5.1: Human error probabilities for GT1 & GT2.
Time (h) 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 10
Probability 2.07 101 2.07 102 3 103 3 104 2 104 1 104 1 105 1 105
Table 5.2: Component Reliability Data.
Component Transition
Distribution
Utm
CCF Parameters
Type Parameters Start-up Failure Running Failure
DG-A & DG-B
1-2 Weibull p100, 1.24q
0.009 t0.979, 0.021u t0.972, 0.028u2-3 Lognormal (6.42,2)
4-3 Lognormal (5,1.2)
GT1 &GT2
4-1 deterministic 0.5
0.0099 t0.959, 0.041u t0.962, 0.038u
4-2 Weibull (200,1.5)
2-3 Lognormal (5,2)
8-3 Lognormal (7,1.8)
1-2 Weibull (100,1.05)
7-4 Weibull (0.2872,0.8194)
5-8 Weibull (0.2872,0.8194)
DG-5
1-2 Weibull (100,1.24)
2-3 Lognormal (6.42,2)
7-3 Lognormal (5,1.2)
6-1 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)
4-7 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)
Switchyard
4-1 Weibull (0.197,0.7467)
2-1 See Figure 5.13
Grid 2-1 See Figure 5.12
The repair times for the six grid sources are lognormally distributed with means
and corresponding standard deviations deﬁned by t8.99, 11.84, 8.24, 10.25, 9.61, 9.15u
and t6.71, 4.83, 4.05, 6.61, 1.92, 5u respectively. Similarly, switchyard repair times are
lognormally distributed, with t8, 10.41u and t5.83, 2.5u respectively being the sets of
means and corresponding standard deviations for the two switchyards. The eﬀective
repair distributions for the grid and switchyard nodes are modelled according to the
proposal in Section 5.3.2.1, as shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, respectively.
All ﬁve standby generators are assumed to have a start-up failure probability of
1.756 102. Also, the human errors associated with the failure to complete the start-
up procedures for GT-5 and the switchyard are assumed equal but one-sixth of those
for GT1 and GT2. Table 5.1 deﬁnes the probability of the operators not completing
the start-up of the gas turbine generators within selected times. Using the procedure
proposed in Section 5.3.2.3, the parameters deﬁning transitions 7 Ñ 4 and 5 Ñ 8 of
the gas turbine generators were obtained. The same procedure was used to obtain the
parameters for transitions 6 Ñ 1 and 4 Ñ 7 of DG-5 and transition 4 Ñ 1 of the
switchyard. These and the parameters for the remaining transitions are presented in
Table 5.2. The column, Utm, deﬁnes the unavailability due to test/maintenance of the
generators. The CCF parameters are deﬁned by a set in which each element represents
the probability of a certain number of components being involved in any failure event
initiated by the component. The number of components is determined by the index of
the element in the set. For instance, from the table, the probability that the start-up
failure of any of the main diesel generators leads to the failure of the other generator is
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Table 5.3: Common-Cause Group Deﬁnition.
CCG Description
Attributes
Designation Value
1 Emergency diesel generator failure to start
ρt1u t5, 6u
θt1u t0.979, 0.021u
β
t1u
1 4
β
t1u
2 3
2 Emergency diesel generator failure to run
ρt2u t5, 6u
θt2u t0.972, 0.028u
β
t2u
1 2
β
t2u
2 1
3 Gas turbine generator failure to start
ρt3u t3, 4u
θt3u t0.959, 0.041u
β
t3u
1 4
β
t3u
2 3
4 Gas turbine generator failure to run
ρt4u t3, 4u
θt4u t0.962, 0.038u
β
t4u
1 2
β
t4u
2 t1, 4u
0.021. This implies a total of two component failures, explaining why the probability
value is the second element of the set (see Section 5.3.3.1 for details). Transition 4 Ñ 1
of the gas turbine generators depicts their start-up duration, which as we are told in
Section 5.5, takes 30 minutes, explaining why it is assigned a deterministic 0.5 hours.
5.5.3 Representing Component Interdependencies
The ﬁrst and easily recognizable form of interdependency in the system is CCF, where
the failure of a generator could trigger the almost instantaneous failure of another
generator. This type of interdependency is modelled according to the CCF model
presented in Section 5.3.3.1. DG-A and DG-B, as we know, are of the same design and
model, diﬀerent from the make of DG-5. Therefore, while the former are susceptible to
CCF, DG-5 is immune to it. Similarly, GT1 and GT2 are susceptible to CCF, giving rise
to four common-cause groups, as deﬁned in Table 5.3. The table is developed from the
CCF parameters in Table 6.1 in conjunction with the CCF model proposed in Section
5.3.3.1. CCG 1, for instance, represents the CCF due to the start-up failure of any of
the main diesel generators. Since these generators are denoted as nodes 5 and 6 in the
system, ρt1u, the set of of components in the CCG is deﬁned as t5, 6u. Now, as shown
in Figure 5.8, the start-up failure of DG-A or DG-B is denoted by state 4. Also, the
other generator could only be aﬀected by this event if it is in cold standby (state 3) at
the time of occurrence. This explains why βt1u1 and β
t1u
2 are assigned the values, 4 and
3, respectively. The parameters for CCG 2 to 4 are derived in a similar fashion.
The other form of interdependency, like the grid failure necessitating the start-up
of the standby generators or the failure of GT-5 forcing the start-up of the gas turbine
generators, is a little more subtle and diﬃcult to deduce. It requires a good knowledge
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of the operating principle of the system and cannot be modelled by the CCF model.
For this, the cascading failure model proposed in Section 5.3.3.2 is invoked. To ensure
the reproducibility of the case study, the step-by-step procedure for developing the
dependency matrices is shown, by recreating the sequence of events following a LOOP.
D1 D2 


2 5 3 1
2 6 3 1
2 5 3 3
2 6 3 3

 D110 

3 3 3 7
3 4 3 7

D15 D
1
6 

3 10 3 6
3 10 3 3
 (5.17)
1. Let's assume the occurrence of the initiating event (LOOP), due to the failure of
the grid (node 1). As already stated at the beginning of Section 5.5, the main
diesel generators, A (node 5) and B (node 6), are restarted from cold standby.
This is accounted for by the ﬁrst 2 rows of the dependency matrix, D1. However,
if the main generators are not in cold standby, maybe due to test/maintenance
or failure, the shared standby generator, DG-5 (node 10), is restarted. Recalling
the concept of joint dependency discussed in Section 5.3.3.2, the joint dependency
between the grid and DG-5 can be deduced. Here, the main generators are the
intermediate nodes, since they dictate whether or not to start the shared generator.
This behaviour is jointly represented by the last two rows of D1 and the ﬁrst row
of D15 in Equation 5.17. Again, if the shared generator too is unavailable (not in
cold standby), the gas turbine generators, GT1 (node 3) and GT2 (node 4), are
restarted (see Figure 5.10). This attribute is jointly represented by D110 and the
last row of D15. If, however, the gas turbine generators are not in cold standby
on arrival of their start-up signal, no action is taken. This is due to the fact that
the signal signiﬁes the unavailability of all the standby sources at the plant. D15
and D16 are equal because nodes 5 and 6 produce the same eﬀect on the shared
generator when unavailable for start-up. Similarly, D1 and D2 are equal, as the
response of the standby systems is the same for grid and switchyard failures.
D5 


2 6 3 1
4 6 3 1
2 6 3 3
4 6 3 3

 (5.18)
2. DG-A (node 5) fails to start or starts but fails to run (see Figure 5.8). The system
will ﬁrst check if DG-B (node 6) is available for start-up and initiate its start up,
if available. This behaviour is deﬁned by the ﬁrst two rows of D5, as shown in
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Equation 5.18. The eﬀect of the unavailability of DG-B on arrival of its start-up
signal has already been deﬁned in scenario 1 (see the last row of D1). This is
adapted to account for the case when DG-A fails to start or run and DG-B is
unavailable for start-up, in the last two rows of D5 (see Equation 5.18).
D6 


2 5 3 1
4 5 3 1
2 5 3 3
4 5 3 3

 (5.19)
3. Similarly, DG-B (node 6) fails to start or starts but fails to run. The system will
ﬁrst check if DG-A (node 5) is available, and initiate its start-up. The ensuing
sequence of events is similar to that in scenario 2, as illustrated in Equation 5.19.
D10 


2 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
4 1 2 2
4 2 2 2

 D11 D1 D12 D2 (5.20)
D3 


8 4 5 8
8 4 7 4
4 4 5 8
4 4 7 4
2 4 3 7
2 4 2 2
2 4 8 8
2 4 5 5
2 4 6 6


D4 


8 3 5 8
8 3 7 4
4 3 5 8
4 3 7 4
2 3 3 7
2 3 2 2
2 3 8 8
2 3 5 5
2 3 6 6


D13 D
1
4 


2 1 2 2
5 1 2 2
6 1 2 2
8 1 2 2


(5.21)
4. DG-5 in cold standby fails to start or starts but fails to run (see Figure 5.9). In
this case, any repaired emergency diesel generator is restarted ﬁrst, otherwise,
the gas turbine generators are restarted. The ensuing possible sequence of events
are already covered by scenarios 1-3, and it is, therefore, recommended to not
explicitly redeﬁne these in D10, for simplicity. It is deducible that the failure of
DG-5 induces the same response sequence as grid or switchyard failure. Therefore,
recreating a LOOP accounts for the failure of DG-5, as expressed in Equation 5.20.
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Table 5.4: Summary of the static SBO indices obtained.
LOOP Type p
tsbou
1 fs (per yr) p
tsbou
2 % of SBO at Start-Up Simulation Samples
Grid 0.0033 6.18 103 0.0022 29.23 1 108
Switchyard 0.0035 3.65 103 0.0153 27.97 4.5 107
5. GT1 (node 3) starts up successfully and enters the start-up state (see Figure 5.10).
Recall, states 7 and 8 account for the time taken by the operator to initiate the
start-up of the generator. However, since both GT1 and GT2 (node 4) are in the
same location, they are exposed to equal delays. Hence, the transitions, 7 Ñ 4 and
5 Ñ 8, of GT1 and GT2 are equal. To ensure the satisfaction of this constraint,
when GT1 enters state 4, GT2 too is forced to state 4 if it is in state 7 or state
8, if it is in state 5. Similarly, when GT1 enters state 8, GT2 is forced to state 8
if it is in state 5 or state 4, if it is in state 7. This behaviour is expressed by the
ﬁrst four rows of D3, as shown in Equation 5.21.
6. GT2 (node 4) starts up successfully and enters the start-up state. This scenario
has the same eﬀect on GT1 as scenario 5 has on GT2. Therefore, the ensuing
sequence of events is accounted for by the ﬁrst 4 rows of D4, as in Equation 5.21.
7. GT1 (node 3) fails to run. GT2 (node 4) is restarted, if it is available for start-up,
otherwise the system checks whether or not the failed diesel generators have been
repaired. The ﬁrst case is represented by the ﬁfth row ofD3, as shown in Equation
5.21. The sequence of events involved in the second case is similar to the events
following a LOOP. Therefore, a LOOP scenario is recreated, as shown in the last
4 rows of D3 and D14. States 1, 4, and 7 have been left out of the possible GT2
states to necessitate the second case because, they mean either GT2 is already in
operation (state 1), or on the verge of operation (states 4 and 7).
8. Similarly, GT2 failure to run produces the same eﬀect on the other generators, as
scenario 7. The ensuing sequence of events is, therefore, deﬁned by D4 and D13.
The sequence of events following the failure of the gas turbine generators to start have
not been considered because, being the last standby sources to be called into operation,
their start-up failure means the unavailability of the other standby sources.
5.5.4 Results and Discussions
The proposed framework is implemented in the open-source uncertainty quantiﬁcation
toolbox, OpenCOSSAN [109,110] and used to quantify the SBO risk at the Maanshan
nuclear power plant. For a grid and switchyard LOOP frequency of 1.86  102 and
1.04  102 per/year respectively, the case study was analysed on a 2.5GHz, E5-2670
v2 Intel® Xeon® CPU. A 5% coeﬃcient of variation was imposed on the conditional
probability of SBO as the simulation convergence criterion. The analysis took about
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Figure 5.14: Probability of SBO duration exceedance.
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Figure 5.15: Composite frequency of ﬁrst SBO exceedance.
3 hours, and the results yielded are summarised in Table 5.4, Figure 5.14, and Figure
5.15. The probability of exceedance gives a measure of the likelihood of non-recovery
from the SBO within a given time. The composite frequency of exceedance is the sum
of the frequencies of exceedance yielded by the two LOOP categories investigated.
As shown in Table 5.4, the probability of an SBO given a LOOP is almost the
same for both LOOP categories. The slight diﬀerence is due to the fact that the gas
turbine generators are unusable during switchyard centred LOOP. Their eﬀect, however,
is prominent in mitigating the second SBO. The non-recovery probability from an SBO,
as shown in Figure 5.14, is expressed as the non-recovery likelihood as a function of
time and number of safety buses. The overall SBO risk at the plant is deﬁned by the
composite frequency of exceedance, as shown in Figure 5.15.
As a way of verifying the convergence of the simulation, the product of ptsbou1 and
the fraction of SBO at start-up, should match the probability, p0, of the emergency
power system being unavailable at time 0. Bear in mind GT-5 and the gas turbine
111
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Duration of SBO
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
Co
m
po
sit
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 E
xc
ee
da
nc
e
CASE 1
CASE 2
CASE 3
CASE 4
(a) Composite frequencies of exceedance when
two power trains are required for power recovery
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Duration of SBO
10-9
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
Co
m
po
sit
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 E
xc
ee
da
nc
e
CASE 1
CASE 2
CASE 3
CASE 4
(b) Composite frequencies of exceedance when
one power train is suﬃcient for power recovery
Figure 5.16: Comparison of composite frequencies of exceedance.
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generators have no inﬂuence on p0, as a result of the delays in their start-up. Therefore,
the emergency power system is unavailable at start-up only if DG-A (or DG-B) is un-
available due to test/maintenance and DG-B (or DG-A) fails to start or both are not in
test/maintenance but fail to start. If Utm is the unavailability due to test/maintenance
of DG-A and DG-B and ps, their start-up failure probability, p0 is obtained as,
p0  Utm pps   psq   p1 Utmq p
2
s
p0  2Utmps   p1 Utmq p
2
s
(5.22)
Substituting the required values in Equation 5.22, an error of 3.17% is realised for grid-
centred LOOP and 4.7%, for switchyard-centred LOOP. Since the error in each case is
not in excess of 5%, the convergence of the simulation is veriﬁed.
Ensuring an enhanced risk insight, the system was re-analysed for three additional
scenarios as follows.
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 Case 2: No delays in the start-up of DG-5, implying immunity to human error.
 Case 3: Gas turbine generator start-up is simultaneous with DG-A and DG-B.
The generators, however, are kept in warm standby after start-up.
 Case 4: A combination of cases 2 and 3.
Case 1 represents the scenario already analysed, and the results for the four cases are
summarised in Figures 5.16 to 5.18 (please note the composite frequencies in Figures 5.16
(a) and (b) are expressed on a log-scale). Absolute, instead of conditional probabilities,
have been used in Figure 5.18, to ensure uniformity.
The following risk insights are inferred by the outcome of the case study;
1. As shown in Figure 5.14, station blackouts induced by switchyard failures are more
diﬃcult to recover from and, therefore, contribute more to the overall SBO risk. In
this light, feasible reliability improvement programs should be designed to ensure
the high reliability of the switchyard. Such a programs should be complemented
by an eﬃcient repair policy to keep the non-recovery probability low.
2. The gas turbine generators are the only diﬀerence between the recovery durations
of grid and switchyard LOOP. These generators, therefore, are very instrumental
to mitigating SBO risks at the plant, and their availability should be kept high.
3. Automating the start-up of DG-5 and initiating the start-up of the gas turbine
generator just after LOOP guarantees an improved resilience to SBO, as endorsed
by Figures 5.16 to 5.18. However, starting the gas turbine generators simultane-
ously with the emergency diesel generators brings with it additional costs, borne
from fuel consumption and maintenance. This decision, therefore, should be pre-
ceded by a robust cost-beneﬁt analysis. In fact, under economic constraints, it
is prudent to automate the start-up of DG-5 only, as the diﬀerence between the
outcomes yielded by case 2 and case 4 is only just slight.
The explicit sensitivity and importance analyses of the individual components has been
ignored, since these quantities can be achieved even with the existing techniques.
5.6 Chapter Summary
Station blackout accidents, though a rare occurrence, can have devastating consequences
on a nuclear power plant's ability to achieve and maintain safe shut-down. Consequently,
the plant's capability to cope and recover from them is an indicator of its resilience.
In this chapter, an intuitive simulation framework to model a nuclear power plant's
recovery from station blackout accidents has been proposed. The framework provides
a simple means of deﬁning the complex interdependencies that often characterise the
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operation of practical engineering systems, and therefore, applicable without unreal-
istic assumptions. This attribute, coupled with its ability to intuitively tolerate the
multi-state behaviour of the system's building block, distinguishes it from the existing
approaches. Its applicability has been demonstrated by modelling the SBO recovery of
a pressurised water reactor, providing an informed insight into its SBO risks. The pro-
posed approach was able to fully model the dynamic behaviour of the power system and
provide valuable insights into the SBO risk mitigation at the plant. The non-recovery
probability curve obtained, for instance, can be absorbed into the existing probabilistic
risk assessment models, getting rid of laborious fault trees. Since this curve also depicts
the unavailability of AC power, it can be directly compared with the reliability of the
plant's SBO coping mechanism, providing an easier means of determining the need for
their reliability improvement. It also helps ascertain the adequacy of the plant's station
blackout recovery capability, without revisiting the entire model. A key desirable feature
of the proposed framework is its wide applicability, even to non-nuclear applications.
In spite of their well documented limitations relative to the proposed framework, the
existing static fault tree-based models still possess attributes that give them an edge
in importance, sensitivity, and uncertainty analyses. With this in mind, the proposed
framework has been developed with the view to complementing their applicability, in-
stead of serving as an explicit replacement. A clear description of how its output can
be incorporated into these models, has, therefore, been included. The framework, in
addition, has been implemented in the open-source uncertainty quantiﬁcation toolbox
developed at the Risk Institute (see [109,110]), thereby rendering it readily available.
The multi-state model and dependency matrices proposed, create the foundation
for the incorporation of additional dynamic considerations. Such considerations as the
optimal number of maintenance teams on-site, emergency diesel generator failure during
cold standby, optimal inspection interval, and the availability of spares, are a possibility.
Eﬀorts are underway to extend the framework to these considerations, other LOOP
categories, and incorporate epistemic uncertainties.
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Chapter 6
Maintenance Strategy Optimization
for Complex Power Systems
6.1 Introduction
Maintenance is a necessity for most multi-component systems but its beneﬁts are often
accompanied by considerable costs. However, with the appropriate number of mainte-
nance teams and a suﬃciently tuned maintenance strategy, optimal system performance
is attainable. Given system complexities and operational uncertainties, identifying the
optimal maintenance strategy is a challenge. A robust computational framework, there-
fore, is proposed in this chapter to alleviate these diﬃculties. The framework is par-
ticularly suited to systems with uncertainties in the use of spares during maintenance
interventions, and where these spares are characterised by delayed availability. It is
provided with a series of generally applicable multi-state models that adequately deﬁne
component behaviour under various maintenance strategies. System operation is recon-
structed from these models using an eﬃcient hybrid load-ﬂow and event-driven Monte
Carlo simulation. The simulation's novelty stems from its ability to intuitively im-
plement complex strategies involving multiple contrasting maintenance regimes. This
framework is used to identify the optimal maintenance strategies for a hydroelectric
power plant and the IEEE-24 reliability test system. In each case, the sensitivity of
the optimal solution to cost level variations is investigated via a procedure requiring a
single reliability evaluation, thereby reducing the computational costs signiﬁcantly. The
results, which are published in [52], show the usefulness of the framework as a rational
decision-support tool in the maintenance of multi-component, multi-state systems.
The proposed simulation framework can be used to identify the optimal maintenance
strategy for a multi-state system prone to the range of possible operational dynamics
outlined in Section 2.3.1. A detailed account of its theoretical and modelling principles
is provided here, setting the tone for its wide applicability. Even though algorithms
for forcing maintenance in a system characterised by limited maintenance teams have
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been proposed in Chapter 4, they assume all the components of the system belong to
the same maintenance group. In reality, however, the components of a system could be
organised into a series of maintenance groups and their maintenance made to follow a
predeﬁned strategy. These algorithms, therefore, will be replaced by a single algorithm,
proposed to both overcome their limitations and improve the eﬃciency of the process.
The remainder of this chapter is organised thus; the next section describes the pro-
posed approach and outlines its advantages over the existing approaches. Section 6.2
is dedicated to deﬁning key terms, presenting a general overview of the problem under
consideration, the proposed cost model, and a description of the solution procedure. In
Section 6.3, a background to the component and system models is presented. The sim-
ulation algorithm and details on how components are modelled to account for various
system dynamics are also described here. Section 6.4 presents two case studies, illustrat-
ing the application of the models developed to realistic systems. Finally, a conclusion
is drawn on the proposed framework in Section 6.5, with insights into its applicability.
6.1.1 Advantages of the Proposed Approach
The dependability of the optimal solution obtained from any maintenance strategy op-
timization scheme is determined by the accuracy of its system performance measures.
This, in turn, is inﬂuenced by the suitability to the system, of the reliability modelling
technique employed. These modelling techniques fall into one of two broad categories;
analytical and dynamic reliability models. The former are inapplicable to certain reli-
ability problems, especially those involving complex maintenance strategies and other
dynamic considerations. When forced to suit such problems, the resulting models are
often oversimpliﬁed to an extent that compromises the credibility of the outcome. In
fact, most of the limitations of the existing maintenance optimization models discussed
in the Section 2.3.1 are associated with analytical models.
Dynamic reliability models, on the other hand, possess suﬃcient ﬂexibility to model
the dynamic considerations and uncertainties that characterize the operation of realistic
systems. Stochastic Petri Nets [95], Stochastic Hybrid Systems [37], and Monte Carlo
simulation [55,56,97,161] are the most popular in this category. Stochastic Petri Nets,
however, require the enumeration of the entire state-space of the system, which makes
them infeasible for complex multi-state systems, even of moderate size. They also suﬀer
a serious setback when the system can undergo non-Markovian transitions, in which case
Tuﬃn et al. [134] recommend simulation. Stochastic Hybrid Systems are an emerging
modelling formalism with promising prospects for dynamic reliability modelling. They
are built around the Markov reward model of the system, when solicited for problems
involving performance optimization or system operation cost minimization [37]. Conse-
quently, like Stochastic Petri Nets, they are intractable for complex multi-state systems,
due to their susceptibility to the state explosion conundrum. In addition, they proceed
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by translating the dynamic reliability problem into a set of diﬀerential equations, which
closed-form solution, in some cases, may be diﬃcult to obtain analytically. Some re-
searchers [15] have even had to resort to a Monte Carlo simulation approach to solving
these diﬀerential equations. Given the structural complexity of most power systems
and their multi-state attributes, Monte Carlo simulation, therefore, remains the most
feasible approach, regardless of its higher computational intensity.
However, most Monte Carlo simulation algorithms [61, 81, 161] require state enu-
meration and prior knowledge of the system's structure function, path sets, or cut sets
when solicited for multi-state system reliability analysis, which for complex systems,
is tedious. In Chapter 3, a simple load ﬂow-based simulation approach, applicable to
any system conﬁguration was introduced. It allows the simulation of a multi-state sys-
tem without the need to deﬁne its structure function, path, or cut sets. Notably, it
enables the replication of realistic system operating principles like, the shut-down and
restart of components. This feature is particularly necessary if the assumption of sta-
tistical independence of components should be avoided, which, especially for systems
with long maintenance durations, is desirable. Shut-down events can be a result of the
unavailability of another component or loading restrictions imposed on the components
themselves. When dealing with maintainable systems, it is vital to consider this form
of functional interdependency between components, as the failure and preventive main-
tenance of most components, depend on the eﬀective time spent in operation. Most
reliability analysis approaches disregard component shut-down and restart because, it
is either impossible or extremely diﬃcult to determine the actual ﬂow through system
components. In this chapter, the approach proposed in Chapter 3 is adapted to systems
with limited maintenance teams and prone to maintenance delays and other operational
uncertainties. The modiﬁed approach is a credible pathway via which the system per-
formance and reliability indices relevant to the maintenance model are derived, without
making unrealistic assumptions.
Appreciating that most power systems exhibit multi-state characteristics, each sys-
tem component is modelled as a semi-Markov stochastic process. The multi-state model
is modiﬁed to incorporate additional stochasticity induced by the operational dynamics
surrounding the system. Thus, the resultant component model is also a translation
of system dynamics, from the system to the component level. This model simpliﬁes
the simulation procedure, rendering it more intuitive and generally applicable. Most
importantly, the procedure supports the complex scenario where various components
follow diﬀerent maintenance strategies; another limitation of existing models.
6.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a multi-component system of arbitrary structure, composed of either binary-
state components, multi-state components, or both. These components can undergo
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corrective maintenance when in a degraded state and preventive maintenance which
interval is determined by the eﬀective time spent in operation since the last mainte-
nance action (i.e., periods when the component is unavailable do not count). The state
transition times of components may be constant or follow any probability distribution.
On entering a degraded state, a component is added to the maintenance queue and
its repair process follows two stages; a diagnosis stage and a stage dedicated to actual
repairs. At the end of diagnosis, the maintenance team may proceed to the second
stage or initiate a spares request, if spares are required. The probability of the latter
happening is ptsui , where i, a positive integer arbitrarily assigned, is the index of the
component in the system. There's a delay between the initiation of a spares request and
the subsequent delivery of the requested spares, which duration may vary from compo-
nent to component and may again follow any probability distribution. Like corrective
maintenance, preventive maintenance is prone to interruptions at a probability, qtsui .
This is realised after an average time kitpm | 0   ki   1, tpm being the component's
expected preventive maintenance duration, and ki, the proportion of this time to elapse
before the need for spares is realised. Whilst the crew awaits the spares, they can be
assigned to another job, if there are no other idle maintenance teams.
At the system level, components are arranged into ω maintenance groups, and each
group maintained by ntj | j  1, 2, ..., ω maintenance teams. Under dedicated main-
tenance, ntj is expressed in the form,
 
n1j , n2j

| n1j   n2j  ntj , where n1j is the
number of teams dedicated to corrective maintenance, and n2j , the number of teams
dedicated to preventive maintenance. It is assumed each of these ntj teams has the ex-
pertise to maintain any of the mj components in group j. Maintenance is outsourced,
and its cost constitutes three parts; a ﬁxed cost per unit time per maintenance team,
a ﬁxed cost per maintenance call, and a ﬁxed cost per unit time of actual maintenance
service. There are no penalty costs on the system operator for failing to meet demand
but consumers only pay for the quantity of output supplied. The lost revenue accrued,
with the total maintenance cost over a period, provides a measure of the performance
of the system for that period. It is desired to ﬁnd the maintenance strategy and the
value of ntj@j P t1, 2, ..., ωu, ensuring optimum system performance. The objective is
the minimization of system maintenance cost, as well as the cost incurred from unmet
demand. A given strategy, therefore, is optimal if it minimizes the total cost.
There are a few attributes of the system described that pose some challenges. From
a modelling point of view, the fact that the system could be multi-state and of any ar-
chitecture, disqualiﬁes most of the existing system reliability evaluation techniques (see
Section 6.1.1). Similarly, the limited number of maintenance teams, the uncertainties
associated with the need for spares to complete a maintenance action, and the delays
in the availability of these spares, present a serious planning and scheduling dilemma.
For instance, if the maintenance crew knew every preventive maintenance action would
require spares, they would place a spares request in advance. Alternatively, they could
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carry with them a few spares in anticipation, but this would be applicable only to
non-bulky components, since there is a limit to how much could be carried. The need,
therefore, for an optimal maintenance strategy cannot be overemphasised.
6.2.1 Deﬁnition of key terms
1. Expected Output-not-supplied : A measure of the expected amount by which the
actual system output deviates from its expected level, within a given period, Tm.
This quantity, in power systems, is known as the Expected Energy Not Supplied
(EENS), and it accounts for the periods the system performance curve is below
the load curve. If Y ptq and Ydptq respectively denote the instantaneous system
output and demand, then, for a demand-driven system (i.e., Y ptq ¤ Ydptq),
EENS 
» Tm
0
pYdptq  Y ptqq dt (6.1)
For a given system reliability problem, Ydptq is normally known, and Y ptq is com-
puted from the system reliability analysis outcome. When obtained via Monte
Carlo simulation, Y ptq is deﬁned by a collection of discrete sets of system perfor-
mance levels, as a function of time. The discrete form, therefore, of Equation 6.1
should be used to compute the system EENS. Given Y ptq is random, the EENS is
computed as the average of the performance deﬁciencies of all the samples of Y ptq.
For N Monte Carlo samples of Y ptq, let the ith sample contain ji performance level
transitions, yik  Ydptq  Y ptq at the kth transition, and t  tik | 0 ¤ tik ¤ Tm;
EENS 
Y0
N
Y0 
N¸
i1
pyiji pTm  tijiq   Y1q
Y1 
ji¸
k2
yipk1q
 
tik  tipk1q

(6.2)
the corresponding transition time, the EENS is as deﬁned in Equation 6.2, where
yiji and tiji are respectively the ﬁnal performance level and transition time of
sample i. Alternatively, if instead of Y ptq and Ydptq, only the possible system
β 
α¸
j1
pP d, jqβ
tju
0
β
tju
0 
n¸
i1
max ppCd, jq  pC, iq , 0q pP , iq
EENS  Tmβ
(6.3)
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performance and demand levels with their corresponding occurrence probabilities
are known, the EENS is computed via a diﬀerent approach. Let the system exist
in n distinct output levels as deﬁned by vector C, with probability of occurrence
within the period, Tm, deﬁned by vector P . The expected performance deviation
per unit time, β, and EENS are given by Equation 6.3, where α is the number
of possible demand levels, Cd, the vector deﬁning these levels, and P d, the vector
specifying their corresponding probabilities of occurrence. For systems like power
distribution networks with multiple load points, the eﬀective EENS, pEENSqeff ,
is given by the sum of the EENS at all the load points.
2. Shared Maintenance: In this strategy, the same team is assigned to perform both
preventive and corrective maintenance on a component or a group of components.
3. Dedicated Maintenance: Unlike shared maintenance, separate teams carry out
preventive and corrective maintenance on the same group of components. This
implies, a failed or a component due for preventive maintenance remains unat-
tended if its dedicated maintenance team is unavailable.
6.2.2 The Cost Model
The resultant eﬀect of component failure, maintenance strategy, and operational dy-
namics on the system, is expressed in terms of the expected total loss, L, incurred.
Assuming zero inﬂation, its components are expressed as follows.
1. Loss, L1, due to lost output, which in turn is due to system outages, consequent
of component failure. If C0 is the cost of a unit output, L1 is expressed as,
L1  C0 pEENSqeff (6.4)
For commercial power systems, EENS is in kWh and C0, the cost of a kWh.
2. Fixed maintenance cost, L2, emanating from ﬁxed wages for maintenance person-
nel. If each team of group j is paid rj units of currency per unit time,
L2  Tm
ω¸
j1
rjntj (6.5)
3. Total cost, L3, associated with the ﬁxed cost per maintenance action. This cost
accounts for the transportation of the maintenance crew, contribution to oﬀset
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the purchasing cost of tools, or both. If mc is the cost per maintenance action,
L3 
M 1¸
i1
mc

N
tcmu
i  N
tpmu
i
	
M 1 
ω¸
j1
mj
(6.6)
L3  tmcu1M 1tN
tcmu
i , N
tpmu
i uM 12t1u21
| i  1, 2, ...,M 1
(6.7)
N
tcmu
i and N
tpmu
i respectively the number of successful corrective and preventive
maintenance actions on component i, L3 is given by Equation 6.6, where M 1 is
the number of maintainable components of the system. When expressed in closed
form, Equation 6.6) takes the form of Equation 6.7.
L4 
M 1¸
i1

C
tcmu
i t
tcmu
i   C
tpmu
i t
tpmu
i
	
(6.8)
4. Cost, L4, of maintaining system components; a function of the time spent by each
component in maintenance and the cost per unit time of maintenance. If Ctcmui
and Ctpmui respectively are the costs of corrective and preventive maintenance of
component i per unit time, ttcmui and t
tpmu
i , its total time spent in corrective and
preventive maintenance, L4 is as given by Equation 6.8, which in closed form is,
L4  t1u1M 1lt1u21
l 

tC
tcmu
i , C
tpmu
i uM 12  tt
tcmu
i , t
tpmu
i uM 12
	 (6.9)
The `' operator denotes element-wise multiplication of two matrices.
L5 
M 1¸
i1

Ctcmusi s
tcmu
i   C
tpmu
si s
tpmu
i
	
(6.10)
5. Cost, L5, of spares used in maintaining system components. For most systems,
on average, the spares used during preventive maintenance are minor and cheaper
than those used in corrective maintenance. Let stcmui and s
tpmu
i respectively be
the number of spares used in corrective and preventive maintenance of component
i. If their corresponding unit costs are respectively Ctcmusi and C
tpmu
si , then L5 is
as expressed in Equation 6.10, which in closed form condenses to,
L5  t1u1M 1lt1u21
l 

tCtcmusi , C
tpmu
si uM 12  ts
tcmu
i , s
tpmu
i uM 12
	 (6.11)
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The overall system lost revenue, L, is given by,
L 
5¸
i1
Li (6.12)
Normally, the nominal system output and the various costs are known. Determi-
nation of L, therefore, eﬀectively reduces to the task of estimating pEENSqeff ,
tN
tcmu
i , N
tpmu
i uM 12, tt
tcmu
i , t
tpmu
i uM 12, and ts
tcmu
i , s
tpmu
i uM 12 via reliability evalua-
tion. These parameters are a function of the failure and maintenance events of the
system components, and are therefore random. As a consequence, their mean/expected
values are used in calculating the system lost revenue, L.
If the system reliability and performance indices for strategy k are represented by
the function R pn, kq, and the set of costs, by C, then, the system loss function can be
expressed in the form, L pC,R pn, kqq. With R pn, kq known for all the possible main-
tenance strategies, the optimal maintenance strategy can be identiﬁed and its sensitivity
to variations in cost levels investigated, without the need for multiple simulations.
6.2.3 Proposed Maintenance Regimes
Depending on the type of maintenance strategy in use, diﬀerent system performance out-
comes are possible, even with the same number of maintenance teams. For instance, in
a series-connected system, it may seem reasonable to postpone preventive maintenance
until system failure. In such a scenario, preventive and corrective maintenance actions
are performed concurrently. Ideally, this should result in reduced system downtime
and subsequent improvements in performance. This is normally the case if preventive
maintenance actions are frequent, require large times, or if some components are not
easily accessible, such that their maintenance inﬂicts signiﬁcant throughput losses on
the system. However, postponing a component's preventive maintenance may increase
its likelihood of failure and bring with it additional costs. These costs are incurred from
spares used, longer system down times, and higher maintenance intervention costs, as
corrective maintenance durations normally are longer. In addition, more than one main-
tenance team may be required for eﬃcient implementation of this strategy, since there
may be multiple components requiring maintenance intervention when the system fails.
On the downside, the teams are idle while the system is in operation but continue to
receive salaries as the maintenance contract demands. A similar argument can be prof-
fered for corrective maintenance of partially failed components, if in spite of the failure,
system performance remains above a certain threshold. This procedure, however, may
be counterproductive if component interdependencies exist in the system, such that a
degraded component aﬀects the operation of healthy ones. Therefore, even for a system
this simple, it is diﬃcult to determine whether the procedure yields the most cost ef-
fective solution, without a detailed reliability analysis. In summary, the optimality of a
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given strategy depends, amongst other factors (cost levels, for instance), on the topology
of the system and the non-topological functional relationships between its components.
The following regimes may be considered when deciding the promptness of preventive
maintenance and major corrective maintenance of partially failed components.
1. Maintenance can be carried out at any time. The time of intervention depends
only on the availability of maintenance teams.
2. Maintenance is carried out only when system output is nominal.
3. Maintenance is carried out only when a component is not in operation. This may
coincide with the unavailability of the entire system or a subsystem.
When the maintenance of a component is interrupted due to delays in the availability
of spares, two possible scenarios ensue.
4. The component remains shut down until spares are made available. In this case,
there are no risks of incurring additional costs from failures. However, the main-
tenance team may be assigned to another task during the wait and there will be
revenue losses as the system operates below its nominal performance level.
5. The component is put back in operation, in which case it continues to perform its
normal function. This results in no loss of system output, provided it doesn't fail.
6.2.4 Solution Sequence
The regimes highlighted in Section 6.2.3 can be arranged into two groups. Regimes 1-3,
deﬁne the promptness of maintenance actions and 4-5, the status of a component during
maintenance interruptions. Each system component may be subjected to a combination
of regimes; one from each group, giving rise to 6 possible maintenance strategies. De-
pending on the dynamics surrounding the operation of the system, additional strategies
are applicable. For instance, on the basis of division of labour, preventive and corrective
maintenance interventions could be shared or dedicated. This would lead to a total of
12 possible strategies, if considered. The corresponding component and system models
are then derived for each of these strategies, in preparation for system optimization.
The optimization procedure follows a two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage, the
optimal maintenance strategy is identiﬁed by analysing each system model, with no
restriction on the number of maintenance teams. For each case, the performance func-
tion, L, is determined, and the optimal strategy is identiﬁed as the one yielding the
least value of L. The second stage searches for the optimal number of maintenance
teams using this strategy. Here, the system is re-analysed for various values of ntj , in
shared policies and various combinations of n1j and n2j , in dedicated policies. Given
a component can undergo only one maintenance intervention at any instance, each ntj
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is bounded by p0,mjq and
°ω
j1 ntj ¤ M
1. In dedicated policies, both n1j and n2j
are bounded by p0,mjq, with the additional condition, n1j   n2j ¤ mj . Additional
constraints may be imposed on the number of maintenance teams in each group, de-
pending on the maintenance strategy and certain requirements set by the operator. For
example, if two maintenance groups, i and j, have at least one component in common,
nti   ntj ¤| θi Y θj |. The operator, under economic constraints, may also impose
bounds that are less than the limits already deﬁned on the maintenance team size.
pLmax, koptq  min

tL pC,R p8, kqquf
	
k  1, 2, ...,f kopt ¤ f
(6.13)
 
Lmin,n

opt

 min

tL
 
C,R
 
nj , kopt

uφ
	
j  1, 2, ..., φ nopt P N Lmin ¤ Lmax
(6.14)
Let n | n  tnt1 , nt2 , ..., ntωu represent a combination of maintenance teams, and
N | N  tn1 ,n2 , ...,nφu, the set of all possible maintenance team combinations, with φ
denoting their total. Deriving N entails obtaining, ﬁrst, the set deﬁned by the number of
components in each group, such that, N  t1, 2, ...,m1ut1, 2, ...,m2u...t1, 2, ...,mωu
and φ 
±w
j1mj . Any combinations not satisfying the operator and maintenance-
strategy-imposed constraints are removed. The optimal solution, therefore, is deﬁned
by the triplet,
 
Lmin,n

opt, kopt

, where Lmin, nopt, and kopt are respectively the min-
imum system loss, the optimal maintenance team size combination, and the optimal
strategy. If R p8, kq represents the reliability/performance indices of the system under
maintenance strategy k with no restrictions on the number of maintenance teams, and
f, the number of strategies, Equations 6.13 and 6.14 summarize the optimization pro-
cedure. R p8, kq is obtained by setting the number of teams in each maintenance group
to the number of components in that group. For this, components belonging to multiple
groups are assumed to belong to the group with the least cost per maintenance team.
Large systems often result in a large number of candidate solutions. In such cases, it
is advised to exploit smart optimization techniques like, Genetic Algorithm [14, 74, 97]
and Particle Swarm optimization [58]. These, however, have not been considered in this
chapter, as the objective here is to provide a clear insight on the component and system
modelling procedures, as well as the problem formulation from ﬁrst principles.
6.3 System Reliability and Performance Analysis
In this section, a brief description of the component and system modelling procedures is
presented, with details on the algorithms invoked in the reliability evaluation process. To
ensure simplicity and maintain focus on the modelling procedures, a perfect maintenance
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Figure 6.1: State-space of a binary-state component under various maintenance scenarios.
situation is assumed. It is, however, worthwhile noting that this is in no way limiting,
as the framework can easily be extended to imperfect maintenance scenarios.
6.3.1 Component and System Representation
The multi-state model proposed in Chapter 3 is adopted to deﬁne the behaviour of each
system component. This model takes cognisance of the various parameters required
for the complete representation of a component's attributes. It accounts for the com-
ponent's possible state transitions, their associated density functions, the performance
level associated with each state, and any load restrictions imposed on the component.
The system is modelled as a graph which nodes represent the components and de-
mand points of the system, and edges; their physical links. Deﬁning the connectivity
of the graph is a square adjacency matrix, conditioned to incorporate the eﬃciency of
the physical links. Eﬃcient algorithms have been proposed in Chapter 3 to deduce the
system ﬂow equations from this matrix, in a format suitable for direct computation with
the interior-point algorithm [68]. Given a system state vector, the actual ﬂow through
every node can be determined by updating the ﬂow equations matrices and applying
the interior-point algorithm. The matrix representation of the system structure makes
the procedure easily implementable on a digital computer. See Chapter 3 for details.
6.3.2 Maintenance Modelling of Components
Consider a hypothetical series system, composed of binary-state components (compo-
nents naturally existing in only 2 states) with capacity, C, equal to 1 when working,
and 0, otherwise. The eﬀects of repairs and preventive maintenance on the state-space
of each system component, without maintenance delays, uncertainties, and mainte-
nance suspensions, are ﬁrst highlighted. The resulting models are later modiﬁed and
generalised for multi-state components in systems prone to maintenance delays and
operational dynamics. The following maintenance scenarios are considered.
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Figure 6.2: Repairable binary-state component under maintenance delays.
Table 6.1: Component state assignment
State Designation Description
1 Working Component operates at required capacity.
2 Failed
Component is failed and CM has yet to
commence; C  0.
3 CM Component is under repairs; C  0.
4 Awaiting PM
Component is due for PM but mainte-
nance has yet to commence; C ¡ 0.
5 PM PM in progress; C  0.
6 Shut-down
Component not failed but taken out of op-
eration; C  0.
7 Diagnosis Failure is being diagnosed; C  0.
8 Idle
Diagnosis is complete but the maintenance
team is waiting for spares to resume main-
tenance. Required only if delays in the
availability of spares is modelled; C  0.
1. Each component of the system is non-repairable (Figure 6.1 (a)).
2. A component can be repaired when failed (Figure 6.1 (b)).
3. A component can undergo preventive and corrective maintenance (Figure 6.1 (c)).
Unlike the non-repairable case, a failed component is subject to repairs in scenarios
2 and 3, which is indicated by a transition from state F to state W, in Figsure 6.1
(b) and (c). Whilst the component is in operation, other components of the system
may fail. Given a series system is unavailable with the unavailability of at least one
of its components, available components are unavoidably taken out of operation during
repairs of failed components. A third state, S, is, therefore, introduced to account for
this dependent unavailability of the operating component, as shown in Figures. 6.1 (b)
and (c). The component remains in this state until all failed components are repaired,
following which, it is restarted and restored. A fourth state, PM, is incorporated in
Figure 6.1 (c), to represent the period the component is in preventive maintenance.
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Table 6.2: Description of state transitions
Transition Description Transition Description
1-2 Component
Failure
7-3 Fault Diagnosis Dura-
tion
1-4 PM Interval 5-1 PM Duration
3-1 CM Duration 4-2
Failure of component
whilst awaiting PM
team
2-7
Forcing Diag-
nosis; deter-
mined by the
availability of
maintenance
team
5-8
spares needed during
PM; determined by the
probability of spares be-
ing used
8-5
spares are
available and
PM resumes;
determined by
the availability
of PM team
8-3
spares are available
and PM resumes;
determined by the
availability of CM
teams
7-8
Spares needed
during CM;
determined by
the probability
of spares being
used
1-6
Shut-down event, like
failure of system or an-
other component
6-1,6-4
Component
restart; sug-
gests correc-
tion of event
leading to
shut-down
6-5
PM during shut-down;
determined by availabil-
ity of maintenance team
and whether previous
state of component was
APM (state 4)
4-6
Shut-down
event whilst
component is
due for PM
4-5
Forcing PM; determined
by the availability of
maintenance teams and
spares
5-4
PM interrup-
tion due to
spares delay
One can easily deduce that the transitions fromW to F and W to PM are competing,
which is due to the perfect maintenance assumption used. Since preventive maintenance
and repairs make the component as good as new, any pending failures are eliminated
after PM, and any scheduled PM is reset after repairs. An as good or bad as old
assumption would have been implemented by replacing the transition from W to PM
with a forced transition. This, however, is outside the scope of this work. It is also
clear none of the three scenarios discussed considers the eﬀects of external factors on
component state transitions. For instance, there are no delays in the commencement
of maintenance, and the maintenance process once initiated, suﬀers no obstructions or
suspensions. This, however, is not the case for many practical systems.
Suppose the series system is replaced with the system described in Section 6.2, such
that there are more components than there are maintenance teams. To model such
case, four additional states are introduced in the state-space diagram in Figure 6.1
(c), as shown in Figure 6.2. A description of the state designations and a summary
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Figure 6.3: Binary-state component under `maintenance only when component is unavailable'.
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Figure 6.4: Multi-state component under maintenance delays and operational uncertainties.
of the transitions depicted are presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. Figure 6.2
also reveals that component state transitions can be classiﬁed as either natural/normal,
forced, or conditional. Natural transitions occur randomly and depend only on their
associated distributions. Forced transitions occur purely as a consequence of events
outside the component boundary, and their distributions are unknown. Conditional
transitions on the other hand, have a known distribution but are assigned a lower priority
and only occur on the fulﬁlment of a predeﬁned condition or a set of conditions. In
the transition matrix, T i, of the component, conditional and and forced transitions are
indicated by 8 in their relevant positions (see Chapter 3). Unlike natural transitions in
which the next state of a component depends only on its current state, the next state of
a component under forced transitions may also depend on its previous state. For this,
a set of special procedures are deﬁned to execute them during system simulation.
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Algorithm 5 Sampling procedure for transition parameters of a multi-state com-
ponent with preventive maintenance, under a limited maintenance team scenario.
Require: x and t
1: function Sample(x)
2: J Ðset of possible transitions from state x
3: f Ðset of corresponding distributions
4: k ÐNumber of elements in J
5: for nÐ1 to k do  Loop over possible transitions
6: pttimes, nq ÐSample from pf , nq
7: end for
8: tsample Ð minpttimesq  get earliest time
9: pÐtransitions corresponding to tsample
10: if numelppq ¡ 1 then  if multiple transitions
11: u ∼ r0, 1s  generate uniform random number
12: indexÐ pp, ru  numelppqsq
13: else
14: indexÐ p
15: end if
16: ynext Ð pJ , indexq  get next state
17: if ynext is APM then  survives till PM is due
18: t1sample Ð min pttimes, tsampleq
19: y1 Ðstate corresponding to t1sample
20: t1 Ð t1sample  tsample
21: end if
22: return (ynext, tsample, y1, t1)
23: end function
24: tnext Ð tsample   t
The models presented in Figure 6.2 are based on the assumption that preventive
maintenance is carried out at any time or only when system performance is nominal.
However, if preventive maintenance is carried out only when a component is out of
service, the models are as presented in Figure 6.3. The diﬀerence between the two sets
of models is the absence of the transition from state 4 to state 5 in Figure 6.3. They
share the same modelling principles, as well as the designations in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Multi-state component modelling under maintenance delays follows a similar ap-
proach. The models in Figures. 6.2 & 6.3 can easily be generalised for multi-state
components, by deﬁning one idle state (if components are kept out of operation during
spares delay), a `Diagnosis' state (where necessary), and one corrective maintenance
state for each repairable failure mode, as shown in Figure 6.4. In Figure 6.4, states
4 and 5 are a partial failure mode and its corresponding corrective maintenance state
respectively. States 9 and 10 are an additional `Diagnosis' and `Idle' states respectively,
for the partial failure mode. All the other states and transitions retain their designations
and meanings, as deﬁned in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.
129
6.3.3 Determining Component Transition Parameters
A system's reliability analysis by Monte Carlo simulation entails the sequential gener-
ation of the transition states and times of its components, with a view to replicating
its actual operation. The next transition state, ynext, and time, tnext, of a multi-state
component, are determined by which of its possible transitions from its current state,
x, occurs ﬁrst. Given its transition matrix, all the possible transitions from state x are
sampled, and the sampled times stored in a register, ttimes. The transition correspond-
ing to the least element of this register gives the next state of the component whilst the
next transition time is given by the sum of the least element and the current simulation
time, t. If multiple transitions satisfy this condition, one of them is randomly selected.
The sampling procedure described is pretty straightforward and directly applicable
to most multi-state models. However, when PM is modelled as a competing transition
with failures in the presence of limited maintenance teams, a slight modiﬁcation to
the procedure is required. For instance, if a working component is due for preventive
maintenance (state 4 in Figures 6.2 and 6.3), and for some reason there is a signiﬁcant
delay, it may fail (transition from state 4 to 2) before the commencement of maintenance.
The elapsed time depends on what the failure time would be assuming the component
was not subject to preventive maintenance. Therefore, if on application of the procedure,
the component is found to survive till preventive maintenance is due (i.e., its next state
is APM), its next failure state, y1, and the maximum period, t1, it will survive before
failure are also determined. This procedure is summarised by Algorithm 5.
6.3.3.1 Accounting for Non-Markovian Transitions
Algorithm 5 is only applicable to Markovian transitions (i.e., the next state of a com-
ponent depends only on its current state). A second procedure, therefore, is required to
implement forced and conditional transitions. The transitions to and from shut-down,
with the exception of those from shut-down to CM, PM, or Diagnosis (see Figure. 6.2 to
6.4), can be implemented by the shut-down and restart procedure described in Chapter
3. The remaining conditional and forced transitions are dependent on the availability
of maintenance teams or spares. For these, a procedure hinged on the assumption that
the component is already assigned to an available maintenance team, is proposed.
When a component makes a transition to a new state, its next transition parameters
are automatically derived, by invoking Algorithm 5. However, for the reasons already
stated, this algorithm cannot derive forced maintenance transition parameters. The
component's next maintenance state, ym, from its new state, is therefore, manually
determined from its transition matrix. With correct modelling according to the models
proposed in Section 6.3.2, each failure mode will have at most one maintenance state
(CM or Diagnosis) associated with it, and the component is added to the CM queue, if
ym exists. If on the other hand, the new state is APM, the transition parameters of the
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Algorithm 6 Procedure for forcing maintenance.
Require: p
tsu
i , q
tsu
i , ki, s
tcmu
i , s
tpmu
i , t, ym, µ
tcmu
i , µ
tpmu
i
1: function ForceMaintenance(i, input)
2: xÐ ym  Force transition
3: pynext, tsample,∼,∼q ÐSample(x)
4: if x is PM then  In preventive maintenance
5: if µ
tpmu
i Ð 1 then  If component is from suspension
6: tsample Ð p
1
ki
 1qtspent
7: µ
tpmu
i Ð 0  Reset indicator
8: else if u ∼ r0, 1s ¤ qtsui then  Check whether pares needed
9: s
tpmu
i Ð s
tpmu
i   1  Increment PM spares used by 1
10: tsample Ð kitsample
11: xprev Ð previous state
12: if T ipx, xprevq  0 then If component should be kept out of operation
13: ynext Ð xprev
14: else
15: ynext Ð`Idle' state linked to x
16: end if
17: µ
tpmu
i Ð 1  Set indicator
18: end if
19: else if x is Diagnosis then
20: if µ
tcmu
i Ð 1 then  If component is from suspension
21: xÐ CM state connected to x
22: µ
tcmu
i Ð 0  Reset indicator
23: pynext, tsample,∼,∼q ÐSample(x)
24: else if u ∼ r0, 1s ¤ ptsui then
25: s
tcmu
i Ð s
tcmu
i   1  Increment CM spares used by 1
26: call lines 12 to 16
27: µ
tcmu
i Ð 1  Reset indicator
28: end if
29: end if
30: tnext Ð tsample   t
31: return (ynext, tnext, s
tcmu
i , s
tpmu
i , µ
tcmu
i , µ
tpmu
i )
32: end function
component are deduced from y1 and t1, obtained when the algorithm was ﬁrst applied
when the component entered the Working state (state W). In this case, ym is the only
PM state, and the component is added to the preventive maintenance queue.
In the most general case, ym could either be Diagnosis, CM, or PM. To force main-
tenance, ym is made the current state of the component, and Algorithm 5 is applied
to determine its next transition parameters. It is deducible from the component mod-
els presented in Figures 6.2 to 6.4 that a component in Diagnosis (state 7) can either
undergo a normal transition to CM (state 3) or a conditional transition to Idle state
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(state 8). However, the sampling algorithm always yields the normal transition. Given
the conditional transition to Idle state occurs only if spares are required, a uniform ran-
dom number, u, between 0 and 1, is generated and compared to the probability, ptsui ,
of spares being needed to complete the maintenance. The Idle state (state 8) is made
the next transition state if u ¤ ptsui , and the transition time yielded by the sampling
algorithm is retained. In the case of repair from a partial failure mode such that the
component is returned into operation during spares delay (see states 4 and 9 in Figure
6.4 (b)), the partial failure mode is made the next state, µtcmui , assigned the value 1, and
the component is removed from the maintenance queue. µtcmui is an indicator function
that takes the value 1 when CM is suspended, and 0, otherwise.
tspent  kitpm
tnext  t  p1 kiq tpm
 t 

1
ki
 1


tspent
(6.15)
Similarly, a component in PM (state 5 in Figures. 6.2 and 6.3) can either return
to Working state (state 1), go to Idle state (state 8), or return to its previous state,
if it should be kept in operation whilst awaiting spares. Like CM, any of the last two
outcomes is determined by the probability, qtsui , of spares being needed to complete
preventive maintenance. The next transition time if spares are required is given by
t  kitpm, where tpm is the PM duration yielded by Algorithm 5, and ki, its proportion
spent before the maintenance team realises spares are required. When PM is suspended,
the component is removed from the maintenance queue, and µtpmui , its indicator func-
tion for PM suspension, set to value 1. On PM resumption, the expected duration of
the remainder of the maintenance exercise is p1 kiq tpm. To avoid storing too many
variables during simulation, this period is expressed in terms of tspent, the time spent
by the component in PM before maintenance suspension. tspent is computed from the
saved transition history of the component, and the next transition time is derived as in
Equation 6.15. The procedure described above is summarised by Algorithm 6.
6.3.4 Maintenance Strategy Implementation
Algorithm 6 assumes the component has already been assigned an available maintenance
team. However, with multiple components requiring maintenance, maintenance team
assignment follows the maintenance strategy in use. Let h1 and h2 respectively be the
sets of components requiring corrective and preventive maintenance,Π  tn1j , n2juω2 |
j  1, 2, ..., ω, the matrix deﬁning the number of corrective and preventive maintenance
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teams in each maintenance group, and ν  tνjuω1, an indicator vector which elements
νj 
$&
% 1, If maintenance group j is shared0, Otherwise (6.16)
are matched to the rows of Π. Each indicator element speciﬁes whether its correspond-
ing maintenance group practices shared maintenance, as deﬁned by Equation 6.16.
Given the assumption of a component being as good as new after PM or CM and the
additional constraint that the former is carried out only on the perfect component, the
condition h1 X h2  H is imposed. Therefore, prior to maintenance team assignment,
all the elements of h1 X h2 are removed from h2 (i.e., h2  h2  ph1 X h2q or simply
h2  h2  h1). Depending on the maintenance strategy, additional components may
be removed from h1 and h2. For instance, if δ is the set of components in shut-
down state, ϑ1, the set of components repairable only while in shut-down, and ϑ2,
the set of components which PM is initiated only when in shut-down, then, h1 
ph1  ϑ1q Y pδ X ϑ1q and h2  ph2  ϑ2q Y pδ X ϑ2q. Similarly, let γ1 be the set of
components repairable only while system performance is nominal, and γ2, the set for
which PM is initiated only at nominal system performance. If system performance is
below nominal at maintenance team assignment, h1  h1  γ1 and h2  h2  γ2. It
is, however, worthwhile to note that ϑ1 applies to partially failed components only.
With h1f and h2f denoting the ﬁnal contents of h1 and h2 respectively, the ﬁrst
maintenance group is considered. Its assigned components in the maintenance queue
are ranked according to the predeﬁned priority rule and the top ranked component is
assigned to the ﬁrst available team in the group. As a consequence, the number of
available maintenance teams and the number of ranked components reduce by 1 each.
The procedure is repeated until all the ranked components have been assigned or until
there are no available maintenance teams in the group. At this stage, h1f and h2f are
updated accordingly, and the next maintenance group considered if h1f Y h2f  H.
This recursive procedure continues until all the maintenance groups have been covered.
Let θtcmuj be the set of components assigned to maintenance group j for CM and
θ
tpmu
j , the set assigned for PM. If λ
tcmu
j and λ
tpmu
j are respectively the numbers of un-
available teams from group j for CM and PM, Algorithm 7 summarises the maintenance
strategy implementation procedure. Line 10 accounts for when components maintained
only while system performance is nominal are removed from the queue, following the
deviation from nominal performance. This normally is a consequence of preventive or
corrective maintenance of a partially failed component of a higher priority in the queue.
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Algorithm 7 Procedure for maintenance strategy implementation.
Require: ph1f Y h2f q  H, h1, h2
1: for j Ð 1 to ω do  Loop over maintenance groups
2: if νj ¡ 0 then  Check whether maintenance is shared
3: TeamsÐ Π pj, 1q  Π pj, 2q 

λ
tcmu
j   λ
tpmu
j
	
4: Xcomp Ð

h1f X θ
tcmu
j
	
Y

h2f X θ
tpmu
j
	
5: while Teams ¡ 0 and Xcomp  H do
6: iÐtop ranked component
7: ForceMaintenance(i, input)
8: TeamsÐ Teams 1
9: Xcomp Ð Xcomp  i  Remove component from maintenance queue
10: adjust Xcomp if necessary
11: end while
12: else
13: H Ð th1f ,h2fu
14: GÐ tθ
tcmu
j ,θ
tpmu
j u
15: I Ð tλ
tcmu
j , λ
tpmu
j u
16: for k Ð 1 to 2 do
17: Xcomp Ð pH, kq X pG, kq
18: TeamsÐ Πpj, kq  pI, kq
19: call lines 5 to 11
20: end for
21: end if
22: Remove assigned components from h1f and h2f
23: if ph1f Y h2f q Ð H then
24: break
25: end if
26: end for
27: Remove assigned components from h1 and h2
6.3.5 The Simulation Procedure
A discrete-event simulation model is proposed to replicate the behaviour of the system.
Starting with components in their initial states, the initial performance level of the
system is computed and recorded. Following which, the next transition parameters of
each component are sampled, and the simulation progresses to the earliest transition
time. At this time, the current state of the appropriate component making the transition
is updated, its new state recorded as a function of time, its next transition parameters
sampled, and the next simulation time determined. This procedure is repeated for
subsequent transitions until the mission time is exceeded. For every transition resulting
in a change in the ﬂow properties of a component, the output of the system is computed
and recorded as a function of time. The relevant reliability and performance indices are
then determined from the saved component transition and system output histories.
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Let τ be the vector of next transition times of nodes (components and output points)
and τ spare, the vector holding the availability times of component spares. If M is the
total number of system nodes, the simulation procedure is summarised as follows.
1. Initialise the system in preparation for simulation. This involves the following:
(a) initialization of registers to save the current ﬂow properties of nodes, transi-
tion history of components, and the performance histories of output nodes.
(b) setting the required number of simulations, N , and mission time, Tm.
2. Set t  0, stcmui  s
tpmu
i  µ
tcmu
i  µ
tpmu
i  0@i P t1, 2, ...,Mu, h1  h2  H,
τ  τ spare  t8u
M .
3. Save the initial states of components.
4. Compute and save the initial performance level of all the output nodes.
5. Sample the next transition parameters of nodes, update τ , and set t  min pτ q.
6. Check for nodes with next transition time equal to t and for each node, i,
(a) eﬀect the required transition.
(b) with the exception of the case when the new state is APM, Idle, or Partial
Failure given its previous state is Diagnosis, sample its next transition pa-
rameters, ynext and tnext, and determine ym, where applicable. Update h1
or h2 if ym exists, set µ
tcmu
i and µ
tpmu
i to 0, and go to Step (g).
(c) if the new state is APM, ynext  y1, tnext  t1   t, ym is set to the PM
state, and h2 updated. However, h2 is not updated if the node is returning
from PM, as the transition depicts a maintenance suspension. In this case,
tnext  trem   t, where trem is the remaining life of the component prior to
its maintenance being forced. Go to Step (f).
(d) if the new state is Partial Failure and previous state, Diagnosis, tnext 
trem  t, the expected failure state before the transition to Diagnosis is made
ynext, and ym is set to Diagnosis. Go to Step (f).
(e) if the new state is Idle, tnext  8. ym is set to PM if the node is from PM,
and CM, if it is from Diagnosis. Go to Step (f).
(f) steps (d) and (e) involve maintenance suspensions. For these and the case
involving PM suspension in step (c), the time, tspare, the spares will be
delayed by, is sampled from the appropriate distribution. Update τ spare,
such that pτ spare, iq  tspare   t.
(g) update the node's state history, the ﬂow vectors, and τ | pτ , iq  tnext.
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7. Identify the nodes which spares have been made available. For each node, i,
update τ spare | pτ spare, iq  8, h1, if ym is CM or Diagnosis, and h2, otherwise.
8. Compute h1f and h2f and call Algorithm 7.
9. If the current and previous ﬂow property vectors diﬀer:
(a) restart nodes in shut-down, compute the ﬂows through the nodes of the
system, and shut down nodes, as proposed in Chapter 3.
(b) for each output node, update its performance history if its current and pre-
vious performances diﬀer.
10. Save the current node ﬂow property vectors.
11. Compute h1f  h1X δ X ϑ1 and h2f  h1X δ X ϑ2 and call Algorithm 7 again.
This step accounts for those components maintainable only while in shut-down.
12. Set the next simulation time, t  min pmin pτ q ,min pτ spareqq.
13. Repeat Steps 6 to 12 until t ¡ Tm, updating τ , the ﬂow property vectors, node
state histories, and output performance histories at every transition.
14. Repeat Steps 2 to 13, N times, saving the ﬁnal node histories at every trial.
15. Determine the system performance indices.
The desired performance indices are, pEENSqeff , tN
tcmu
i , N
tpmu
i uM 12,
tt
tcmu
i , t
tpmu
i uM 12, and ts
tcmu
i , s
tpmu
i uM 12. The last set of indices is yielded di-
rectly by the simulation algorithm, pEENSqeff is computed from the performance
histories of output nodes, and the remainder, from the state transition histories of
components. ttpmui is given by the average time spent by component i in preventive
maintenance (e.g., state 5 in Figs. 6.2 and 6.3), ttcmui , the average time spent in
Diagnosis and corrective maintenance (e.g., states 7 and 3 in Figures 6.2 and 6.3,
states 3, 5, 7 and 9 in Figure 6.4), N tcmui , the average number of transitions from all
CM states to Working state (e.g., transition 3-1 in Figsures 6.2 and 6.3, transitions
3-1 and 5-1 in Figure 6.4) and N tpmui , the average number of transitions from PM
state to Working state (e.g., transition 5-1 in Figures 6.2 and 6.3). These indices are
substituted in the equations proposed in Section 6.2.2, to compute the system loss.
The simulation procedure, with its associated algorithms, accounts for most of the
forced and conditional transitions. As a result, some of these transitions could be
omitted from the component models without compromising the simulation outcome. For
instance, the shut-down state and its related transitions could be omitted altogether.
This, however, does not mean shut-down and restart are not accounted for during
simulation. Of the remaining forced and conditional transitions, only those to and from
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Figure 6.5: Schematic of a 2-unit hydroelectric power plant.
Table 6.3: Component and system data for the hydroelectric power plant.
Component Valves Turbines Gens. Breakers Synch. Xfmr.
Failure time distribution Wb(1000,1.5) Wb(4125,2.1) Wb(2000,2) Exp(3750) Exp(3250) Exp(2500)
Repair time distribution Exp(40) LogN(106,5) Exp(150) Exp(36) Exp(96) Exp(80)
PM interval U(500,625) U(1125,1250) U(1125,1250) U(2125,2175) U(2125,2175) U(2125,2175)
PM duration Exp(8) Exp(21.2) Exp(30) Exp(7.2) Exp(19.2) Exp(16)
Diagnosis duration Exp(5) Exp(14) Gu(20,3.24) G(5,2) Exp(16) LogN(16,2)
Spares cost(CM) 1624 2100 1944 1006 2245 2700
Spares cost(PM) 1055.6 1365 1263.6 653.9 1459.25 1755
PM cost/hr 162.5 243.75 203.13 101.56 243.75 264.06
CM cost/hr 250 375 312.5 156.25 375 406.25
Spares delay Exp (24)
Probability of Component Replacement During Maintenance
CM (pi) 0.5 0.55 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6
PM (qi) 0.8 0.9 0.96 0.42 0.4 0.45
Mean Fraction of PM Duration Before Component Replacement Becomes Eminent
Fraction (ki) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Diagnosis state, from PM to Idle state, and from PM to APM state (if applicable) are
required, the rest could be omitted. Applying this new information to the component
models presented in Figures 6.2 to 6.4, for instance, would result in much simpler models.
6.4 Case-Studies
The proposed framework is implemented in the MATLAB-based toolbox, OpenCosan
[109, 110], and used to identify the optimal maintenance strategies for two power sys-
tems.
6.4.1 Case-Study 1: A 50MW Hydroelectric Power Plant
In this case-study, a two-unit hydroelectric power plant is analysed. It is a slightly
modiﬁed model of the Bumbuna hydroelectric power plant, a 50MW plant in Sierra
Leone. Its two units are similar, and each, rated 25MW consists a butterﬂy valve,
turbine, generator, and circuit breaker. Their generated power is synchronized in the
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Figure 6.6: Plant's network model.
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Figure 6.7: State-space diagrams of components.
synchronizing unit and fed to the step-up transformers for onward transmission. These
transformers are also rated 25MW, and when one is unavailable, the plant is reconﬁgured
such that only one unit operates. The plant's schematic representation is shown in
Figure 6.5 and its reliability data, in Table 6.3. All failure and repair times are in
hours, and costs, in British Pounds (£). The unit cost of electricity is £ 0.5, the ﬁxed
wage per maintenance team is £ 7 per hour, and a negligible cost per maintenance call.
It is worthwhile noting that the data presented in Table 6.3 are assumed, and therefore
for illustrative purposes only. Ideally, such data should be based on actual ﬁeld data
extracted from component failure and maintenance histories.
6.4.1.1 Modelling the Plant and its Components
The following assumptions are considered.
1. All components operate at only two distinct performance levels.
2. Components are ranked in their order of arrival in the maintenance queue.
3. There is only one maintenance group.
4. The load is ﬁxed at 50MW, and the reservoir can always meet this demand.
5. The failure rates of the control gate and penstock are negligible.
Figure 6.6 shows the network model of the plant. The components of unit 1, that is,
valve-1, turbine-1, generator-1, and breaker-1 are respectively denoted by nodes 1 to 4
and their counterpart in unit 2, by nodes 5 to 8. Nodes 9 to 14 respectively represent
the synchronizer, breaker-3, transformer-1, transformer-2, dam, and the external load.
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Figure 6.9: Plant reliability.
Assuming perfect links between components, the parameters of the network are obtained
as proposed in Chapter 3. For this system, the number of nodes, M , is 14 while
the number of maintainable components, M 1, is 12. The state-space diagrams of the
components, without maintenance delays are shown in Figure 3.8. Under the range of
possible maintenance regimes proposed in Section 6.2.3, these state-space diagrams can
be transformed into those in Figure. 6.2 and 6.3. Since the demand and source (dam)
capacity are ﬁxed at 50MW, nodes 13 and 14 have a single state of capacity 50 units.
The reconﬁguration procedure used in the simulation shuts down nodes when their
load ﬂow drops below a threshold. To enable plant reconﬁguration when only one
transformer is available, a minimum load restriction is imposed on the turbines. The
choice of the turbines, however, is arbitrary, as any of the unit nodes would do, due to
their being connected in series. With only node 11 or 12 available, the load ﬂow from
node 13 drops to 25MW, which is divided equally between the two units if they both
are in operation. The threshold ﬂow for each turbine, therefore, is set to a value slightly
greater than 12.5 units (say 12.52), and 0, for all the other nodes.
6.4.1.2 The Eﬀects of Maintenance on System Performance and Reliability
The plant is analysed separately under the assumptions that its components are non-
repairable, subject to preventive maintenance only, corrective maintenance only, and
both maintenance types. With the exception of the non-repairable case, there is no
restriction on the number of parallel maintenance actions that can take place. The
maintenance team size in each case, therefore, is expressed as (0 0), (0 12), (12 0), and
(12 0), respectively. Dedicated maintenance is used in the second and third cases to
ensure only the intended maintenance type is carried out (e.g., no CM during a PM
only policy). This stage is aimed at investigating the relative eﬀects of the various
maintenance strategies on the plant's reliability, performance, and loss function. It
identiﬁes the candidates for the optimal maintenance strategy and determines whether
139
Table 6.4: Plant expected output and loss.
Strategy Output (GWh) L (£106)
None 23.66 238.17
PM only 26.06 237.82
CM only 382.21 60.98
PM+CM [1,4] 370.99 66.38
[1,5] 384.21 59.91
[2,4] 369.18 67.51
[2,5] 383.57 61.42
[3,4] 396.29 53.63
[3,5] 388.22 58.07
or not to proceed with the search for the optimal maintenance team size. This prevents
searching in unlikely regions or strategies, thereby reducing the computational cost.
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 respectively show the reliability and instantaneous performance
of the plant as a fraction of its nominal output, for a mission time of 1  104 hours
and 5 103 Monte Carlo samples. Plant reliability is deﬁned with respect to complete
outages, however, excluding those due to preventive maintenance (scheduled outages).
The objective is to study the survivability of the plant, which scheduled outages would
underestimate. For instance, more frequent outages may be experienced under a main-
tenance strategy incorporating both preventive and corrective maintenance than one
with the latter only. In practice, scheduled outages do not count toward a systems's
survivability, since they are out of choice rather than failure. Hence, the need for their
disregard in its survivability analysis. In summary, plant reliability at time, t, is the
non-occurrence probability of complete-outage-inducing failures in the interval r0, ts.
The reliabilities and instantaneous performances deﬁned by Figures 6.8 and 6.9
depict the upper bounds for the various maintenance strategies. As expected, both
maintenance types, indeed, improve the reliability and performance of the plant. The
impact of PM, however, is only slight, given that 50% of the components exhibit an
exponential failure characteristic. For such components, PM only reduces their avail-
ability without an improvement in reliability [161]. Preventive maintenance, therefore,
is most eﬀective in systems with ageing components. Table 6.4 presents the upper
bound of the expected plant output and the corresponding loss for each maintenance
strategy. The notation [a,b] denotes a strategy made up of a combination of regimes
a and b, as described in Section 6.2.3. A review of the trend portrayed in Figures 6.8,
6.9, and Table 6.4, suggests a maintenance strategy incorporating both PM and CM is
desirable. The losses in Table 6.4 are yielded by the maximum number of maintenance
teams, the optimal loss in each case, therefore, is provided by fewer maintenance teams.
These teams are determined by the procedure proposed in Section 6.2.4.
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Table 6.5: Optimal plant loss as a function of maintenance strategy
Strategy L (£106) Number of teams
r1, 4s 65.66 2
r1, 5s 59.24 2
r2, 4s 66.88 3
r2, 5s 59.65 3
r3, 4s 52.89 5
r3, 5s 57.32 4
CM only 60.14 4
Table 6.6: Optimal maintenance strategy sensitivity to costs.
Cost Element
EC FMC CPHM CS
Strategy
(0 0), kf  0 r3, 4s @kf
r3, 4s, 0 ¤ kf   70.9 r3, 4s @kfr3, 4s kf ¡ 0 r3, 5s, kf ¥ 70.9
6.4.1.3 Optimal Maintenance Strategy Identiﬁcation
It is clear the non-repairable and preventive-maintenance-only strategies are very ineﬃ-
cient. The plant, therefore, is analysed for the other strategies, using the same mission
time and number of samples as in the preceding section. The optimal solution for each
strategy is identiﬁed and recorded as shown in Table 6.5. From these, the best mainte-
nance strategy and the optimal number of maintenance teams are deduced as [3,4] and
5, respectively. To explore the existence of a more optimal solution for this strategy,
the plant is re-analysed under dedicated maintenance. It is observed that for the same
number of teams, shared maintenance strategies produce a better plant performance.
The optimal strategy being [3,4] is in agreement with the preliminary results pre-
sented in Table 6.4. Therefore, the optimal solution would have been obtained using this
strategy alone. However, the other strategies were considered to establish a relationship
between the optimal maintenance team size and maintenance strategy.
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6.4.1.4 Sensitivity to Cost Levels
The robustness of the optimal maintenance strategy to variations in cost of electricity
(EC), ﬁxed cost per maintenance team (FMC), ﬁxed cost per hour of maintenance
(CPHM), and cost of spares (CS) is investigated. Figure 6.10 shows how the number
of maintenance teams required for optimal performance varies with kf | 0 ¤ kf ¤ 100,
where kf is the ratio of new cost to the original cost provided in Table 6.3. It is
evident from the ﬁgure that the optimal maintenance team size is insensitive to the cost
of spares but exhibits a fair degree of sensitivity to the other costs. In contrast, the
optimal maintenance strategy is insensitive to all four cost elements up to kf  70.9
(for CPHM), beyond which [3,5] becomes the optimal strategy, as shown in Table 6.6.
In practice, when inﬂation occurs, it aﬀects all the cost elements concurrently. The
sensitivity of the optimal solution in such a scenario is investigated. It is observed that
with kf  0, the maintenance strategies are all equivalent, since all the services are in
eﬀect provided free-of-charge. Beyond this value, the optimal maintenance strategy and
the number of teams remain constant at [3,4] and 5, respectively, for the entire range
of kf . The optimal loss, however, increases according to Figure 6.11. This strange
behaviour is explained by the dominance of the cost of electricity in the loss equation
(see Section 6.2.2). When all the four costs change by the same factor, the resultant
eﬀect is dominated by the electricity cost, for kf ¡ 0.4, and the other costs, otherwise. A
comparison of the trends portrayed in Figures 6.10 and 6.12 supports this theory. Figure
6.12 is obtained by holding ﬁxed, the cost of electricity and varying the maintenance
costs. Expectedly, it shows a decrease in the optimal maintenance team size, with
rising maintenance costs. Indeed, with high maintenance costs, the only logical decision
is downsizing the maintenance team, to ensure sustainability.
6.4.1.5 Computational costs
The simulations were run on a 48 core, 1895.257MHz AMD Opteron(tm) 6168 processor,
using 19 cores running in parallel. Less than one minute was required for the non-
repairable system and an average of 8.95 minutes per candidate solution for the system
under preventive and corrective maintenance.
6.4.1.6 Discussions
Analytical approaches do not make a feasible option for the analysis of complex systems
with realistic attributes. Simulation algorithms, on the other hand, are disadvantaged
by their large computational costs, made worse when employed in optimization proce-
dures. This, often, is attributed to the large number of samples required for a dependable
estimate of the system performance indices. Therefore, the trade-oﬀ between accuracy
and moderate computational burden is worth adequate attention. Another limiting
constraint of great importance is the mission time, which should be selected such that,
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Figure 6.12: Sensitivity of optimal solution to concurrent variation in FMC and CPHM.
the performance indices obtained reﬂect the true long-term indices of the system. This
requires that the mission time be suﬃciently greater than the time the system takes
to attain steady-state. In the case study presented, 5  103 samples are just enough
to provide an acceptable degree of accuracy and a manageable computational burden.
Also, from Figure 6.8, the plant's steady-state attainment time is about a ﬁfth of its
mission time. These attributes endorse the dependability of the optimization outcome.
The analyses suggest the optimal number of maintenance teams is maintenance strat-
egy dependent. They also reveal, returning components into operation during mainte-
nance suspensions improves system performance. This improvement is attributable to
the increased availability of the components culminating in a lower EENS. The excep-
tion is the case when PM is initiated only while components are not in operation. In
this regime, the initiation of a component's PM is determined by the failure character-
istics of other components. Therefore, when the component is returned into operation,
its PM resumes only on the occurrence of another shut-down event. The likelihood
that the component fails in this interval is higher than in the other regimes, due to the
longer wait times. The result is, a fewer PM actions, more failures, longer component
downtimes, and a higher EENS. These consequences are minimized by keeping the com-
ponent out of operation until PM resumes. However, in both cases, initiating preventive
maintenance only while components are not in operation yields the best performance.
The range of kf used in the sensitivity analyses is a little unrealistic for practical
applications. The range of interest, therefore, is conservatively chosen to be 0 ¤ kf ¤ 2,
depicting an inﬂation of 100% to  100%. In this range, the optimal maintenance
strategy is unaﬀected by variations in cost levels, though the number of teams required
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for optimal performance varies with the cost of electricity. The following, therefore, is
recommended for the hydroelectric power plant.
1. PM should be carried out only when a component is not in operation. That is, it
should coincide with a shut-down event that renders the component inactive.
2. Components should be kept out of operation during maintenance interruptions.
3. At the current cost levels, ﬁve maintenance teams, employing a shared mainte-
nance strategy, are required for optimal performance. This, however, should be
scaled down to 3, 2, 1, and 0, when the cost of electricity deﬂates by 50%, 60%,
90%, and 100%, respectively, as depicted in Figure 6.10.
4. As evidenced in Figures 6.8 and 6.9, preventive maintenance does not quite im-
prove the overall performance of the system, contrary to anticipations. This, as
explained earlier, could be due to subjecting components exhibiting exponential
failure characteristics to needless preventive maintenance. It is anticipated that if
preventive maintenance is not carried out on these components, additional gains
could be made from improved plant availability and reduced maintenance costs.
This hypothesis is tested, and as expected, results in an output gain of 1.82% and
a corresponding system loss reduction by 7%. Preventive maintenance, therefore,
should not be carried out on the breakers, synchronizer, and transformers.
6.4.2 Case-Study 2: The IEEE-24 Bus Reliability Test System
In this case-study, a more realistic system is considered, in order to showcase the appli-
cability of the proposed approach to systems of practical nature. Shown in Figure 6.13
is the single-line diagram of the IEEE-24 bus one-area test system, adapted from [107].
It is composed of 24 buses, 34 power lines, 10 generation stations, and 17 load points.
Its total generating capacity is 3405MW with a varying load which annual peak is
2850MW. The total generating capacity and load are distributed across the network as
described in [112]. The buses are assumed perfectly reliable and the transmission lines,
binary-state. The failure and repair characteristics of the transmission lines in [112]
are retained but a few other properties are modiﬁed, to make the system more realistic
and compatible with the proposed approach. These modiﬁcations are summarised as
follows.
 Multiple generation units at a bus are represented by a single unit with a gener-
ating capacity equivalent to the sum of the generating capacities of the units.
 To make the network more sensitive to the unavailability of transmission lines
and generation units, the maximum transmission capacities of the former and
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The IEEE Reliability Test System
1 System Description
The 24 bus system [1] is illustrated in Figure 1. The slack bus of the system is node 13.
Figure 1: 24-bus power system – IEEE One Area RTS-96
1
Figure 6.13: Single-line diagram of the IEE -24 bus Reliability Test System.
Table 6.7: Maintenance data for generation units.
Gen. Type Bus Number
Spare Usage Prob. PM Transition Distribution Parameters
CM PM Interval Duration 1-2 2-1 2-3 1-3 3-1
1 22 0.7 0.9 1200 U(156,180) Wb(2234,2) Exp(20)
2 1 & 2 0.9,0.25 0.9 1200 U(60,66) Exp(980) Exp(20) Wb(1106,2.3) Wb(2212,2) Exp(40)
3 7 0.8,0.4 0.9 1200 U(60,66) Exp(600) Exp(25) Wb(677,2.3) Wb(1354,2) Exp(50)
4 15,16 & 23 0.8,0.3 0.9 1000 U(81,87) Exp(480) Exp(20) Wb(542,2.3) Wb(1083,2) Exp(40)
5 13 1.0,0.5 0.9 1000 U(102,108) Exp(575) Exp(50) Wb(649,2.3) Wb(1298,2) Exp(100)
6 18 & 21 1,0.6 0.9 1000 U(123,129) Exp(550) Exp(75) Wb(621,2.3) Wb(1241,2) Exp(150)
minimum allowable loads of the latter are considered in the analysis. These ca-
pacities and limits, are respectively given in [112] and [107]. Please note that the
minimum load for the unit at bus 22 is set to 25MW instead of the 300MW sug-
gested in [107]. The reason for this is that its contribution to the total load when
every component works correctly is only about 37.5MW. A minimum allowable
load of 300MW, therefore, would mean it operates only on the failure of another
unit. This, in other words, reduces the unit to cold standby, thereby defeating the
intention of making every component useful to the system throughout the mission.
 The buses are assigned maximum capacities according to the following rules.
1. For load and generation buses, the maximum capacity is arbitrarily set to 3
times the capacity of the generation unit or load.
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Table 6.8: Maintenance costs for generation units.
Gen. Type
CM PM
CS CPHM CS CPHM
1 180 20 108 12
2 180 20 108 12
3 180 20 108 12
4 200 25 120 15
5 280 40 168 24
6 300 50 180 30
2. For buses with both a generation unit and load, the capacity is set to 3 times
the generating capacity or load, whichever is greater.
3. For all other buses, the capacity is set to 3 times the maximum of the capac-
ities of the buses they are connected to.
 Each generation unit, with the exception of the unit at bus 22, is assumed to exist
at three possible distinct output levels; 100%, 50%, and 0% of its rated capacity.
Unit 22 operates at only two levels; 100% and 0% rated capacity.
6.4.2.1 Maintenance Information
The failure times of the transmission lines are exponentially distributed. As a conse-
quence, they undergo CM only, with an assumed 0.9 likelihood of spares being used. It
is also assumed the maintenance crew are able to carry with them these spares. The
maintenance of the lines, therefore, is immune to delays in the availability of spares.
The generation units, on the other hand, undergo both PM and CM, and are sus-
ceptible to all the operational dynamics described in Section 6.2. Table 6.7 contains
their failure and maintenance parameters, where states 1, 2, and 3, respectively repre-
sent nominal performance, partial, and complete failure. Their replacement probability
during CM is represented by a pair which elements respectively deﬁne the probabilities
associated with states 3 and 2. Where applicable, the diagnosis and CM durations have
the same distribution, with means in the ratio, 1 : 4. For instance, the transition of the
unit at bus 13 from state 3 to 1, denoting repairs from complete failure, is exponen-
tially distributed with mean 100. Therefore, the diagnosis and corrective maintenance
durations are also exponentially distributed with means 20 and 80 respectively. All
transition times are in hours and ki for generation units is conservatively assumed to
be 0.3. Also note that the data presented in Table 6.7 are for illustrative purposes only.
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6.4.2.2 Maintenance Grouping and Costs
The network components are arranged into three maintenance groups, and each group
maintained by a separate maintenance company. The transmission lines above buses 11,
12, and 24 make maintenance group 1, the remaining lines, group 2, and the generation
units constitute group 3. Each maintenance team in groups 1 and 2 is paid a ﬁxed
£5 per hour and a ﬁxed £100 per successful maintenance action. Teams in group 3
earn £8 every hour and £120 for every successful maintenance action. The cost of
one transmission line spare is averaged at £150, the cost per hour of transmission line
maintenance, at £15, and the cost levels for the generation units, as deﬁned in Table
6.8. The operator imposes the total number of maintenance teams to not exceed 16.
6.4.2.3 Objective
In the current maintenance strategy, hereafter referred to as the base strategy, corrective
and preventive maintenance can be initiated at any time, subject to the availability of
maintenance teams. For an annual load cycle of 8736 hours (see [112]) and £100 per
MWh of electricity consumed, the optimal maintenance team size is determined for
this strategy and its eﬀectiveness compared with three complex strategies. The base
strategy, for simplicity, is labelled strategy 1, and the other strategies, as outlined thus.
 Strategy 2: PM and CM of partially failed units only when in shut-down.
 Strategy 3: PM and CM of partially failed generation units only when system
performance is nominal.
 Strategy 4: PM of generation units only when system performance is nominal but
CM of partially failed units can be carried out at any time.
Each maintenance strategy is computed for the case when the units;
 (a) are kept out of operation during maintenance suspensions
 (b) are returned into operation during maintenance suspensions
6.4.2.4 System modelling
Since the goal is to identify the optimal maintenance strategy, a DC ﬂow analysis, using
the procedure proposed in Chapter 3, is employed to compute the system reliability
and performance indices. The buses, generation units, and load points are modeled as
nodes, while the transmission lines are modeled as edges, in the system graph model. In
this case study, the edge attribute of the transmission lines has been retained, to keep
the number of nodes moderate and improve performance. Consequently, the vector of
maximum edge capacities is modiﬁed after every transition involving a transmission
147
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
  B1
  B2
  B3
  B4
  B5
  B6
  B7
  B8
  B9
  B10
  B11   B12
  B13
  B14
  B15
  B16
  B17
  B18
  B19
  B20
  B21
  B22
  B23
  B24
  U1
  U2
  U7
  U13
  U15
  U16
  U18
  U21
  U22
  U23
  L1
  L2
  L3
  L4
  L5
  L6
  L7
  L8
  L9
  L10
  L13
  L14
  L15
  L16
  L18
  L19
  L20
0.0
6
0.
06
0.07
0.04
0.0
6 0.06
0.06
0.03
0.
06
0.06
0.1
4
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.0
3
0.07
0.07
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.0
5
0.12
0.0
4
0.12
0.060
.06 0.
06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.
14
0.14
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.
14
0.14
0.07
0.
14 0.
14
0.18
0.1
8
0.14
0.14
0.180.18
0.18
0.18
0.
18
0.09
0.1
8
0.1
6 0.
07
0.160.3
3
0.1
8
0.11
0.1
6
0.16
0.16 0.160.0
4
0.16
0.18
0.18
0.180
.35
0.1
2
0.16
0.13
0.06
0.13
0.1
3
0.04
0.3
3
0.3
5 0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.
18
0.1
3
0.1
4
0.1
8
0.07
0.
07
0.11
0.21
0.08
0.05
0.14
0.14
0.
11
0.23
(a) Both reciprocal edges shown
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
 B1
 
 B2  B3
 
 B4
 
 B5
 
 B6
 
 B7
 
 B8
 
 B9   B10
 
 B11   B12
 
 B13  B14
 
 B15
 
 B16
 
 B17
 
 B18
 
 B19
 
 B20
 
 B21
 
 B22
 
 B23
 
 B24
 
 U1   U2   U7  U13  U15   U16  U18  U21  U22   U23
 
 L1
 
 L2  L3
 
 L4
 
 L5
 
 L6
 
 L7
 
 L8
 
 L9   L10
 
 L13  L14
 
 L15
 
 L16
 
 L18
 
 L19
 
 L20
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.0
4
0.
06
0.06
0.030.06
0.1
4
0.06
0.060.0
3
0.070
.0
2
0.060.0
5
0.1
2
0.04
0.0
6
0.06
0.06
0.14
0.14
0.0
6
0.1
4
0.14
0.07
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.180.18
0.
090.1
6
0.07
0.16
0.33
0.18
0.11
0.160.16
0.04
0.18
0.180.35
0.12
0.
13
0.06
0.13
0.04
0.
18
0.07 0.07
0.11
0.21
0.08
0.05
0.140.140.11
0.23
(b) Only one reciprocal edge shown
Figure 6.14: System graph model.
line, and both this vector and the vector of node capacities are required for system ﬂow
calculation. Figure 6.14 (a) shows the graph model of the system, where Un and Ln
respectively denote the generation unit and load point at bus n. Figure 6.14 (b) is the
same graph but with only one edge of each reciprocal pair (see Chapter 3) shown, for
clarity. In both cases, the number along each edge deﬁnes the maximum ﬂow along that
edge, as a fraction of the annual peak load.
The eﬀective EENS of the system (given the multiple load points) could be computed
as proposed in Section 6.2. However, the computation is rendered less complicated by
representing the global system output by a virtual node which ﬂow is the sum of the
ﬂows through all 17 load points. The ﬂow history of this virtual node is recorded
during simulation, and subsequently used to compute the eﬀective EENS, instead of
all 17 nodes. Being mindful of the computational demand of simulation algorithms,
a smart procedure is employed to treat the variable demand on the system. Recall
the objective of system reliability analysis is to determine the maximum achievable
system performance as a consequence of component failure and maintenance. For this
reason, the instantaneous system performance, Y ptq, is obtained with the assumption
that the demand is ﬁxed at its peak annual value. Under this assumption, however,
the system is no longer strictly demand-driven (since the actual demand varies with
time), and Y ptq has to be normalized to make it compatible with Equations 6.1 and 6.2.
The normalization entails expressing Y ptq as a function of the same time-step as the
instantaneous demand, Ydptq, such that they both have equal lengths, and applying,
Y ptq  mintY ptq, Ydptqu (6.17)
Normally, variable demand is treated by performing the simulation with respect to
the time-step deﬁned by the demand and the events generated by component failures
and maintenance. It is, therefore, easy to deduce the computational eﬃciency of the
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Figure 6.16: Simpliﬁed multi-state model for multi-state generation units.
procedure employed here, relative to the widely practised. The procedure is correct for
all single-load-point systems, as well as multiple-load-point systems where the quantity
of interest is the total output, and not the output through the individual load points.
To derive the set, N, of possible maintenance team combinations, the possibility
of a 0 maintenance team in any of the maintenance groups is ignored. This is due
to the fact that it is known already (from the previous case study) non-repairable
maintenance strategies to be grossly ineﬃcient. Recall also that maintenance groups 1
and 2 are composed of equal number of components with the same failure and repair
characteristics. They, therefore, have the same optimal maintenance team size. Given
these constraints and the upper bound imposed by the operator on the total number of
maintenance teams, N would contain 50 maintenance team combinations.
6.4.2.5 Component Modelling
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 are the system's simpliﬁed component models, showing only the
required transitions, as discussed in Section 6.3.5. Since the transmission lines are
not susceptible to maintenance interruptions, their failure diagnosis and actual repair
have been collectively represented by the CM state. This, however, implies the number
of spares used cannot be directly obtained from the simulation, as spares used are
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Table 6.9: Optimal System Loss as a function of maintenance strategy.
Strategy EENSp%q L
 
£106
 Optimal number of teams
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1
a 0.3940 6.63 1 1 3
b 0.2468 4.47 2 2 3
2
a 2.4218 37.66 1 1 4
b 2.4780 38.68 3 3 4
3
a 1.3592 21.36 1 1 3
b 1.5049 23.65 1 1 4
4
a 0.3373 5.90 1 1 5
b 0.2128 3.95 2 2 3
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Figure 6.17: Optimal maintenance team sensitivity to cost levels.
accounted for only if the component enters Diagnosis or PM state (see Algorithm 6).
The total spares used, therefore, is obtained from the product of the spares usage
probability and the number of CM to W transitions. Please note the models in Figures
6.15 and 6.16 are based on the assumption that components are kept out of operation
during maintenance suspensions. Those for the case when components are returned into
operation can be easily deduced from Figures 6.2-6.4. It is also worthwhile noting that,
the simpliﬁed component models for regimes 1 to 3 of Section 6.2.3 are equivalent.
6.4.2.6 Results and Discussions
The system was analysed on the same computer used for the previous case study, and
the outcome is summarized in Table 6.9. The table provides the EENS as a percentage
of the total expected output, the expected loss, and the optimal maintenance team
combination for each strategy. Each sample of a candidate solution took an average of
0.8s, using 10 MATLAB workers. Given the large number of candidate solutions, the
number of samples per candidate solution was set to 500. The sensitivity of the optimal
solution to the costs considered in the previous case study and a few other costs, was
also investigated. The additional costs considered are as follows.
 Cost per hour of CM and cost per CM call (CPHM1).
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 Cost per hour of PM and cost per PM call (CPHM2).
 Total maintenance cost (MC); a combination of FMC, CPHM1, and CPHM2.
 All costs relevant to the system loss function (ALL).
Deducing from the data in Table 6.9, the optimal maintenance strategy is strategy 4
(b). In this strategy, the corrective maintenance of partially failed generation units can
be initiated at any time but preventive maintenance, only when system performance
is nominal, with components returned into operation during maintenance suspensions.
Postponing both corrective and preventive maintenance until component shut-down
appears to be the most ineﬃcient, contrary to what obtained in the previous case
study. This observation reiterates the point that the optimality of a given maintenance
strategy depends on speciﬁc properties of the system. For 0 ¤ kf ¤ 100, strategy 4
(b) remains optimal, but the optimal number of maintenance teams varies as depicted
by Figure 6.17. It should be noted that cost parameters with no eﬀect on the optimal
number of maintenance teams have been left out in Figures 6.17 (a) and 6.17 (b). Given
maintenance groups 1 and 2 are made up of the transmission lines only (which do not
undergo PM), CPHM and CPHM1 are equivalent, explaining the absence of CPHM1
and CPHM2 in Figure 6.17 (a). A notable conclusion drawn from Figure 6.17 is that
the optimal number of maintenance teams is most aﬀected by the cost of electricity
(EC) and the ﬁxed cost per maintenance team (FMC). It is also easily deducible that
the number of teams required for optimality reduces and increases with reduction in
EC and FMC, respectively, both observations conforming to common reasoning.
Figure 6.18 shows the variation in system loss with changes in cost levels in the
range, 0 ¤ kf ¤ 2. For clarity, system response over the ranges 0 ¤ kf ¤ 1 and
1 ¤ kf ¤ 2 has been presented separately in Figures 6.18 (a) and 6.18 (b), respectively.
With kf  1 as reference, Figure 6.18 (a) deﬁnes the sensitivity of the total system loss
to cost reductions and Figure 6.18 (b), to cost increments. In both cases, the cost of
electricity and the overall maintenance cost impact system loss the most. However, the
system shows very little sensitivity to both the cost of spares and the cost per hour of
PM action, suggesting a few PM actions and low spares usage. The low system loss
sensitivity to CPHM2 is explained by the fact that only 10 of the 44 system components
undergo PM. Given strategy 4 imposes PM be initiated only if system performance is
nominal, a good number of these components fail before their PM commences.
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Figure 6.18: System loss sensitivity to cost levels.
6.5 Chapter Summary
It is realistic to think that increasing the number of maintenance teams improves the
performance and reliability of a multi-component system. However, a threshold exists
exceeding which no gains are realised. Rather, it results in increased operational costs,
borne from the imbalance between income and expenditure. This threshold varies with
the maintenance strategy, the input costs to the system's cost model, the topology of
the system, and the non-topological functional relationships between its components.
In this chapter, a maintenance strategy optimization framework, aiding proper main-
tenance scheduling and robust maintenance decisions has been presented. Applicable
to binary and multi-state systems, the framework proposes a multi-state model to de-
ﬁne the behaviour of components under various maintenance strategies. A nonsystem-
speciﬁc, event-driven Monte Carlo simulation, based on the load-ﬂow approach proposed
in Chapter 3 is employed to replicate the operation of the system. This simulation algo-
rithm, together with the multi-state component model, enhances the implementation of
complex maintenance strategies. For instance, a component may belong to two mainte-
nance groups practising dedicated and shared maintenance, respectively. There could
also exist multiple maintenance groups, with some initiating maintenance promptly and
others only during a shut-down event or at the attainment of nominal system perfor-
mance. Many more contrasting combinations of regimes are possible, without the need
to modify the simulation algorithm. The framework is also built on a cost model struc-
tured to allow the sensitivity analysis of the optimal solution from a single reliability
evaluation. These attributes render it novel, eﬃcient, and generally applicable to power
& water distribution networks, as well as other ﬂow-based systems.
The framework has been successfully used to optimize the maintenance strategies
for two realistic power systems, obtaining insightful information on their maintenance.
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The relationship derived between the optimal number of maintenance teams and the
cost of electricity, for instance, is a very useful tool, given a volatile electricity market.
The framework, therefore, can shape the quality of maintenance-related decisions, even
in the presence of external dynamics.
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Chapter 7
An Extended Survival Signature
Approach for Dependent Failures
7.1 Introduction
Dependent failures impose severe consequences on a complex system's reliability and
overall performance, and a realistic assessment requires an adequate consideration of
these failures. System survival signature opens up a new and eﬃcient way to compute
a system's reliability, given its ability to segregate the structural from the probabilistic
attributes of the system. Consequently, it outperforms the well-known system reliability
evaluation techniques (like the ones proposed in Chapters 3 and 4), when solicited
for problems like maintenance optimization, requiring repetitive system evaluations.
The survival signature, however, is premised on the statistical independence between
component failure times and more generally on the theory of weak exchangeability,
for dependent component failures. The assumption of independence is ﬂawed for most
realistic engineering systems whilst the latter entails the painstaking and sometimes
impossible task of deriving the joint survival function of the system components. This
chapter, therefore, proposes a novel, generally applicable, and eﬃcient Monte Carlo
simulation approach that allows the survival signature to be intuitively used for the
reliability evaluation of systems susceptible to induced failures. Multiple component
failure modes, as well, are considered, and sensitivities are analysed to identify the most
critical Common-Cause Group to the survivability of the system. Examples, which
results obtained are under consideration for publication in the Journal of Risk and
Reliability, demonstrate the superiority of the approach.
The next section of this chapter presents a general overview of the proposed ap-
proach. Section 7.3 contains the detailed modelling procedure and the Monte Carlo
simulation algorithm. The two examples illustrating the applicability of the approach
are presented in Section 7.4, followed by a summary of the chapter, in Section 7.5.
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7.2 Overview of Proposed Approach
The existing survival signature-based modelling formalism is harnessed to propose a
more realistic approach to system reliability analysis. In the proposed approach, the
survival signature of the system is obtained prior to system analysis, using its topological
attributes only. An eﬃcient event-driven Monte Carlo simulation is then invoked to
recreate the failure of the components and propagate the ensuing dependencies, where
necessary. The number of operating components is determined for each component type,
with the corresponding system survival signature directly read oﬀ from a predeﬁned
register and saved as a function of time. These stored values are later used to compute
the time-dependent reliability of the system, using basic probabilistic principles.
Since the survival signature of a system is ﬁxed so long as its topology does not
change, the proposed approach makes an eﬃcient alternative. Its eﬃciency particularly
stands out in maintenance optimization problems, sensitivity & uncertainty analyses,
and other problems requiring multiple system reliability evaluations. Also, because it
is simulation-based, it can accommodate any component failure time distribution type,
including user-deﬁned distributions. In summary, the proposed approach inherits the
desirable attributes of both the survival signature-based and Monte Carlo simulation-
based approaches. It is, to the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst documented extension of
the survival signature-based approach to the complete system level reliability evaluation
of complex systems susceptible to both common-cause and cascading failures.
7.3 Modelling & Simulating the System
Consider the system described in Section 2.5.1, and suppose the random failure of a
component of type k may trigger the failure of one or more components. In addition,
let one or more components have multiple total failure modes, which failure modes in
turn may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the system. By total failure I mean, the component
is completely failed and its output/structure function is 0. The component, in other
words, is still deemed binary-state. Suppose also that the system is not only susceptible
to cascading failures emanating from within its boundaries but to cascading failures
triggered by external factors, as well. Clearly, the existing survival signature-based
reliability evaluation approaches are inadequate for such a system. This section provides
a detailed description of the modelling approach for such systems.
7.3.1 Components with Multiple Failure Modes
The survival signature is suited to binary-state components and systems. Therefore,
when the system being modelled also contains components with multiple failure modes,
the analyst would need to make these compatible with the signature-based approach.
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Consider a component with two failure modes, and which occurrence times follow the
CDF, F1 ptq and F2 ptq, respectively. If these failure modes have the same eﬀect on the
system, then, they can be merged. Two total failure modes have the same eﬀect if they
do not trigger dependent failures or if they have an equal likelihood of aﬀecting the same
set of components. The eﬀective CDF, Fi ptq, of the component is computed from the
probability, P pmin pT1, T2q ¤ tq, where T1 and T2 are the random occurrence times of
failure modes 1 and 2, respectively. This follows from the reasoning that the component
is failed on the occurrence of any of the failure modes. The resulting probability could
also be viewed as the complement of the probability that none of the failure modes
occurs, yielding, Fi ptq  1  r1 F1 ptqs r1 F2 ptqs. Generally, the eﬀective CDF,
Fi ptq, of an n failure mode component is given by Fi ptq  1
±n
l1 r1 Fl ptqs, so long
as the failure modes are total and impose the same eﬀect on the system.
There are times when a set of component failure modes do not satisfy the condition
for merging. Currently, such a scenario cannot be solved analytically, and I will, there-
fore, not be bothered about computing the eﬀective CDF of the component. Instead,
I will propose a set of procedures to segregate the component into several binary-state
elements, which then can be easily implemented by a Monte Carlo simulation algo-
rithm. It should be noted that this segregation is only required to enhance the intuitive
representation of the inter-component dependencies and ensure a simpliﬁed simulation
algorithm. The system, otherwise, could still be analysed, only the sampling algorithm
proposed in Chapter 3 and the dependency matrices proposed in Chapters 4 and 6
would be required, complicating an otherwise simple solution procedure.
An n failure mode component, i, is segregated by redeﬁning its state-space to contain
the working state (conservatively assumed to be state 1), and one of the failure modes
(assumed to be state 2). The remaining n  1 failure modes (assumed to be state
3 to state n) are each then assigned to a virtual binary-state node. Component i
retains the failure time distribution to state 2 while the virtual nodes inherit the failure
time distributions to their respective failure modes. The virtual nodes, as their name
implies, are not really a part of the system, and should, therefore, be considered external
factors/nodes. External nodes are not considered when deriving the survival signature
set, Sτ , of the system, which is why their numbering starts from M   1, M being the
number of system components. Since in practice, the virtual nodes, together with the
parent node, i, represent the same component, the failure of any of these nodes denotes
the failure of the component. Hence, each virtual node is a dual of the parent node.
When a node fails, its duals can no longer aﬀect the system, since the failure modes of
a component are mutually exclusive and in this chapter, non-repairable. Consequently,
the system simulation algorithm should be equipped with a special routine to ensure
aﬀected dual nodes are removed, following a failure event. For this, an eﬃcient recursive
algorithm is proposed in this chapter. The algorithm takes the current values of x1, ρtku
for all k P t1, 2, ...,Ku, the set, F, of failed components, and the set, Di, of duals of
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Algorithm 8 Procedure for removing dual nodes.
Require: x1, F, ρ, D, i
1: function RemoveDualNodes(x1, F, ρ, D, i)
2: Di Ð Di  F  Remove failed nodes
3: if Di ÐH then
4: go to line 13  Exit algorithm if i has no duals
5: end if
6: for j P Di do  Loop over dual nodes
7: k Ðcomponent type of node j
8: ρtku Ð ρtku  j  Remove j from set
9: px1, kq Ð| ρtku |  Update state vector
10: F  FY j  Update failed nodes/components
11: px1,F,ρq ÐRemoveDualNodes(x1, ..., j)
12: end for
13: return (x1, F, ρ)
14: end function
component i for all i P t1, 2, ...,M  M2u, returning x1, ρtku, and F, where M2 is the
number of external nodes. Following the failure of a component, the algorithm ﬁrst
removes all its duals that are not in operation, from Di. The component type, k, of the
ﬁrst active dual is determined, following which it is removed from the set of components,
ρtku, in that group, and the kth element of the modiﬁed system state vector, x1, replaced
with the cardinality of ρtku, which in other words is written as px1, kq | ρtku |. Due
to the possibility of a dual node possessing its own duals, the algorithm is recursively
applied to the node, as highlighted on line 11 of Algorithm 8. The sequence is repeated
for the remaining active duals, adding each to set F before moving on to the next.
Algorithm 8 summarises the procedure for removing the duals of component i, following
its failure. In the algorithm and the remainder of this chapter, D denotes the global set
of Di@i P t1, 2, ...,M  M2u, such that D  tD1,D2, ...,DM M2u. Similarly, ρ denotes
the global set of ρtku@k P t1, 2, ...,Ku, such that ρ  tρt1u,ρt2u, ...,ρtKuu.
7.3.2 Cascading Failure Modelling and Propagation
The cascading dependency between components is deﬁned by the cascading matrix, C.
The cascading matrix, which can be a sparse matrix, is an pM  M2q order square
matrix which elements denote whether or not the failure of a component can trigger the
almost instantaneous failure of another component. The element in row i and column
j of the matrix is assigned the value 1 if the failure of component i can induce failures
(in the cascading failure sense) in component j, and 0, otherwise. Therefore, the set, Ii,
of components which failure is induced by component i is given by the column indices
of the non-zero elements of row i of C.
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Algorithm 9 Procedure for forcing cascading failures.
Require: x1, F, ρ, D, C, i
1: function CascadeFailure(x1, F, ρ, D, C, i)
2: Ii Ðinduced components obtained from C
3: Ii Ð Ii  F  Remove failed nodes
4: if Ii ÐH then
5: go to line 15  Exit if i cannot induce failure
6: end if
7: for j P Ii do  Loop over induced components
8: k Ðcomponent type of node j
9: ρtku Ð ρtku  j  Remove j from set
10: px1, kq Ð| ρtku |  Update state vector
11: F  FY j  Update failed nodes/components
12: px1,F,ρq ÐRemoveDualNodes(x1, ..., j)
13: px1,F,ρq ÐCascadeFailure(x1, ..., j)
14: end for
15: return (x1, F, ρ)
16: end function
To account for these cascading dependencies, a second recursive algorithm is pro-
posed, to propagate their eﬀects across the system during simulation. The algorithm
takes in the same input set required by Algorithm 8 in addition to the cascade matrix
and returns x1, ρtku, and F. Following the failure of a component, the algorithm ﬁrst
deduces the possible set of components that can be aﬀected. From this set, currently
inactive components are removed, and the rest of the procedure is similar to what ob-
tains in Algorithm 8. Since an induced component can also induce failures in other
components, the algorithm recursively calls itself, this time, to propagate any failures
the induced may induce. The procedure is summarised by Algorithm 9.
7.3.3 CCF Modelling and Propagation
For non-repairable binary-state systems, a CCG is characterised by a set of probabilities.
This set deﬁnes the likelihood of a given number of components being involved in any
random failure event aﬀecting the group.
Let the CCF probability for component type k be deﬁned by θtku, such that θtku 
tθ
tku
r uMk  tθ
tku
1 , θ
tku
2 , ..., θ
tku
Mk
u, r being the total number of components aﬀected by the
failure event, and
°Mk
r1 θ
tku
r  1. In eﬀect, θ
tku
r denotes the probability of an additional
r  1 components failing, following the failure of a type k component, in conformity
with the α-factor model. A key requirement, therefore, is that CCF probabilities are
expressed according to this model. Probabilities expressed according to the Multiple
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Greek Letter model would need to be converted as outlined in Ref. [104]
H  tHkruKmaxtξu | Hkr 
$&
% θ
tku
r If r ¤Mk
0 otherwise
(7.1)
In the most general sense, the notation established in the preceding paragraph could
as well be used for component types immune to CCF. For this special case, θtku1  1
and θtkur  0 for all r ¡ 1, which by deﬁnition, means, the probability of no additional
component failing, following the failure of a type k component is 1. Leaning on this fact,
the CCF matrix, H, is introduced to deﬁne the CCF characteristics of a system with a
mix of component types susceptible and immune to CCF. H is a K maxtξu matrix,
where ξ  tM1,M2, ...,MK1,MKu is the set of number of components, Mk | k 
1, 2, ...,K, in each group. Each row of H, therefore, deﬁnes the CCF characteristics of
the component type corresponding to the index of that row, as outlined as in Equation
7.1. The attributes of H impose two constraints;
1. A component can only belong to one CCG. This implies, CCF events in one CCG
are independent of the CCF events in other CCGs. They can, however, still induce
cascading failures in these CCGs.
2. For a given component type k, all its Mk components must belong to the same
CCG. What this means is, no component should be immune to a CCF to which
some components of the same type are susceptible. Strictly speaking, in real life,
it is unlikely to have a CCF aﬀecting only a fraction of the components of a given
type. However, on its unlikely occurrence, I suggest the components be segregated
into two new component types, based on their susceptibility to CCF.
These constraints should, therefore, be kept in mind when deﬁning component types.
As a rule-of-thumb, every component type should be viewed as a CCG, and deﬁned as
such, whether or not it is susceptible to CCF. This, indeed, is logical, since components
of the same type have similar characteristics, and would, therefore, be inﬂuenced by the
same common-cause event.
With the CCF modelling procedure outlined, the remainder of this section details
CCF propagation during system simulation. Recalling simulation entails recreating the
actual operating principles of a system, a very simple procedure for propagating CCF,
following the failure of a component is proposed. When a member of a CCG fails,
there could be 0, 1, 2 up to Mk  1 additional component failures. The total number of
component failures is determined by the CCF matrix, as discussed earlier. Therefore,
following a component failure, the number of additional components to fail is ﬁrst
deduced. This is achieved by generating a uniform random number, U , between 0 and
1 and comparing it to the cumulative sum, H1, of H. H1 is the cumulative sum of the
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Algorithm 10 Procedure for propagating CCF.
Require: x1, ρ, F, D, H1, C, k
1: function PropagateCCF(x1, ρ, F, D, H1, C, k)
2: if H 1k1 Ð 1 or ρ
tku ÐH then
3: go to line 16  Exit if CCF is not possible
4: end if
5: get r  Get number of components to fail
6: if r ¡ 1 then  Multiple components aﬀected
7: Z Ð set of pr  1q components from ρtku
8: ρtku Ð ρtku Z  Remove components
9: px1, kq Ð| ρtku |  Update state vector
10: F  FYZ  Update failed nodes
11: for j P Z do  Loop over components
12: px1,F,ρq ÐRemoveDualNodes(..., j)
13: px1,F,ρq ÐCascadeFailure(x1, ..., j)
14: end for
15: end if
16: return (x1, F, ρ)
17: end function
elements of H along each row, from left to right. Thus,
H1  tH 1kruKmaxtξu | H 1kr 
r¸
r1
Hkr (7.2)
The total number, r, of components involved in the CCF of a type k component is equal
to the index of the smallest element of the kth row of matrix H1 greater than or equal
to U , expressed as r  mintn, n  1, n  2, ...,maxtξuu | H 1kn ¥ U .
If r ¡ 1, r  1 components, excluding the one initiating the CCF, are randomly
chosen from the set, ρtku, of components of type k. The selected components are those
aﬀected by the CCF event. The condition r  1 denotes the scenario when no additional
components are aﬀected by the failure of the ﬁrst component. On the other hand, if
the cardinality of ρtku is less than or equal to r  1, all the active type k components
would fail. As in Algorithms 8 and 9, each failed component is removed from ρtku, with
F and x1 updated accordingly. Algorithms 8 and 9 are also applied to the component,
to ensure dual nodes and cascading failures are accounted for, respectively. Since all
the components aﬀected by the CCF event belong to the same component type (see
the assumptions in this section), they can be removed from ρtku and added to F, each
in just one step, without needing a for or while loop. Algorithm 10 summarises CCF
propagation, following the failure of a component. Line 2 of this algorithm checks
whether or not the component failure can induce CCF in other components. The
condition H 1k1  1 means type k components are not susceptible to CCF while ρ
tku  H
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suggests none of these components is active, explaining why the algorithm is terminated.
7.3.4 The Simulation Algorithm
Prior to simulation, each system component is assigned a positive integer, i | i P
t1, 2, ...,Mu, representing its index in the system. The numbering starts with the com-
ponents that actually make up the topology of the system, ending with external nodes.
These components are then segregated into groups, according to their similarities. For
the purpose of this work, the words, component and node, will be used interchangeably
to refer to any element that eﬀects the operation of the system.
Let fkptq denote the common failure time distribution for all components of type k
and f , the global set containing fkptq for all k P t1, 2, ...,Ku. To prepare the system
for simulation, set the initial state vector, x1, to tM1,M2, ...,MK1,MKu and the set,
F, of failed components to H, since all the components are initially working. For the
same reason, the survival signature, Sτ px1q, at the initial time step, j0  1, is assigned
a value of 1. The set, ρ, the CCF matrix, H, the cascade matrix, C, and the global set
of duals, D, are also deﬁned. Finally, the mission time, Tm, is divided into equal time
steps of magnitude δ, and the survival function, Rptq, preallocated as a vector of zeros,
with each element corresponding to a time step. The survival function, in other words,
is deﬁned as, Rptq  t0uδt , where δt is the number of time steps.
At time t  0, the failure time of each of the M  M2 components of the system is
sampled from its appropriate distribution and stored in τ . From τ , the next transition
time, t, and the component, i, to fail are deduced. t is equivalent to the minimum
element of τ and i, its index in the set. The simulation is then shifted to this time, at
which point the number of time steps, j, t represents is computer as rt{δs. Elements j0
to j of the survival function, R ptq, are each incremented by Sτ px1q. The type, k, of the
component is determined, the component is removed from ρtku, added to the set of failed
components, and x1 modiﬁed to reﬂect the changes. Where necessary, Algorithms 8, 9,
and 10 are invoked to remove dual nodes, cascade failures, and propagate CCF across
the system, respectively. The next transition times of the failed components are set to
inﬁnity and j0 set to j   1. Again, the next transition time, t, and component, i, are
determined and the cycle restarts. This procedure continues until t ¡ Tm or Sτ px1q  0,
which ever occurs ﬁrst. The second condition is satisﬁed only when the non-repairable
system is failed, explaining why the simulation is terminated on its occurrence.
The sequence of events described in the preceding paragraph accounts for only one
simulation sample. Since component failures are random in nature, this sequence should
be repeated for an appreciable number of times. The eﬀective survival function of the
system is obtained by dividing the ﬁnal value of Rptq by the number of simulation sam-
ples, N . It is, however, worthwhile noting that the accuracy of the outcome is inﬂuenced
by the values of N and δ. A large N and a small δ (relative to the mission time), guar-
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Algorithm 11 System simulation procedure.
Require: H1, N , ρ, f , C, D
1: function Simulate(H1, N , ρ, f , C, D)
2: x1 Ð tM1,M2, ...,MK1,MKu  Initialise x
3: Rptq Ð t0uδt  Initialise survival function
4: τ Ð t0uM M
2
 Initialise τ
5: j0 Ð 1  Deﬁne initial time step
6: FÐH  Deﬁne initial set of failed components
7: Sτ px
1q Ð 1  Set survival signature to 1
8: for k Ð 1 to K do  Loop over component type
9:
 
τ ,ρtku

Ð fkptqsMk  Sample failures
10: end for
11: rt, is Ð mintτ u  Get next failure time and i
12: while t ¤ Tm and Sτ px
1q ¡ 0 do
13: j Ð rt{δs  Get the number of time steps
14: pRptq, j0 Ñ jq Ð pRptq, j0 Ñ jq   Sτ px
1q
15: k Ðcomponent type of node i
16: ρtku Ð ρtku  i  Remove i from set
17: px1, kq Ð| ρtku |  Update state vector
18: F  FY i  Update set of failed nodes
19: px1,F,ρq ÐRemoveDualNodes(x1, ..., i)
20: px1,F,ρq ÐCascadeFailure(x1, ..., i)
21: px1,F,ρq ÐPropagateCCF(x1, ..., k)
22: pτ ,Fq Ð 8  Update transition times
23: j0 Ð j   1  Set next initial time step
24: rt, is Ð mintτ u  Get next failure time and i
25: end while
26: if j0 ¤ n and Sτ px
1q ¡ 0 then
27: pRptq, j0 Ñ nq Ð pRptq, j0 Ñ nq   Sτ px
1q
28: end if
29: Repeat lines 5 to 28 N times
30: Rptq  RptqN
31: return (Rptq)
32: end function
antee an accurate Rptq. Algorithm 11 summarises the simulation procedure, which is
diﬀerent from the Algorithms proposed by Patelli and Feng [111], as the proposed pro-
cedure considers dependencies and multiple failure modes. The block of code between
lines 26 and 28 updates the survival function after the last component failure. The
notation, fkptqsMk, on line 9 denotes Mk random failure times sampled from fkptq.
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Figure 7.1: An arbitrary multi-component complex network.
7.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is the study of how the variation in the output of a mathematical
model is apportioned to variations in its inputs [14]. In a complex system with multiple
CCGs, each CCG may have a unique eﬀect on the system's survivability.
Consider a complex system with K component types and its CCG matrix, H. The
relative inﬂuence of the various CCGs on the reliability of the system is a vital decision-
support information [77]. The computation of this relative sensitivity entails analysing
the system with only one CCG active, for all the CCGs. To compute the eﬀect of
CCG i, Hk1 is set to 1 and Hk2, Hk3, ...,HkMk to 0, for all k  i. This is equivalent
to replacing all rows other than i, of H, with the y-element vector, r1, 0, ..., 0s, where
y  maxtξu. The most critical CCG is the one producing the least deviation from
the reliability of the system with all CCGs active. Since simulation provides the time-
dependent system reliability, the proposed approach can reveal the evolution, over time,
of the relative criticality of the CCGs. The sensitivity of this relative criticality to the
mean-time-to-failure (MTTF) of the component groups can also be investigated.
7.4 Case Studies
To illustrate how the proposed modelling and simulation approach is applied in practice,
two case studies will be considered in this section. Though only numerical examples, the
case studies have been carefully designed to reﬂect the every-day problems encountered
by the system engineer in industry. I, therefore, believe they set the tone for the
applicability of the proposed approach to realistic problems. To validate the approach,
the solutions obtained are compared to the existing analytical survival signature-based
approach [30,49], as well as a simulation approach based on a modiﬁcation of the load-
ﬂow approach proposed in Chapters 3 and 4. The modiﬁed load-ﬂow simulator is the
same as Algorithm 11, save for the replacement of Sτ px1q with a structure function
that is assigned the value 1 for non-zero ﬂows across the system and 0, otherwise.
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Table 7.1: Failure time distribution data and CCF parameters of component groups.
Component Type Distribution Type Distribution Parameters CCF Parameters
1 Weibull (1.8,2.2) {0.95, 0.05}
2 Exponential 1.2 {0.8, 0.1, 0.05, 0.05}
3 Weibull (2.3,1.6) {1}
4 Weibull (3.2,2.6) {0.9, 0.1}
5 Exponential 2.1 {0.75, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05}
7.4.1 Case Study 1: A Complex Bridge Network
Shown in Figure 7.1 is an arbitrary 13-component complex system, which components
are arranged into ﬁve groups. The number within each box denotes which group the
component belongs to while the number outside deﬁnes the index of the component in
the system. Components of the same group are assumed to have the same failure time
distribution, as deﬁned in Table 7.1. The CCF parameters deﬁne the probabilities of
a given number of components being aﬀected by a CCF event and correspond to the
α-factor CCF model. In the table, an exponential distribution is deﬁned by its mean
(in hours) while a Weibull distribution is deﬁned by a set in which the ﬁrst element is
its scale parameter (in hours) and the second element, its shape parameter.
7.4.1.1 Analyses and Results
The system is ﬁrst analysed with and without CCF, using the proposed simulation model
and the data in Table 7.1. For this system, ξ  t2, 4, 1, 2, 4u and the CCF matrices,
with and without CCF, are as expressed in Equations 7.3 and 7.4, respectively.
H 


0.95 0.05 0 0
0.8 0.1 0.05 0.05
1 0 0 0
0.9 0.1 0 0
0.75 0.1 0.1 0.05


(7.3)
H 


1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0


(7.4)
To validate the proposed approach and demonstrate its generality, it was used to
analyse the system, with and without dependencies. The system was then re-analysed,
in separate instances, using load-ﬂow simulation and an analytical algorithm based on
Equation 2.3 in Section 2.5.1. The analytical algorithm was used only for the case
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Figure 7.2: System reliability with depen-
dencies ignored.
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Figure 7.3: System reliability with depen-
dencies considered.
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component MTTF.
without dependencies, due to its inapplicability to the other. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show
the system reliability plots for a mission time of 3.5 hours and 5 104 samples.
The relative sensitivity of the system survival function to the Common-Cause Groups
(CCG) was also investigated. The system was analysed considering CCF in all the CCGs
(designated full CCG), with no CCF, and CCF in only one group at a time, for all the
CCGs. The results obtained are plotted in Figure 7.4, from which the critical CCG
is deduced, as described in Section 7.3.5. Figure 7.5 shows the variation of this CCG
with component mean-time-to-failure (MTTF), as a function of time. The factor, kf ,
denotes the number by which the nominal MTTF presented in Table 7.1 is multiplied.
For an exponential distribution, the new mean becomes λ0kf , where λ0 is its nominal
mean. The MTTF of a component with a failure time following a Weibull distribution
is varied by keeping the shape parameter constant, while varying the scale parameter.
If α0 is the nominal scale parameter, the new scale parameter becomes α0kf .
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Table 7.2: Comparison of computation times (in seconds).
Dependencies Ignored With Dependencies
Survival Signature computation 92.00 92.00
Analytical technique 0.29 n/a
Proposed technique 32.50 32.80
Load-Flow simulation 2300.00 1654.00
7.4.1.2 Discussions
The accuracy and generality of the proposed simulation approach are validated by the
plots in Figures 7.2 and 7.3, given the agreement between the results yielded by the
various techniques. As highlighted in Figure 7.4, the reliability of the system reduces
drastically when the eﬀects of CCF are factored into the analysis. It exempliﬁes the
need to consider this realistic aspect of a system's operation in its reliability evaluation.
The ﬁgure also reveals CCG-2 as the most critical and CCG-3, the least critical. The
latter, however, is not surprising, as CCG-3 is made up of only one component, inferring
its immunity to CCF. Figure 7.5 shows that the criticality of a CCG may or may not
remain ﬁxed during the mission, depending on the MTTF of its components. For
instance, for kf  1, corresponding to the nominal values presented in Table 7.1, CCG-
2 is initially the most critical until at time, t  2.5 hours, when it is overtaken by
CCG-5. A diﬀerent trend, however, is realised with kf  0.5, for instance. The essence
of the results presented in Figure 7.5 could be appreciated on two fronts;
1. Since the most critical CCG is a function of the MTTF of its components, there
is suﬃcient incentive for the system operator to re-identify the most critical CCG
after every component replacement.
2. Given limited resources, the operator can eﬃciently allocate mitigating resources
during the mission. For instance, with kf  0.5, resources should be allocated to
CCG-2 for 0 ¤ t ¤ 1.36, CCG-5 for 1.36 ¤ t ¤ 1.57, and CCG-1 for t ¥ 2.
Though the proposed approach yields the same outcome as the load-ﬂow simulation
and analytical techniques, it requires less computational eﬀort than the former but more
than the latter, as summarised in Table 7.2. The table provides the recorded wall clock
times for each approach, when the system was analysed on a 2GHz Intel(R) Core(TM)
i5-4590T computer. Row 1 of the table provides the time it took to derive the survival
signature of the system, for all its possible state vectors. This time is ﬁxed, with or
without dependencies, since the survival signature depends only on the system topology.
In survival signature-based techniques, the structure function of a system is com-
puted once for each of its state vectors. In load-ﬂow simulation, however, the simu-
lation computes the ﬂow through the system for every component failure. Therefore,
there could be up to N load-ﬂow calculations per state vector, in an N sample sim-
ulation. This explains why the proposed approach is more eﬃcient, even when both
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Figure 7.6: Schematic of a 50MW hydroelectric power plant.
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Figure 7.7: Condensed block diagram of the plant.
are simulation-based. Its computational superiority is most appreciated when employed
to solve a problem requiring repeated system evaluations. For instance, if the system
under consideration were analysed n times with dependencies ignored, the proposed
approach would take 92  32.5n seconds and the load-ﬂow simulation, 2300n seconds.
7.4.2 Case Study 2: A Hydroelectric Power Plant
In this case-study, a two-unit hydroelectric power plant adapted from the ﬁrst case
study in Chapter 5, and which schematic is shown in Figure 7.6, is analysed. It is
a slightly modiﬁed model of the Bumbuna hydroelectric power plant; a 50MW plant
in Sierra Leone. Its two units are similar, and each, rated 25MW consists a butterﬂy
valve, turbine, generator, and circuit breaker. The power generated by the units is
synchronized in the synchronizing unit and fed to the step-up transformers for onward
transmission. The equivalent reliability block diagram of the plant is presented in Figure
7.7, where the Penstock and Synchronising unit have been neglected due to their very
high reliability. CB3, which has two failure modes, is of a make diﬀerent from that
of CB1 and CB2. Its failure in mode 1 forces the failure of CB1 while its failure in
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Table 7.3: Failure time distribution data and CCF parameters of plant components.
Component Type Components Distribution Type Distribution Parameters CCF Parameters
1 1 Weibull p3, 1.8q t1, 0u
2 2,3 Weibull p1.8, 2.3q t0.9, 0.1u
3 4,5 Weibull p4, 3q t0.8, 0.2u
4 6,7 Weibull p2.1, 2.6q t0.85, 0.15u
5 8,9 Exponential 4 t0.8, 0.2u
6 10 Exponential 3.85 t1, 0u
7 11,12 Gamma p3, 1q t0.82, 0.18u
8 13 Hazard Function 2t t1, 0u
9 14 Hazard Function t2   t{100 t1, 0u
1 2
3
10 11
CG
TB1
TB2
4
5
T1
T2
6
7
G1
G2
8
9
CB1
CB2
CB3
TX1
TX2
12
In
Out
13 14
A B
A B
Cascade failure of B due to A
A & B are dual nodes
Figure 7.8: Plant block diagram showing interdependencies.
mode 2 forces the failure of TX2. The dam is contaminated with impurities that induce
failure in CG and T2, at a rate of 2t per year, where t is the time spent in operation.
T1, however, is conservatively assumed immune to this impurity. The goal of this case
study is to compute the reliability of the plant for a mission time of two years.
fk ptq  hk ptq e

³t
0 hkpuqdu
Fk ptq  1 e

³t
0 hkpuqdu
(7.5)
H 


1 0
0.9 0.1
0.8 02
0.85 0.15
0.8 0.2
1 0
0.82 0.18
1 0
1 0


C 
p8, 11q 1
p10, 8q 1
p13, 1q 1
p13, 5q 1
p14, 12q 1
(7.6)
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Table 7.4: Comparison of computation times (in seconds).
Dependencies Ignored With Dependencies
Survival Signature 34.20 34.20
Analytical technique 0.07 n/a
Proposed technique 29.00 32.80
Load-Flow simulation 757.70 486.40
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Figure 7.9: Plant reliability with dependen-
cies ignored.
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Figure 7.10: Plant reliability with depen-
dencies considered.
7.4.2.1 Analyses and Results
The impurity aﬀecting CG & T2 and the second failure mode of CB3 can each be rep-
resented by an external node, as proposed in Section 7.3.1. The impurity is assigned
a component ID of 13 and failure mode 2 of CB3, a component ID of 14. The latter
is also the dual of node 10, since they both represent diﬀerent failure modes of the
same component, CB3. In Figure 7.8 is the ﬁnal block diagram of the plant, showing
cascading dependencies. The components, including the external nodes have been or-
ganised into 9 component groups/types depending on their similarity in functionality,
make, and failure characteristics. Table 7.3 presents these component groups, their
composition, failure time distribution (in years), and CCF parameters. In the table,
Hazard Function" as a distribution type suggests only the hazard rate, hk ptq, of fail-
ures is known for that component type. Given hk ptq, however, the probability density
function, fk ptq, and the cumulative density function, Fk ptq, for type k can be obtained
as in Equation 7.5. For the plant, ξ  t1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1u, D10  t14u, D14  t10u,
and Di  H@i R t10, 14u. The plant's CCF matrix, H and cascade matrix, C, deﬁned
as a sparse matrix, are given in Equation 7.6.
As in the ﬁrst case study, the plant was analysed using 5 104 simulation samples
and the same reliability evaluation techniques used in that case study, with depen-
dencies neglected. It was then re-analysed using the proposed technique and load-ﬂow
simulation, but this time considering dependencies. The computation time in each case,
in seconds of wall clock time, was recorded as presented in Table 7.4 while Figures 7.9
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Figure 7.11: The eﬀects of dependencies on plant reliability.
and 7.10 show the plots of the results obtained. The plant was also analysed separately,
with CCF neglected (denoted Cascade only) and then with cascading failures neglected
(denoted CCF only). The results obtained were plotted on the same axes, as shown
in Figure 7.11, to lay bare, the eﬀects of dependencies, as well as the relative inﬂu-
ence of CCF and cascading failures on the reliability of the plant. The plot designated
`Fully Dependent' denotes the reliability of the plant when the failure of any compo-
nent triggers the simultaneous failure of all the remaining components of the plant. The
assumption, in other words, eﬀectively reduces the plant to a series-connected system.
7.4.2.2 Discussions
Figures 7.9 and 7.10 further validate the accuracy and generality of the proposed ap-
proach. As in case study 1, Table 7.4 shows the proposed approach to be somewhere
between the analytical and load-ﬂow techniques, in terms of computational eﬃciency.
As expected, the reliability of the plant is maximum, with dependencies neglected and
least, otherwise. The eﬀects of cascading failures, however, are prominent, according
to Figure 7.11. This can be attributed to the eﬀects of the contamination of the dam
on the control gate (CG), since the failure of the latter induces the failure of the plant.
The reliability of the plant when it is assumed independent and that when it is assumed
fully dependent, represent the bounds on its reliability. These bounds can ensure an
informed decision when the full extent and nature of interdependencies are unknown.
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7.5 Chapter Summary
Dependent failures can impose adverse eﬀects on the reliability and performance of a
multi-component system. They are normally a consequence of functional and induced
couplings between components, due to a variety of possible reasons. Thus, there is an
inevitability about the susceptibility of realistic multi-component engineering systems
to them. The need, therefore, to incorporate dependency considerations into system
reliability analysis is overwhelming, if an accurate reliability estimate is required.
In this chapter, an approach that extends the applicability of the system survival
signature-based approach to system reliability evaluation to systems susceptible to de-
pendent failures has been proposed. Being a hybrid technique, it inherits the desirable
attributes of both the system survival signature and Monte Carlo Simulation. Conse-
quently, it overcomes the issues of topological complexity, diversity in component failure
time distributions, and complexities in inter-component interactions. Since the survival
signature of a system is computed prior to its reliability evaluation and given this sig-
nature is static for a ﬁxed system topology, the proposed approach is ideal for reliabil-
ity/maintenance optimization and sensitivity/uncertainty analyses. The approach has
been shown to be computationally eﬃcient, albeit less eﬃcient than the analytical ap-
proach, which, however, is inapplicable to systems with dependent failures. This leaves
the proposed approach the most eﬃcient alternative for realistic engineering systems.
It is probably noteworthy to clarify at this point that the Common-Cause and cas-
cading failure modelling strategies proposed in Chapters 4 and 6 could have been used
to model dependencies in the proposed approach. However, those modelling strategies
are optimized for multi-state components, and are, therefore, a little complicated for
binary-state components. Since survival signature is a terminology suited to binary-
state systems, it was necessary to develop their simpler binary-state equivalents.
This chapter has also shown how the approach is used to obtain key system reliability
indices. Knowledge of the most critical Common-Cause Group, for instance, and how it
varies with time and component MTTF, could inﬂuence the limited resource allocation
in the mitigation of Common-Cause Failures. The proposed approach, therefore, can be
used as a decision-support tool in the operation and management of complex systems.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Concluding Remarks
Public resistance to nuclear power generation has increased dramatically, since the
Fukushima Daiichi incident in 2011 [67]. Communities are gradually becoming wary of
its evident risks, which wariness is exacerbated by the growing prospect of nuclear pro-
liferation by rogue states. Consequently, states have become genuinely cautious about
investing in new nuclear power technologies. Taiwan, for instance, halted the construc-
tion of its fourth nuclear power plant in 2014, following a public outcry triggered by
the Fukushima incident. Engineers, therefore, are challenged with the responsibility of
improving the safety of nuclear power plants and assuring the public of minimal conse-
quences, should something go wrong. This calls for the design of reliable and resilient
systems, which are subjected to a constant performance monitoring and evaluation.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a framework that assesses what can go wrong
in a system with its ensuing consequences, and is in extensive use in the nuclear power
industry. It has been used for regulatory purposes, among other tasks, to compare
designs and to obtain relevant licenses. System reliability analysis, which investigates
how well a system performs its intended functions, sits at the heart of this framework.
The quality and computational cost, therefore, of a PRA, is inﬂuenced by the robustness,
as well as the intuitiveness of its underlying system reliability modelling and evaluation
scheme. When modelling the reliability of a system, the scheme used would depend
largely on the complexity of the system, the level of accuracy demanded, the reliability
indices required, and the preference of the analyst. Since every scheme has its own merits
and demerits, selecting the best, therefore, requires a lot of trade-oﬀ considerations.
System complexity, in my opinion, is the greatest determinant of which scheme is
most plausible for the reliability analysis of a given system. Complexity here encom-
passes topological complexities, component interdependencies, multi-state component
attributes, complex maintenance strategies, and any other attribute which inhibits the
application of simple reliability engineering reasoning to the system. For these systems,
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research places simulation-based schemes ahead, for a realistic analysis of their reliabil-
ity, despite the relatively higher computational intensity of simulation-based schemes.
This, however, is not a problem, given the emergence of parallel computing technology.
The applicability of the existing simulation frameworks, however, is inhibited when
the system being analysed can exist in multiple performance levels. In this case, all the
performance levels would have to be known/deduced in advance and a multi-state fault
tree deﬁned for each. This is not only a painstaking process, but one with the capacity
to inadvertently introduce errors in the reliability evaluation process. In addition, the
reliability of systems prone to ﬂow losses and systems that implement reconﬁguration
following certain failure events, can not be easily computed by these frameworks.
In this thesis, therefore, an intuitive simulation framework, applicable to binary and
multi-state systems of any topology, has been developed. It does not require the prior
deﬁnition of the structure function, minimal cut sets, or the minimal path sets of the
system. Instead, it employs a linear programming algorithm and the principles of ﬂow
conservation to compute the actual ﬂow through the system. Thus, it can model ﬂow
losses and implement reconﬁguration requirements relatively easily. It also accounts for
all forms of interdependencies in realistic systems using an intuitive matrix representa-
tion. These attributes render the framework intuitive and generally applicable.
Maintenance being a key determinant of the reliability and resilience of an engi-
neering system, the framework is equipped with a robust maintenance modelling and
optimization scheme. The scheme takes cognisance of realistic operational constraints
like limited maintenance teams, delayed availability of spares, priority maintenance,
and operational uncertainties. The climax, arguably, of this doctoral research is the
application of the simulation framework developed, to model station blackout accidents
in nuclear power plants. Illustrated, also in this thesis, is how the results obtained can
be incorporated into the existing PRA framework, highlighting the wide applicability,
as well as compatibility with legacy techniques, of the simulation framework.
While the framework is optimized for multi-state systems, it can be grossly ineﬃ-
cient for binary-state systems in which at least 2 components are identical. For this
reason, a survival signature-based simulation approach was developed in conjunction,
for non-repairable systems susceptible to common-cause and cascading failures. The
survival signature of a system is a function of its topology only, and, therefore, unique
to that system. Consequently, it is calculated just once and reused in multiple reliability
analyses of the same system. This feature eﬀectively reduces the reliability evaluation
of the system to the analysis of the failure probabilities of its component, which is com-
putationally much cheaper. Though applied to non-repairable systems in this doctoral
study, the approach is extendible to maintainable systems without loss of generality.
In summary, the proposed framework can be used to model and evaluate the reli-
ability of complex systems, identify complex maintenance strategies, aid in the level 1
probabilistic risk assessment of nuclear power plants, and even mitigate the impact of
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targeted attacks on systems. The framework is implemented in the open-source uncer-
tainty quantiﬁcation toolbox, OpenCossan [109,110], to render it readily available.
8.2 Recommendations for Future Work
This doctoral study was aimed at developing a robust and reliable computational frame-
work that transcends the existing frameworks for the reliability analysis of realistic
engineering systems. Though this, as highlighted in the preceding section, has been
achieved, there still is room for improvement. The following, therefore, is an overview
of the relevant shortfalls of the framework developed, with recommendations.
1. Like all simulation-based techniques, the framework developed is computationally
demanding. It is, therefore, prudent to explore tangible avenues of improving its
computational eﬃciency. One of these could be:
(a) developing an analytical approximation to the framework;
(b) employing machine learning or other techniques with the potential to re-
duce the number of load-ﬂow calculations per sample or the total number of
samples required for an accurate outcome;
(c) developing an analytical survival signature-based approach to model systems
susceptible to both common-cause and cascading failures.
2. The maintenance strategy optimization scheme proposed identiﬁes the best strat-
egy from a predeﬁned set of strategies. This implies, the optimal strategy yielded
is only the local optima, which can also be the true optima but only if the pre-
deﬁned set contains the optimal strategy. I am of the opinion that a single main-
tenance strategy cannot yield the absolute optimal system performance. Instead,
a set of strategies is required, such that certain strategies are useful only within
certain periods of the mission. For instance, only a few maintenance resources
are required at the beginning of a mission, when the components are still new.
As the mission progresses, however, the components start ageing and the mainte-
nance resources required for optimal system performance increase. It suﬃces to
say, therefore, that the optimal number of maintenance teams is time-dependent.
Consequently, assigning a ﬁxed number of maintenance teams to the system may
result in the incurring of costs that would otherwise be prevented by a dynamic
allocation, especially at the early stages of the mission. A real-time maintenance
optimization scheme, where maintenance decisions are made during system analy-
sis, therefore, is recommended. The maintenance decisions should take cognisance
of the current state of the system, the remaining lives of its components, and the
outcomes of similar decisions made in the past. This requirement, however, may
necessitate the invocation of artiﬁcial intelligence techniques. The scheme, also,
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would require just one system evaluation, compared to the tens or even hundreds
(depending on the system and the number of maintenance strategies) of system
evaluations the current scheme employs.
3. Though not illustrated in this thesis, the developed framework can also be used
to evaluate the reliability of a system with epistemic uncertainties in the failure
parameters of its components. This is achieved via repeated model evaluations,
in a double loop Monte Carlo scheme. The scheme is designated so because, the
framework being repeatedly evaluated (inner loop) is Monte Carlo-based, and so
is the outer loop sampling the parameters used to evaluate it. It is, therefore, not
diﬃcult to realise the ineﬃciency of this scheme and the need for a better one.
Modelling the imprecise component failure parameters as p-boxes [50,65] or inter-
vals [80] and propagating them through the framework may be computationally
more eﬃcient. The task, therefore, is ﬁnding the best way to go about this.
4. In most critical applications, the system operator is most interested in how quickly
the system recovers after failure or how quickly it reacts to mitigate the conse-
quences of an undesirable event. The ability of a system to maintain its normal
operation following a perturbation is a measure of its resilience. The outcomes
of the application of the framework developed in this doctoral study to a recon-
ﬁgurable oﬀshore oil installation and AC power recovery during station blackout
accidents, have shown its potential applicability to resilience engineering. In both
applications, however, the reconﬁguration requirements and the sequence of oper-
ator response were predeﬁned. This is not the case in practice, especially when the
set of possible reconﬁguration options or operator response sequences is large or
unbounded. A real-time decision support tool, therefore, is recommended. Such
a tool can provide the best system reconﬁguration procedure and the optimal
sequence of operator response, following an undesirable event. Since the exact
status of the system is in most cases not known during a crisis, the tool should be
capable of modelling the epistemic uncertainties in the current states of the system
and its components and make a decision in the presence of these uncertainties.
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